



# FRAGMENTS OF A WORLD MIND

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## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

THE contents of this book, as the title indicates, were not planned to form part of any treatise, except for the chapter on Economics after Marx. They are a collection of articles and statements some of which have been published in this country and abroad. The subjects and issues are varied and some of the latter may have apparently vanished only to reappear in some other shape in a different scene.

Written, dictated or delivered extempore at different periods, the articles, statements and speeches apparently isolated from each other, are recognizable as facets of one and the same idea.



## CONTENTS

TITLE	PAGE
1. Some Fundamentals of a World Mind . . . . .	1
2. The Third Camp in World Affairs . . . . .	6
3. Post-script to Korea . . . . .	37
4. An International Aspect of Communism . . . . .	43
5. The Farmer in India . . . . .	55
6. Hinduism . . . . .	112
7. India and Pakistan . . . . .	126
8. India and Pakistan (Contd.) . . . . .	146
9. Arab World and Iran . . . . .	152
10. U. N. Vote on "China—the Aggressor" . . . . .	159
11. An Interview on Kashmir . . . . .	161
12. A Himalayan Policy . . . . .	165
13. Economics after Marx . . . . .	172
14. An Asian Policy . . . . .	232



## SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF A WORLD MIND

Peace and non-violence have no direct or immediate relevance to the situation in Europe. Several cities of Europe look like hollow ghosts at night and the use of the atom bomb by both sides in a war threatens many more with a similar fate. Yet the anti-war sentiment is weaker today than 16 years ago when I was last in Europe.

No matter what pacifists may say, peace is in conflict with sentiment and reason; the morality and the desire for peace are in conflict with the morality and the desire for free growth.

Every one dislikes war but almost every one dislikes slavery even more. The people of Europe are a little more weary but also a little more resigned to the acceptance of war as a last defence of freedom and growth. Mahatma Gandhi has not yet come to Europe nor ever shall, as long as those who speak in his name fix peace as their central aim and make moral appeals, which are eminently reasonable, but stop just short of being completely reasonable. In India, non-violence went side by side with freedom and growth, and was a corollary, perhaps as weighty as the theorem, but nevertheless a corollary.

Until peace and non-violence can be convincingly correlated to freedom and growth, it is an expensive exaggeration to speak of a European Gandhism.

Freedom and growth are today in Europe embodied in the two symbols of capitalism and communism, the images growing mightier and their swords nearer a clash as time passes. Any other image before which men could burn the incense of their passion and not of ritual does not yet exist.

Socialism or the Third Force is fast turning into a ritual; it is so deeply identified with either capitalism or communism according to its local habitat that its features melt and is, therefore, not cohesive nor powerful enough to be a world image.

Mankind has ceased to think. In spite of the great ideological debates, there is a fertility and fulness of old theories and new slogans but a poverty of thought. Thinking has ceased to be creative. It is propagandist. Ideas are designed and tested for their value to one or the other of the two power blocs.

Facts are forced into the rigid frame-work of old ideas; free inter-play between facts and ideas has ceased to be; some kind of dread of new voyaging has come over men; they cling to the shores of thought reached fifty years ago.

That is why ideas have never before been such a complete servant of force as today. Force has often enough served idea in the past; the relationship is completely reversed today. The stage is perhaps not yet when the use of force can be abandoned altogether. But the question of all questions stridently urging an answer is, which shall serve what; shall idea serve force or force, idea.

Incidentally, the two rigid ideas of communism and capitalism, so mortally in combat, bear a close kinship; both are doctrines of political and economic centralisation, of force, of technical and organisational efficiency, of seeing in any one people the image for others to follow, of environmentalism.

As pointers of creative thinking, one must locate and list the world's main diseases and seek the remedies.

Regional inequality in production is the world's most dangerous and obstinate disease. An hour of labour in the United States produces three times as much as in Europe and fifteen to twenty times as much as in Asia or Africa. Side by side with these many worlds in economics, one world in politics is an impossibility.

Furthermore, world trade and economy cannot expand until this great rock is removed. The now oft-spoken desire in advanced economies to help retarded economies is a ritual and at best a scratch on the problem. Entire economic theories will have to be re-stated and techniques of engineering remodelled.

## SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF A WORLD MIND

As an illustration in theory, I suggest that the doctrine of full employment now being used for theories of world trade and social security has to yield place to the doctrine of relatively equal productivity. In the same way, small-unit technique, power-driven of course, as distinct from large-scale technique, is the securer road in engineering to achieve new formations of capital on a world scale. The problem of relatively equal production in all regions and of new formations of capital on a world-scale can, therefore, be solved not by charitable ritual or one-way assistance but by mutual help and a supreme effort in economic thinking and engineering practice.

Political inequalities among peoples still prevail. The peoples of the world must immediately enjoy equality of rights and their freedom and unity must be restored to them on the basis of democracy and human rights. A violation of ideas takes place when one speaks of the internationalisation of the Ruhr without at the same time wanting to internationalise Pittsburg or Newcastle or Brittany or Jharia or the Donetz.

Furthermore, preaching of curtailment of national sovereignty does not make sense in over three-fourths of the world where it is already curtailed; the national sovereignty of the two or three big powers alone requires to be curtailed so as to make it of equal status with the others.

Although imperialism is speedily dying out and only ten per cent of the world's population is politically unfree, thus reducing colonialism to a marginal phenomenon, it is poisoning human relationships in devious ways. All peoples, particularly in Africa and some parts of Asia, must immediately obtain political freedom.

While equality in the relationship of peoples must be achieved, a like effort in the direction of internal equality within a people is necessary. Social security and full employment or production are not enough, although they must patently continue to be a chief aim of state policy, but to starve the hunger for equality in order to achieve them is dangerous.

Men will do mad things if their hunger for equality is not appeased. Industry must be socialised and economy planned. Social ownership and control must be decentralised to the maximum extent possible; in addition, the enjoyment of human rights which are the basis of all equality, should not be interrupted.

The inadequacy of liberal democracy has caused the challenge of proletarian dictatorship. The claims of either are being rauously raised, but neither is able to fulfil the human need which gave them birth. They cannot, for the frame of reference is common to them both. The world, liberal as well as proletarian, has hitherto known only the two-pillar state. Constitutional theories are being evolved and their elaborate applications continually reconstructed in order to achieve division of the state's functions and powers into its two limbs, the federating centre and the integrating units.

Democracy can bring warmth to the blood of the common man only when constitutional theory starts practising the state of four limbs, the village, the district, the province and the centre. Organically covered by the flesh and blood of equalities already indicated, this constitutional skeleton of the four-pillar state can bring to democracy joyous fulfilment. The time is ripe to add a fifth limb to the state, at least in theory, for a world centre is an urgent necessity.

This is a rough sketching of the new image. I have been continually asked if Russia would accept it. I may as well ask if America or England would. The point is not which government does or does not accept it, but what peoples and which organisations make it the object of their hearts' desire. A possible and reluctant use of force, like a dark interregnum, in the service of this image is not altogether denied.

People talk of a World Union and a European Union and the like and, in the process of doing so, distort this new image so hideously as to melt it into the contours of the two great giants. This image may be worshipped as a whole or not at all, for its

parts do not admit of a logical or mental sequence, although a historical sequence, the achievement of any one part earlier than another, is possible. But clever men, some of whom claim to be realistic statesmen and others equally realistic reformers, are raising what may be a regrettable historical sequence, such as the European Union or the World-government of police-powers that may precede a full Union, into a disastrous mental sequence.

Peace can come only via a World-government and this can come only via a new world-view. All those who desire a World-government must aspire to achieve a world-view of equality and against class or caste or regional inequalities.

This world-view will be barren if it waits on events and approves them or condemns them after they have taken place. It must penetrate into the texture of events as they take place weaving it with the toil of the organisational or technical eye as much as dyeing it with the warm blood of the body.

Socialism or the new world-image is sought to be achieved somewhere by parliament and cost-accountancy. Miserable attempts these, for the active spirit is dulled and stifled by the weight of bureaucratic organisation and force.

Spirit and organisation must come to terms and an adjustment in which neither is sacrificed to the other. Furthermore, the eye must necessarily redden at an act of injustice and at the fact of poverty and inequality, but it must also shed a tear. One man has proved, the first man to do so, that this joining together of wrath at class-society and sympathy with all men and things is not a political fancy but a practical possibility. Europe is dying because of the red eye without the tear and Asia of the tearful eye without the red and both are approaching a fixed and blank look.

Socialism alone can save Asia as well as Europe and, to do this, it must combine action with sympathy, abundant sympathy, and weave them both into an image and an idea whose contours are not fixed in a rigid pattern but grow ever richer in outline as well as in detail.

September, 1949.

# THE THIRD CAMP IN WORLD AFFAIRS

## I. INEFFECTIVENESS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

For 140 years of the last century and the present, India was the axis of world affairs. The military security of India was the main concern of British foreign policy, and international rivalries that dominated this period hinged around this concern.

With freedom, India changed from being an object of world politics to the status of its creator. As fettered India was the prime object of international rivalries and wars, Free India was reasonably imagined to be a maker of world peace and prosperity, if not its prime creator.

The foreign policy of Free India must pass this acid test. India has hitherto failed this test. To the world and its warring blocs she makes little difference. All specific issues of foreign policy and Free India's achievements or failures in regard to them are details of this grand disaster, that freedom of India has made no difference to the world and its ways.

Was this disaster unavoidable? To the extent that armour and industry are two main instruments of foreign policy, Free India, unavoidably weak in both for some time, would in any event have been displaced from the centre of world affairs. But ideas are at least as potent a tool in foreign policy as steel, and the constructs of a new world repose as much in men's minds as in the weapons which their hands wield. Thirty years ago Bolshevik Russia was weak in armour and industry. She attempted to construct a new world and her foreign policy was effective from the beginning.

To the immeasurable poverty in ideas and the contemptible refusal to take risks for a new hope at home and abroad, India owes her displacement from the creative centre of the world stage. Poverty and war continue to threaten Free India and the world

of which she is a part, as much as they did to enslaved India and the world of which she was then a part.

## II. Two CAMPS

As the world was split up into two contending blocs, fascist and non-fascist, before India was free, it is increasingly splitting up again into two blocs, communist and non-communist. There are indeed many other forces such as the socialist, the liberal or the newly-free nations which appear to cut across this basic division of the world. But this is mainly an appearance. None of these forces is strong enough to impress upon the world its own stamp. World politics move on the two axes of American capitalism on the one hand and Russian communism on the other and the conflict between the two.

Both these systems and forces, always poised for mortal combat, are however related in a curious kinship. Either system has taken a leader in the shape of one particular country. That leader strives to construct the world in its own image. Either system results in a high degree of centralisation, the perpetual churning up of all mankind and the creamy centres that result. There are indeed a great many distinctions between the two systems but no preference is possible, if the intention is to achieve a world of justice and peace.

The greatest tragedy that these systems have inflicted on the world is the complete subordination of idea to force. Thinking is propaganda in the service of force that either system represents.

No basic variation is tolerated and the mutuality of theory and fact is therefore completely lost. All facts must be tormented into the rigid theories of either system. Force has indeed always played a part in human affairs. In luminous periods of human existence, however, the primacy has belonged to idea. At any rate, it should. Today, force has primacy over idea. It cannot be otherwise. The human mind has lost its suppleness. It does not experiment in new construction of ideas or let theory and facts march in a gay relationship.

The division of the world into the communist and the non-communist blocs is causing a complete subordination of idea to force, an impatience with the open mind, a total incapacity to regulate human relations by sympathy and reason. Even arguing that there might be a point here and a point there that may be of advantage in the capitalist or the communist system, the question of preference and choice between them does not at all arise, in view of the creative qualities of the human mind they have murdered. They have brought thought to the end of its voyage and they must therefore die.

Capitalism is no more political democracy than communism is economic democracy. Naive notions cause great harm. Socialism and communism are often regarded as kindred doctrines, the former being milder than the latter. This notion I came across in Europe and West Asia as much as it is prevalent in India. The difference between socialism and communism does not at all consist in the question of property.

I had occasion to use a handy formula before foreign audiences. Communism is equal to socialism minus democracy, plus centralisation, plus civil war, plus Russia. There was response to this formula, for anyone can see that it correctly depicts our world in which capitalism is more kindred to communism than it is to socialism, the question of private property apart, which both socialism and communism wish to destroy. But neither the newly-won freedoms nor socialism have made any difference to the capitalist-communist clash. Socialism is often unidentifiable. On the world scale, its features melt into the one or the other system as time and place dictate. In the City of Berlin, which is more sensitive to the clash of the two systems than any other, a Congress of socialist delegates applauded when I told them that the face of socialism was blurred and not recognisable. It was the applause of the man without a face who is told so by another also like him but does so with the wish and the will to acquire one. Unless socialism or the newly-liberated nationalisms or both are able to acquire a hard clarity of features, as easily recognisable as

those of the capitalists and the communists, the mad cycle of poverty, injustice and war will run on.

### III. SOCIALISM AND WORLD OUTLOOK

Socialism is not a cohesive force on the world scale. It does not possess the international sensitivity of communism, which can always claim a world victory even if it is receding in fifty countries as against the one or two in which it is advancing. Capitalism too with its commercial federations is more world-sensitive than socialism; the emotive unity of Roman Catholicism gives capitalism a passion as well. Alone of great doctrines that prevail, socialism has hitherto been unable to acquire a world unity.

European socialism has acquired an intense practical idealism. In the countries where it rises to power, its chief concern is the living standards of its people and their social security. In the streets of socialist Stockholm, I rarely met a person who looked a worker in his dress. Housing conditions are steadily improving, so that a children's home for the poor looked a fantasy and I can recollect within me a sense of resentment at what I saw in Sweden and what I am used to see in India or saw in Egypt. The greatest concern of the socialist government in Sweden was, during the week I stayed there, over the price of milk; whether the one or two pice increase should be charged to the consumer or to the government in the shape of a subsidy to the producer. Likewise, socialist Britain had its chief problem in the nationalised health services and the like; whether the fee of a shilling should be charged for a prescription or not. Much more than any other issue, unless a war meanwhile occurs, British socialist politics will in the next few years be dominated by the desire to expand trade in the sterling area. The attempt to minimise the achievements of British or Scandinavian socialism is nonsense. They are feeding their people well, supplying them with milk and fruit and steadily improving their health and housing. Social security for the mass of the people is their great achievement. But, when that is said, this practical idealism of European socialists leaves them

little time or taste for a more unified thinking in other directions. One often gets the feeling in Europe as if socialism were statistics plus parliament.

This practical idealism drives European socialists into too narrow a nationalistic shell. Charged with the mission to feed and dress their own people, they take on themselves their immediate national needs a little too much to the detriment of the world and, also perhaps, to their own ultimate detriment. A British socialist is nearer an Indian conservative than an Indian socialist in the matter of India continuing within his empire; nearer a German conservative than a German socialist in the matter of dismantling German industry.

Such national attitudes turn international socialist organisations, like the Comisco, into a post office and nothing more. Can there be a greater condemnation of international socialism than that its conferences are never attended by front-rank men except of the country where they meet, but by second-grade functionaries of the various national parties? On the other hand, international communism, whether as a Comintern or Cominform, is a tool of coercion used by one country on all else. Must internationalism be either a post office or a prison house? International socialism must strive to become a world parliament of socialist parties, neither the ineffective thing that it is now nor the tyranny, that communism represents.

The practical idealist, that the European socialist is increasingly becoming, may well ask the international socialist to mind his own business and to do in his own country what the former has done in his. The taunt is somewhat well-merited. Not only is Scandinavian or British socialism providing social security to its people but it is also achieving egalitarian habits to a remarkable degree. Only two members of the Swedish cabinet possess cars; the finance minister owns one and the foreign minister is provided by the Government. Even the Prime Minister goes about when off-duty in trams and buses and his wife teaches in a school. The overwhelming majority of British incomes ranges between £5 a

week and £20 and Britain is sometimes styled a five-pounder democracy. In the Bewag, the largest electricity supply of Berlin with a socialist-controlled trade union in a socialist-controlled municipality, the lowest income is round Rs. 200 a month and the highest Rs. 1,200. The capital of the Bewag runs into Rs. 10 crores and more. Such a narrow range of inequality in incomes breeds egalitarian habits. This is of course possible because West Europe provides a very large range of amenities and of quality free or very cheaply. On my worrying Mr. Erlander with the problem of the egalitarian drive that socialism could never forsake, he told me that some writers in his party were producing literature on that subject. He must have thought he was actually doing what I was worrying about and, in a way, rightly so. British socialists felt likewise and I think Mr. Woodrow Wyatt, one of the younger Labour parliamentarians, told me that in so many words. They feel they are achieving socialism and in a way they are right.

And yet there is a snag in their thinking. I missed in European socialism the ethos and the elan so necessary for the final victory of a doctrine. The explanation lies precisely in its achievements, its practical idealism. European socialists are so much taken up with the problem of the moment, the statistical evidence and requirements of their own nation, that they miss the complete view and the world-view. They have often to wage a battle to conserve what they have achieved so that expansion is slow or halted. Scandinavian co-operatives do not hope ever to extend beyond one-fourth of the economy and they are bureaucratic already. British socialism is faced with a tough problem of morale. It possesses, as Mr. Brailsford told me, neither the discipline of fear that capitalism makes use of nor the worshipful zeal that total social ownership might awaken. European socialism does not wish to face the fact that it is striving for plenty and equality in a small area amidst a world full of poverty and tyranny. This lack of a world-view must force it always to be on the defensive, to lack elan, to make it go slow in its own areas and to have no answer for war and its waste.

A reason of the recent electoral failure of British Labour may well be the people's preference for Churchill because of his world-mind. Churchill's views are wicked, for he contemplates European or English-speaking peoples' domination over the world. And yet these views are wickedly larger than those of Labour; they indicate some type of a world-mind. British Labour's excellent record of achievements in the national sphere may one day be stupidly outweighed in the esteem of the British electorate by Churchill's aggressive though wicked world-mind.

If only some way were found to combine the practical idealism of European socialists and the imaginary flights of, say, Indian socialists and make both share in the properties of either, the world will stand to gain. I am glad to report that one meets such fine types of socialist youth as Erich Sommers of Denmark, Bernard Grik of England, Bjork of Sweden, and the German socialist youth after its terrible experiences is naturally very earnest and enquiring. Apart from the larger inclinations of youth, socialism in opposition appears to be very different from socialism in government. That I knew the German language or that Germany and India had both suffered and are partitioned were indeed factors, but my warmer reception by the German socialists was due to the fact that Indian and German parties are both *opposition parties*. *Socialism in government* becomes practical and narrow and loses some of its elan.

Perhaps, the symbol of the European socialist movement is therefore Dr. Schumacher, the badge of suffering on his body and an uncompromising sharpness of mind, which many men who are not in opposition have often called bitter fanaticism. And yet, the German party is also unable to reach up to a sensitive internationalism.

One of the reasons why Asian socialists have not so far been able to get together is that some are in the government and others in the opposition. Asian socialists in government are afraid to associate with the opposition socialists of a neighbouring country lest they should displease its government party. No such fear

haunts the capitalists or the communists because of their world-view. When a functionary of the British Labour Party told me ✓ that socialists from Rangoon or Jakarta apparently found it easier to meet Indian Socialists in London than in Calcutta, he was right but I told him of the other side of the medal as well. Imperialism had long tied Asian countries not with one another but with the metropolis in Europe so that Burmese and Indian trade and currency had to relate via the British pound. All that is over or should now be over. Asian socialists, weak as they are, must learn to get together. Of Japan, one knows so little except that she has achieved a miracle and is once again the material leader of Asia. One should like to know more about the Japanese socialists and to work together with them so that Asia's vitality shall ever be used alone for pursuits of human welfare.

South American socialists are reported to be as colourful in their action as they are fresh in their outlook; they and a large number of U.S. liberals should be fine material for any international socialist organisation.

Significantly enough, the European socialist whom I found keenest on the international outlook was an ex-communist. Norwegian Ording used to be a member on the Comintern's executive and he appears to have carried over his internationalist elan into his socialist outlook. That George Padmore and I should have chummed up is only natural, but he too used to be an African chief of the Comintern. Heinz Kuhn from Germany is another; he is editing the paper that Marx once edited. If persons like H. N. Brailsford and Fenner Brockway are such keen internationalists, may that not be due to their having come under the influence of a man and his doctrine, the most significant world-man and world-doctrine of the age? I should here like to mention Prime Minister Ben Gurion, General Secretary Lubianiker of the Histadrut, International Secretary Burstein; a more intelligent and alert socialist leadership than this I have never met. But then the Jews are a world-minded people and Israel is keenly alive to the world.

Will Socialism ever be able to acquire a world-face? On this question, more than any other, hangs the destiny of the world. A first step towards that is to cleanse the socialist doctrine of the multiple layers of dust that many decades of ideological schisms have accumulated and to enrich it with the truths that have been discovered but are lying unused. Mutuality between theory and facts must be established so that, while theory must ever seek to mould facts, it must also be willing to be moulded by them. Class struggle must be wedded not to compromise but to sympathy. Practical idealism and socialist ethos must rejoin company. Socialism must again recapture its first fine rapture of human oneness and equality, although the effort to draw up clean and classical lines of ideology and action should never cease. Above all, socialism must acquire a world-mind and a world-view. But a ticklish question will be its application to the immediate problems of foreign and military policies.

#### IV. THIRD CAMP AND KOREA

As the world is increasingly splitting up into the Atlantic and Soviet blocs and the determining issues of foreign and military policy arise out of the clash between the two, the socialist world-view must pre-eminently decide upon its relationship with either. An easy way out is to prefer one to the other. The great quality of the Atlantic bloc, from a socialist point of view, appears to be the possibilities of democratic and peaceful change that it offers. Equally, the Soviet bloc appears to have the eminent merit of equalising standards of living within a nation and all the world over, and thus offering ultimate security against poverty and war. Any theory is to be tested from the results it produces. Ideological preference of the type indicated, reduces socialists to a subsidiary position. They become annexes either of the Atlantic or of the Soviet bloc. They merge almost unrecognisably into the world-face of either. This is indeed too tragic a consequence to contemplate.

It is easy enough to draw a balance sheet of good and bad points in both the Atlantic and Soviet blocs. But what use is

that to the destiny of man? To the three major questions of 'a full stomach for all men,' 'of free quest of the mind,' and 'of preventing war,' neither the Atlantic nor the Soviet bloc has a meaningful answer. Apart from the question of property relationships, the economic premises of both blocs are kindred and they ensure neither a full stomach nor a free mind. In Berlin, where both systems meet and collide and make the city so sensitive, one can see the difference between the two and yet their unity in perspective. In Soviet Berlin, I saw hundreds of workmen cleaning up the city's rubble with much the same inadequate tools as in India. In Atlantic Berlin a workman could get employment only if a decent wage was available to him and his output did not fall below a civilised minimum. This gave me the clue to the Soviet claim that there is no unemployment in Soviet Germany, and I am inclined to accept that claim. Employment, to the Soviets, signifies employment any how, while to the Atlantic community it must secure a minimum basis of decent living and the rest must stay unemployed. While such an apparent difference often confuses the observer and makes him choose one or the other according to his taste, the undeniable truth must be faced that both Germanies are building centralised structures, constructing houses that concentrate political and economic power in the hands of but a few. Furthermore, both systems are like cobras poised to strike, and there is no bridge of ideas between the two. I am not thinking so much of an understanding or even their willingness to talk to each other but of the grievous and total subservience of thinking to force. Ideas have lost their capacity to convert, for they have lost their open character. The two colossuses stand to rigid attention, and nothing but force or the threat of force can convert masses of men. The coercion explicit in Soviet thinking and the convention implicit in Atlantic thinking lead to an identical result—the closing of the human mind. A lot too much is made of this distinction between the medium of coercion and the medium of convention, but the consequences are an identical surrender of reason except as propaganda.

In such a situation, socialism must speak with the voice of authority and an ideological preference for either the Atlantic or the Soviet camp will drown that voice in the din around. An authoritative voice must be a voice of independence and volume. Independence of the two blocs, therefore, is a necessary quality of any force that strives for world law and justice. Such independent force on various occasions is known as the Third Force of Socialism. Some Governments and non-socialist forces also have from time to time adopted a foreign policy of independence. Independence of the two blocs is variously termed as a position of neutrality between them. This independent or neutral bloc often claims to decide each international issue on its merit without prejudice or without affiliation to the warring camps. In principle, such an attitude is excellent, but in practice it does not work. Many such specific issues have arisen in recent years and their detachment from the existing power complex has proved impossible. The Greek, German, Iran, Kashmir, Hyderabad, Palestine and China issues have already shown how exceedingly difficult it is to take a stand except in relation to the two great systems that dominate the world. The background of each specific issue is so inter-woven with the Atlantic-Soviet power complex, that independence, unless properly understood, means inaction.

The Korea issue, apparently so simple, bristles with thorny problems. On the face of it, it is a simple case of aggression by North Korea on South Korea. All suggestions of border raids by South Korea may easily be discounted. But then there is the urgent need to unify Korea and to enable its people to lead a full life. Furthermore, it would appear as if North Korea has stalled all United Nations' moves to unify Korea and give her a Government based on free elections. North Korea's case seems to be black indeed.

But then the picture appears to change as soon as it is recalled that the Russians pulled out of North Korea in December 1948 while the Americans withdrew from South Korea in July 1949 and that the North Koreans have been able to shape them-

selves into a military machine to which the South Koreans are no match. A commonly acknowledged test of the vigour and efficiency of a system is the quality of its military machine. Why is it that the Soviet system is able to infuse greater spirit, courage and cohesion, at least among the non-white peoples? .

This is not to deny the ruthlessness or amorality of the Soviet system. It may also be that the Soviet bloc is fighting to the last Korean in order to gain admission for Red China into the U.N., as it may one day fight to the last Chinese in order to secure the Workers' fatherland.

The legalistic quibble that the U.S. acted in haste and a few hours prior to U.N.'s resolution is therefore meaningless. If the U.S. had waited, its subsequent action would probably have had to be more drastic. Only such as range themselves basically on the Soviet side in the Korean issue can indulge in such criticism.

The Korean war has already led to the involvement of many States in the war and to the strengthening of the French in Indo-China and of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa. Should Russia step into this as the U.S. has already done, a world war will have broken out. Support to South Korea and to U.N. action would then logically lead to involvement in world war on the side of the Atlantic system.

Aggression is indeed bad. But in a world where poverty and tyranny prevail, and peoples are artificially divided and the Atlantic arm reaches out far and wide, what exactly is aggression? Whoever upsets the *status quo* in international law is an aggressor as he is a bandit if he upsets the *status quo* in municipal law. The world situation is such that, no matter what event occurs, the Atlantic system will never be an aggressor in law.

It may be easily countered that elections and the conference method suggest themselves as remedies for injustices—municipal and international. In reality neither remedy is adequate. Only where crude lies and playing on ignorance are kept out of either

remedy; at least in the new States where peoples are politically unaware, is there a chance of partial success.

Does it then mean that the world and its issues are so bad as to make a judgment impossible? There is great force in this question. Everybody knows that to get a right answer, in science or philosophy, the right question should be asked. A wrongly framed question meets with silence. That is so in International politics as well. If the Soviet and the Atlantic systems are permitted to ask the wrong questions the reply will often be silence.

The great drawback of the Third Camp is that its independence of the two blocs is merely passive. It attempts to intervene in the international situation after the crisis stage. While the crisis actually matures it is not a factor and it comes on the scene only after events have come to a head. It tries to assume the role of an umpire or a judge after the play has actually started. The Third Camp must not be an umpire but a participator in international events, because, it will never be able to judge issues until it learns to play a part in their maturing. It must first force the right questions to be asked before the right answers can be given.

The neutral bloc is today only passively independent. It must become creatively independent. Its pretension to judge each issue on its merits will ever be hollow until it learns to put something of its own into the issues as they arise. A crude illustration of this is afforded by India's intervention in the Indonesian issue. India's Foreign Minister and Indonesia's President and Premier had collaborated in the anti-Imperialist Conference way back in 1929 and this collaboration may well have become a factor twenty years later in the cordiality that exists between India and Indonesia. If fleeting collaboration can produce such far-reaching consequences what cannot positive action of a continuing type accomplish? It would tie lands and peoples or sections of them with unbreakable bonds of emotional union.

### THE THIRD CAMP IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Neutrality that is based on national selfishness or passive waiting on events is inconsistent with the world view. To keep one's own country out of war is something wholly different from keeping war out of the world. The former is passive neutrality arising out of national selfishness while the latter is active neutrality arising out of a world view.

Has then this world view nothing to say on the Korean developments? Its first answer should be vigorous self-criticism. That it allowed a free field to the Atlantic and Soviet systems until even to judge would have meant answering a wrong question. At this late stage, all that it can do is to wish for restoration of the boundary of the 38th parallel and efforts at truce and mediation. Whether it can take a hand in this restoration is quite another question. That task must be left to the Atlantic States. They are a part in the maturing of this crisis and they alone can deal with it. To assume that they would not act without the support of the neutral bloc is nonsense. The power-complex compels them to act.

Who are the natural constituents of the Third Camp? Socialists, newly liberated peoples, anti-imperialist movements and all liberals as want progress and world authority. This Third Camp far outnumbers the other two systems in population. And yet it is not cohesive so as to express the power of its members. Part of this weakness is due to lack of grasp of what this Third Camp is.

A camp, in the international sense of today, consists of a bloc and a force, a bloc of governments and a force of peoples. Quite a number of peoples belong ideologically to the third force and yet their military situation compels them to act with the Atlantic bloc. Such are the West European Socialists. Realisation of this fact would somewhat ease the internal frictions within the Third Camp.

The third bloc of governments is yet a very loose and informal affair. The new States of Asia and probably those of South America naturally belong to it but these newly liberated

nationalisms have entered upon an inglorious chapter of inanity after their emergence as states. They have brought neither cheer nor hope to their peoples. They have constructed not one new idea of human freedom or welfare; they have not even woven the old patterns of agrarian freedom or industrial planning. Internal inanity makes for their weakness in foreign affairs. Not possessing the power of steel, they do not even own the passion of ideas. A great part of the blame lies on Asian Socialists, Indian Socialists in particular, for allowing their nationalisms to run into the waste lands of inertia.

The India Government is the chief sinner. On it devolved eminently the task of making the Third Camp cohesive. It alone could have brought into the foreground issues of economic reconstruction of all peoples and economic equality among them, of world government, of freedom and justice. The strength to dictate truce between the two blocs would then have been born.

Internal frictions within the Third Camp, as between India and Pakistan, Egypt and Israel, paralyse it. The Atlantic system is largely to blame for these frictions and their continuance is useful to it. Who knows if India's continuance with the British Empire and her support to American action in Korea is conditioned by her desire to neutralise the Atlantic system in relation to Pakistan?

A bold foreign policy might yet remove these frictions. India should be willing to guarantee the frontiers of Pakistan in exchange of a guarantee to minorities and of a common policy of the Third Camp on the express understanding that a violation of one would automatically bring on the violation of the other. Again, the lack of social justice in her internal programmes has weakened India in her affectionate relationship with the people of Pakistan.

The Third Camp is likewise paralysed in West Asia and East Africa on account of an internal friction prevailing within it—the Israel-Arab conflict. I had attempted to arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Ben Gurion and leaders of the

Arab League. The Israel Prime Minister told me that he would be willing to travel anywhere in order to meet the Arab leaders. I had the impression that guarantee of frontiers could be effected, although the question of Arab refugees from Palestine could not be resolved without difficulty. In any event Israel would do well to treat her Arabs in Nazareth and elsewhere not merely to a formal equality of citizenship but also to the same benefits of civilized existence she is extending to her Jews. I have not been able to understand why a beginning should not be made with collective settlements of Arabs and Jews.

Meanwhile, Egypt has had its elections and has a genial Prime Minister in Nahas Pasha. Although the Egyptian Prime Minister did not seem to be very hopeful about the possibilities of the Third Camp when I talked to him six months ago, he might as well change his mind if he saw India taking a positive line. In any event, a meeting between Nahas Pasha and Azzam Pasha on the one hand and Mr. Ben Gurion on the other would have its advantages even if it could not prevent the outbreak of another war between Egypt and Israel. No matter how many wars take place, a settlement must finally be effected and such meetings are always helpful.

Federative approaches will have to be made some day between Israel and the Arab world. If I had the impression anywhere of a country fighting to its last man, it was Israel. When I told a young, an earnest Israelite, that one or two million Jews stood no chance against eighty million hostile Arabs and that some day the Arabs will be as well armed as the Jews, he frightened me with his calm reply that his people had nowhere to go. Significantly enough, in this country where every girl is a machine gunner, Mahatma Gandhi's autobiography had been read by almost every young person I met. Deep calls unto deep, whether violent or non-violent. Israel is an Asian country. It has human resources and talents which no other country possesses in such abundance. It is experimenting with new forms of living especially in agriculture. All Asia including the Arabs would benefit by inviting Israel into the partnership of peace and

reconstruction. The India Government must not delay in according recognition to Israel. I would make the same submission to the Egyptian Government. I need not add that I felt more at home with the people of Egypt than in Israel, for the dirt and din and indiscipline of Cairo is the same as in Kanpur and this kinship in misery and hope, and perhaps also, some quality of our two cultures draws us together.

The newly liberated nationalisms must take stock before it is too late. Why is it that Japan, in spite of the bad pummelling she took in the last war, is once again the material leader of Asia? The discipline that her people acquired by way of a militarist and capitalist society has stayed with her, but it is too late in the day to expect India or Egypt to follow that example. These peoples can acquire discipline only by way of an egalitarian and socialist society, by destruction of feudalism and capitalism, by redivision of land, by decentralisation of political and economic power, by the four-pillar state, by small-unit industry and inventions, by the volunteer's spade and by the spirit to resist peacefully and to combine for a world law. How far the Japanese people can share in such an enterprise is yet to be seen. They are forced today to belong to the Atlantic camp. I have little doubt that in spirit they belong to the third force of peoples, although their adherence to the third bloc of governments may not yet be possible.

As soon as the Third Camp starts pursuing positive politics and begins having a hard core of believers, large and small, in every land, the contempt which it today arouses in the Soviet as well as the Atlantic camps will turn into respect. The Soviets call it a lie and a sham and the Atlantic call it a camp of imbeciles who preach neutrality towards the plague, for they are both unsure of it and imagine that it would go over to the other side in a crisis. The blame is partly its own, for, unsupported by positive action, the puerility of its passive independence has led it into fickle positions. I must here warn against yet another puerility. There are some people who would want to combine military neutrality with ideological preference for the Atlantic

or the Soviet camp. I first met wth this attitude in the minority socialist party of Israel, which has an ideological slant towards the Soviets. I am beginning to sense a similar development in India, a somewhat more dangerous one, for, the Socialist Party, in spite of its policy of neutrality, cracks emotionally on critical issues. Some party members tend towards the Atlantic and some towards the Soviet bloc. Once such peurilities are discarded, the Third Camp will come into its own.

When that happens, the Third Camp might begin to have listeners even in the Soviet bloc. That it has none today is a frequent charge against it. Its peacemaking value is therefore pooh-poohed. But, may that not be due to the fact that the face of the Third Camp or of socialism is hardly recognisable today and that its *bona fides* are open to doubt? Let it have a face of its own, a hard and clean face, and then the time will come to judge whether it can command attention on both sides. The Third Camp will probably be able then to compel truce between the two warring blocs. The difference between mediating a truce and compelling a truce must be noted. It is not so much the function of the Third Camp to mediate and reason and persuade as to command attention and compel truce with its positive action.

The weakness of the Third Camp in miliary power often gives rise to misgivings. Actually, however, military power is only a concentrated expression of ideological and economic power.

Ideologically, the Third Camp has a bit of a past in India. During the 1942 rebellion, the resistance movement had published a pamphlet entitled "The Third Camp" in which the freedom movement of India was shown to be a part of the larger movement for a world law, that neither the Axis nor the Allies were. I recollect having used the idea and the phrase of the Third Camp even earlier, sometime in 1939 as the world war was to break out. Mr. Phulan Prasad Varma has told me of a conversation in the course of which Leon Blum thought that he was the first to make use of it sometime in 1946. Emmanuel Mounier, probably the most profound journalist of his time, told me that he and his colleagues were already making use of it around 1932.

Whether France or India, whoever first made use of it was only giving expression to a most intimate stirring of the human heart. I should like to add the remarkable reply of Mounier when I rued the impotence of the Third Camp in Europe. 'We are only drops in the ocean, but it is in the nature of the drop to fall, who knows, perhaps someday' so ran his answer. What the third Camp needs today is not so much military power as the power of faith, unshakable and unbreakable faith. Whether the third world war breaks out soon or not, faith in this camp of peace and reconstruction must remain unshaken.

Immediately on my return from Europe, six months ago, I had reported on the possibility of a third world war. But the spokesmen of India's Foreign Ministry had at that time discounted the idea. They are talking about its imminence now. The third world war may not yet break out but the Indian people will do well henceforth to remember that the world situation is permanently war-like and it may at any time explode.

Is there an issue worthwhile for the Third Camp to wage war, is a frequent question. A ready answer is, if a third camp country is invaded. There might be similar issues. But that is a wrong question, at least partly. To prevent war is a task of the Third Camp and if a war occurs or when it is forced to participate, that will be its failure, at least partly. The Third Camp succeeds to the extent that it works for a world parliament and world government based on unpartisan law and sympathy for all peoples.

#### V. FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN ASIA AND AFRICA

Self-rule is still denied to a section of mankind and anti-imperialist movements have therefore a world character. Some parts of Asia and practically the whole of Africa are under the heel of foreign conquerors. Their efforts at release from bondage add to the forces that strive for a world law.

The freedom movements are however weak, for they belong to peoples who are split among various groups and languages and nationality, none powerful in numbers. In their anxiety to

be free they look out for external support and thus become playthings of world views that extend to them moral sympathy or material assistance. They lose their spontaneity, and that well of energy which waters the world with hope dries up. When these movements do not become appendages to the liberal and slow-moving West, they run into the arms of the Communist world view. The extent to which communism with its schisms of Stalinism, Trotskyism and Titoism has penetrated into the African movement is amazing. Their weakness in numbers and want of fresh energy is therefore easily understandable.

Anti-imperialism can become a source of good only if it is separated from the embrace of its Atlantic or Soviet masters. But these freedom movements need a world view and external support suited to it.

India's Foreign Minister recently spoke to the anti-Imperialist peoples of Malaya of the vile futility of terrorism. He presented to them Mahatma Gandhi's method of non-violent resistance. One's mind goes back to an incident nearly 35 years ago when Mahatma Gandhi was making his first entry into Indian politics. After praising the terrorist youth for their bravery, he beckoned them to wield with him the superior and more effective method of non-violent resistance. A negative condemnation of terrorism in Malaya without a positive effort to encourage peaceful resistance would only add to the strength of Malaya's Atlantic masters. The reaction of disgust from such advice may also add to the Soviet hold.

This contemptible intrusion of India's Foreign Office into Malayan affairs was matched by an equally contemptible and uncalled for statement with regard to Tibet. Our northern neighbours who are our kinsmen in culture and language, more than they are of any other people, have long been oppressed by their native rulers. If it was too late for India to give any succour to the people of Tibet, she should at least not have gone out of her way to claim the sovereignty of another state over them. A negative and artificial desire for neutrality between two

world views seems to have led to this perversity of a pro-Atlantic attitude in Malaya and a pro-Soviet one in Tibet.

Anti-imperialism must be helped to regain its spontaneous energy. This can only be done by a world view that recognises the unhedged claims of all peoples to be free in a world that has tamed the Atlantic and the Soviet conquerors back into their homelands. The Indian Government would repair its errors by yet inviting the great freedom fighters of the world to visit this country as guests and thus to present a dramatic spectacle of this world view. Emir Abdul Karim and Taib Slim of North Africa, George Padmore and Dr. Azikiwe of Negro Africa must be invited to visit India as her guests as a step towards a spontaneous, unfettered and powerful anti-imperialism. I had made this suggestion six months ago on my return from Europe, Africa and near Asia. Delay is losing the world this great force of good and compelling it to run into the arms of one or the other bloc or even of religious reaction.

Although Nepal is under no foreign heel, its people do not enjoy self-rule and it is denied representative institutions and responsible government. Tyranny of a small clique in Nepal has caused a vacuum and, unless its people are actively helped to self-rule, Atlantic or Soviet power would inevitably rush in. The Socialist Party has striven to help the people of Nepal to fill up the vacuum with their own power of a self-rule movement. The Indian Government must give up its policy of doing nothing until the milk is split and then of crying over it.

As long as India permits the continuance of Portuguese and French imperialisms within her own body, her effort at coupling the anti-imperialist movements with strivings for a world law will be tarred and blemished. It is monstrous that scores of Indians should be wasting away their lives in prisons thousands of miles away for no offence other than the attempt to hold a public meeting. Portugal must be made to release these prisoners.

The Congress of the Peoples against Imperialism will be unable to fulfil its mission if it is restricted to being an information

and propaganda centre. It must be a creative centre which radiates the warmth of sympathy and support to all peoples struggling to be free and which unites them into a concerted offensive. Its gravity must shift from its centres in London and Paris to those in India and Africa. I may recall in this connection the farewell words of Taib Slim, the Tunisian fighter whom France had sentenced to death, to me, when he asked me to work for a united endeavour of the Congress Party and the Socialist Party in order to help free the still enslaved peoples of the world. This is a mission to which men in either party who combine dexterity with faith might well devote themselves. What the Indian Government has done for Indonesia is a fine chapter indeed, but on balance it is lost amidst the barrenness elsewhere. The time for a comprehensive anti-imperialist policy is now.

Imperialism has already become a marginal phenomenon. In its vague and loose interpretation, probably all mankind except the Russians and the Americans are colonials. In its proper meaning of denial of self-rule, only ten per cent of mankind is still subject to this tyranny. It is a sad reflection on the freedom-loving peoples in the rest of the world that this marginal phenomenon should continue any longer. The ruling class of Europe, both West and East, and the U.S. has become Africa-conscious. May not the peoples of Europe and the U.S. and of course Asia strive to release Africa and Malaya from their bondage and bring peace and freedom to Indo-China and Korea? As a marginal issue in world affairs, imperialism is weak and tottering and purposeful assault on it by the free peoples of the world could see its end before our century enters its second half.

## VI. INDIANS ABROAD

Indians in foreign lands account for nearly one per cent of the Indian population. Their condition has, if anything, deteriorated after freedom. Partly, at least, that is due to India Government's perverse policies. While it has done nothing assertive for plantation labourers in Ceylon and such like, it, for a long time, intervened futilely with the Burma Government for

compensation to Indian landlords. The only worthwhile policy would be to demand assertively, nothing more and nothing less than, equal rights and equal duties, in fact, full and equal citizenship for them in the state of which they form a part.

Apart from questions regarding their own status, Indians overseas are faced with the decision of what world-view they shall adopt and practise. The sooner they adopt the world-view presented here, the better for them and, the world. They have it in their power to become catalytic agents of a world order wherever they live.

An essential requirement would be their readiness to shed their separatist groupings as Indians in the political and trade union fields or in any other farmers' industrial and professional associations. Thus, in Africa or in Malaya, they should join with the Africans, the Whites, the Malayans and the Chinese, the party or the association of their choice. Should it be necessary to form a new party on right ideological lines, the effort should always be made in conjunction with the other groups of citizens and not as Indians.

## VII. RELIGION IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Religion in the political sense has revived on an international scale. Not only are religious organizations trying to influence politics but various religions have set up their own political parties such as Christian, Muslim or Hindu party. They are openly defending property in land and industry. Their support to capitalism is beyond doubt. If Acharya Narendra Deva was publicised as an atheist in the course of an imaginary dialogue between Rama and Gandhi in heaven, some Christian priests in Germany were about the same time persuading their female clientele to threaten their husbands with refusal to perform their wifely duties if they voted socialist.

Some religious organisations cover up their essentially reactionary character by giving vent to vague feelings of goodwill and harmony. One such organisation on an international scale is

the Moral Rearmament Association. Before the last world war broke out, its leader and his flock praised the Lord for sending Hitler to an unbelieving world. Under cover of spiritual rebirth and goodwill, nationally and internationally, this organisation is once again serving the cause of *status quo* and reaction. Significantly enough, the India Government encourages or permits its ministers to associate themselves with this organisation.

This open excursion of religion into politics is producing results contrary to what might have been expected and which are actually publicised. Instead of making politics religious, religion is itself becoming political. By the introduction of religious fervour into the power drivers of politics, mankind is being further debased in its conduct.

Another aspect of religious influence over world politics is somewhat different. It is a genuine attempt to introduce morality into politics, to preach the convertibility of means and ends. While the motives behind such an effort are lofty, the consequences have hitherto been none too happy. Except in the hands of the man who was the author of this new mode of behaviour in politics, it tends to lead men into positions of compromise when not of inertia. The ineffectiveness of those who are pledged to morality in politics and are even the successors of Mahatma Gandhi, is pitiful against the strange break-up of collective life that has overtaken India. This appears to be paralleled in Germany. The Social Democratic Party of Germany has two pronounced trends, the classical socialist trend led by Schumacher and the somewhat religious trend led by Schmidt. While I would at some points prefer the suppleness of the new trend to the rigidity of the classical type, I had the impression that compromise and coalition politics were more popular with the supple than with the classical type. The moral and imaginative approach in politics has so far been unable to rid itself of an obsession with compromise.

Religious politics are nevertheless gaining ground all over the world and it will not do for socialism merely to brand them

as reactionary. There must be something in human nature and its needs, which politics has been unable to fulfil and which religion claims it can. Men are perhaps fed up with the continuous clash of politics: they sometimes need the peace and good conduct that religion offers. It is too early yet to say what results will finally be produced by the coming together of Christianity and socialism in the Social Democratic Party in Germany. There is no doubt that the Gandhian tradition of good means will continue in one manner or another with India's major political parties. There is greater need for it today than there ever was. But the danger of compromise with evil or inertia in the face of it seems to attend this tradition and unless it is combated no good will come out of it.

India and the East are famed for their spirituality as contrasted with the materialism of Europe. This is one of the strangest lies prevalent in certain circles. In all those concrete cases of conduct on which reason can fasten, materialist Europe appears to be more spiritual than the religious East. Nevertheless the human spirit and the depths of its religious and spiritual foundations have to be explored and brought into the service of a world order, for otherwise they will be used by reaction.

I remember the Egyptian socialist Ahmed Hussain saying that he was deeply religious and when I smiled partly in curiosity, he explained to me that his religion was a question mark of life and that was all. He would like to approach human affairs with the humility of questioning.

Whatever may be the lowness into which India has fallen, there seems to be something in her culture of 6,000 years and over, which other cultures and religions also possess, but which has assumed a completer form here than elsewhere. To the light of reason is added the softness of sympathy; understanding or knowledge is incomplete without a feeling of oneness with the universe and everything in it. I do not know how far this emotion of sympathy could be joined to class struggle and socialism. Should it ever happen that the eye will simultaneously

redden at an act of injustice as it will shed a tear, socialism in India will have achieved a miracle for all the world.

## VII. MOVEMENT FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT

The movement for world government is making headway. It is indeed beset by all kinds of confusions and schisms, but the main idea of a supreme world authority is gaining ground over men's minds.

To some, the idea of a world government would today appear unrealistic and impracticable and they would prefer to strive for regional unities such as the government of Western Europe or the government of Asia. At the same time, there are many who think that a political one-world is impossible without an economic one-world while some would prefer to keep the issue of world government on the purely political level.

The world movement for world federal government is an organisation that strives to unite all forces and groups working for a world government. Its task is none too easy. The double sins of weakness and schisms beset it.

Its weakness arises primarily out of its belief that the U.N.O. is the precursor to a world government. All existing international institutions are clearing houses of disputes and intrigues among nations. No world government movement should therefore get tied up with any one of them. It is quite another matter to assist the U.N.O. in any of its specific jobs as will not mean participation in international rivalries. But the movement for world government should start with a clean slate and its aim should be not any confusing reforms of the U.N. Charter but the convening of a representative assembly elected by all the adults of the world.

Confusion of aim restricts its activity to the men who matter and does not reach it to the people who suffer. The Indian branch of the movement is a rather extreme example of this; nobody has heard of it and is confined to a few members of parliament and such others in the capital. The source of this

mischief lies in a curious phenomenon of our world of nation-states. The nationally responsible men are internationally irresponsible while men who strive to be internationally responsible have no responsibility within their own nation. The men who matter within a nation are generally those whose views disqualify them from world leadership, while such as are so qualified do not matter within their own nation. Until the movement grasps this fact and takes the issue of world government to suffering millions and weaves it into their lives, it will ridicule itself by running after second-rate parliamentarians or ogling at meaningless messages from wellknown men and ministers.

Many splits and schisms also arise out of the belief in logical sequence, already noted, from regional federations to world federation or from political unity of the world to its economic unity. I can understand a regrettable chronological sequence, but a logical sequence is hard to grasp. The full ideal has to be striven for, though, in the actual achieving of it, there might be some stages.

A notable success of the movement took place when the Tennessee State Legislature enacted to send representatives to a world parliament and to surrender a part of its sovereignty on the formation of a world authority. This was not a policy success, for it led to no action. At best, it was a success of propaganda, for it must have led people to think of world government. Nevertheless, I wish that Cord Meyer, a young American who lost an eye in the last war and who is in some ways a symbol of the American movement realised the inadequacy of such a measure. Existing Legislatures will not be able to achieve world government. It will be achieved when it becomes a passionate need of suffering millions. I have no wish here to enter into the controversy that is rending the world federalists between minimalists and maximalists, the two groups who differ on the extent of power that a world government should possess, or between the political and functional approach. As soon as the need to carry the issue of world government to suffering millions is recognised, the present controversy will have lost much of its meaning and

the political and economic approaches will have to be combined. Mrs. Elizabeth Mann Borgese, daughter of Thomas Mann and Secretary of the world movement, is a European now settled in the U.S. and her experience has probably taught her the virtue of compromise and aiming at the attainable. A recent letter from her has emphasized the need to associate organizations of farmers and workers with the world government movement in Asia; but I should have thought that the need was equally urgent in Europe and the U.S.A. The movement must open itself to existing political parties, trade unions and other organizations in various lands, must in fact seek to enter them, so that it could even cut across existing political divisions and thus cause a national ferment on an international issue. But then votaries of the movement will have to accept the egalitarian idea not only for the citizens within a nation but among the nations themselves.

Such a world view requires great faith. It is difficult for satiated nations to contemplate economic and political equality with hungry nations. The average Indian has to work with tools and machines worth about Rs. 150/-, the average European Rs. 3,000/-, the average American Rs. 8,000/- and more. This enormous disparity in capital investment is at the root of the world's evils; but what favoured nation or man will be so sane as to strive for its removal? Without such a sanity, however, the world will be doomed to a state of poverty and war and increasing stagnation. A dim realisation of this seems to be evident in the current gossip about assistance to under-developed nations. This whole idea of assistance flowing out from the strong to the weak in a spirit of generosity is fruitless. The world and its nations need mutual assistance. Europe and the U.S. have too much to conserve and too little to create, while Asia and Africa have too much to create but too little to build it on. Conservation and creation are at war on a world scale. Not the passing conflict of power blocs but this great war of our epoch determines man's destiny. When Europe and U.S. realise the impossibility to conserve, until Asia and Africa create, a world mind potent enough to form world government will have been born.

The final solution may yet be a long way off. It will require a revolutionary thinking on technology and scientific inventions and sharing of resources among all the nations. As a first step towards this, the idea of a world development corporation and international brigades of peace and reconstruction, has been mooted. The world has known of international brigades for war purposes. Would it not be possible to form similar brigades for development work in various lands, not as a symbolic gesture, but with a view actually to achieve something. Scott Buchanan, the American philosopher, and Stringfellow Barr are working on this idea. H. N. Brailsford and his wife Eva Maria were insistent on some such mode of action through which men of all nations could be thrown together into teams working for reconstruction.

The India Government might well take the initiative in proposing such a resolution to the United Nations. Should such a move prove unfruitful, it might directly approach the various governments of the world and begin work with those who are agreeable. I may here add that Clare and Harris Wofford, the young American couple whom Socialists in India know well and admire, suggested on their return to their homeland that the surplus wheat in America be donated to Indian refugees and other needy groups. Such suggestions and initiatives, isolated and unfruitful as they are today can be crystallised by the India Government so as to give them the shape and substance of a world-wide mutual aid society.

An American Liberal is sometimes a strange type nowhere to be met. I have not met a more earnest and genuine young man, open-minded, slow and methodical, than Clifford Dancer who would be an acquisition to the Socialist Party of any land. Socialism in the U.S. is very much wider than its Socialist Party.

The World Government Movement has decided to convene a World Parliament elected on the basis of one delegate for every million of the world's population. It has an international steering committee for this purpose on which Kamaladevi is a member, and she is also a member of the executive of the World Govern-

ment Movement. Who could be more suited than she with her dexterity and faith to enthuse diverse elements in India!

A remarkable episode took place in the general elections of Britain when Henry Usborne, the leader of the British Movement for a World Parliament, brought Harris Wofford, Robert Sarrazac, Claude Bourdet and others to campaign for him and for the issue of World Government. For the first time probably, a national election took place in which a team of foreigners took part. Henry Usborne won for British labour a seat which was considered marginal.

The Movement for a World Parliament has acquired special significance in France. Lieut.-Colonel Robert Sarrazac, one time army officer, underground fighter and now a world federalist, has made it dynamic. He has linked it up with the movement to *mondialise* towns and villages and the movement for world citizenship. The idea is to awaken a world conscience among all the peoples and to prepare them psychologically for a World Parliament. A whole zone of three million inhabitants has almost been *mondialised*. First the municipal council and then the adult population of village or town votes for the acceptance of the *mondial declaration*. I may here add the strange case of Garry Davis, a little known American actor, who has acquired such celebrity in France and Germany as is not excelled even by Mr. Churchill. One simple little act made him a hero. He tore up his American passport and declared himself a world citizen. Whatever may be the quality of this act of Mr. Davis, the episode throws a flood of light on the psychology of Europe, expectant for a new hope and willing to clutch at a straw like a drowning man.

I am glad to report that a majority of students in the Lucknow University have already signed the declaration to make their University a world town. Many villages have also done so. The movement must spread and I hope that Purbunder, Mahatma Gandhi's birthplace, will soon be *mondialised*. I am also glad to report that a register of world citizenship will soon be opened and that Jayaprakash Narayan, Chief of India's

socialists, will be the first world citizen in the country. It will be perhaps for the first time that a nationally responsible politician becomes internationally responsible in a formal way.

Efforts to prevent war in the past, and pacifist and peace-pledge unions, had at one time great vogue; but what happened to them on the outbreak of the war! A very large number of soldiers in the last war were presumably peace-pledgers and the like. But the movement for World Government is something different from the movement to prevent war: the former is positive while the latter is negative. Furthermore, a whole vista of striving and suffering and positive action and Satyagraha opens out in connection with this movement. Should the peoples of the world be ever able to elect their parliament, unofficial though it might be, it may well have the history of the Etats General of Louise XVI which refused to disperse in spite of that monarch and started the French Revolution. The World Parliament may well become a precursor to a world revolution to which governments must perforce submit.

When a country like India is ground by poverty and torn by religions and castes, it might seem ridiculous to make the submerged and hungry landless labourer a world citizen. And yet this movement for World Government in conjunction with socialism may be that lever which raises these submerged millions to a new hope and endeavour.

*July, 1950.*

## POST-SCRIPT TO KOREA

Since I presented my foreign policy report to the Socialist Party Conference, four distinct attitudes towards the Korean incident appear to be crystallising. The pro-Atlantic and pro-Soviet attitudes are easy to understand, once one has chosen one's side in the clash of the two power blocs. But the independent attitude of the third camp has unfortunately been so applied to Korea as to give rise to two different and even contrary policies.

One of these policies rests on the belief that, even while the basis of non-alignment with the power blocs stays, each international dispute can and should be judged on merits. North Korea has according to this belief committed aggression on South Korea. As collective security has to be preserved, the United Nations must defend South Korea. Simultaneously, however, the Government of India got motivated by another principle, the desire to loosen the tension between the two blocs and to give a factual position in China a juridical status. It, therefore, wanted Red China to replace Kuomintang China in the United Nations. Support to the United Nations' action in Korea and inclusion of Red China into the United Nations are the two objectives of the India Government policy towards the Korean war and therefore also of all those who profess to judge each issue on merits and desire a state of no war.

Quite clearly this is a most illogical policy to adopt. One can well understand the pursuit of one or the other objective but the simultaneous pursuit of both objectives is meaningless. For those who judge North Korea, which is obviously a member of the Soviet camp, as an aggressor, it hardly behoves to help the Soviet camp to reap the fruits of that aggression in the shape of an additional adherent in the United Nations and even a permanent seat on its Security Council.

Judging an issue on merits torn from the context of the power clash must inevitably lead to such absurdities. The explanation in motive is simple. As soon as an issue is judged on merit and a pro-Soviet or a pro-Atlantic attitude adopted, the

nervous desire to maintain one's independence from the two power blocs and to show it off must inevitably lead to a counter-balancing act. A pro-Atlantic judgment must be counter-balanced by a pro-Soviet move and vice versa.

What precisely is gained by such a policy? Nothing at all, except the alternate strengthening of the two blocs. No ideas or forces or movements apart from the two camps are brought into being or strengthened and this policy of judging each issue on merits degenerates into alternate touting for the Atlantic or the Soviet bloc.

The principle of collective security and of aggression must be grasped more fundamentally. Out of over sixty votes in the United Nations less than ten belong to Asia. Fifty per cent of the world's population possesses around fifteen per cent of its votes. Out of eleven members on the Security Council, three belong to the non-white races. Less than one-third of the world's population has over two-thirds of its executive power. The colossal inequalities in the world's development can be gauged from the earnings of Asians which are around one-fourth of those of the European who in their turn earn about a half of the American income. Poverty is strangling Asia, Africa and the larger part of South America. Finally, what is collective security if there is no freedom for men to travel and work where they like and the doors of Australia or Russia or the U. S. are barred to them? If a man has the right to die destitute on the streets of Delhi and Cairo, he has an equal right, if he wishes, to die on the streets of Sydney, Moscow and New York. Formal interpretation of the principle of collective security can never be a midwife for bringing the new world into being. I readily grant that countries like India must check the increase in their population. No government in India can be called civilized until it takes effective steps towards this aim.

There can be no genuine security, individual or collective, until a clean break is made with the past and the world is liberated from the ideological and militaristic strangleholds of the war blocs. India has indeed a traditional friendship with China

and the Indian people will always wish well of the Chinese people and it is only proper that an India Government and a China Government should recognise each other. But Red China is a part of the Soviet camp and to undertake supporting moves for the former is inevitably to strengthen the latter. We can only wish for the day when the people of China will regain their independence of mind and action and all official and non-official approaches between the two countries should necessarily be used to the full. To have initiated Red China's admission into the United Nations, particularly in the context of a war between the two blocs, was therefore wrong; it would have been quite another matter to vote for such an admission on some other occasion.

The communication that was sent by the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Ministers of Russia and England and the United States Secretary of State suffers from another major blemish. To have established a connection between the Korean incident and the China issue was itself wrong, but to suggest that Red China's admission into the United Nations was to precede the settlement of the Korean issue took away what little meaning there might have been in the spurious move of India. In establishing precisely such a sequence between the China issue and the Korean issue, the Prime Minister of India conceded the Soviet case and only he could have imagined that the Americans would accept it.

West Europeans and particularly the West European Left may have generally liked India's intervention. The reasons are clear. West Europe is far more afraid of war than is the United States. It will have to bear the first terrific onslaught of the war. It is therefore always favourably susceptible to any action intended to prevent a war or to postpone it. Furthermore, Britain has not yet given up her belief to lead the world. She is undoubtedly quite conscious of her subordination to the United States in the event of a world war, but she would like to play her own game of supple diplomacy. She probably imagines United States to be crude and Russia to be vulgar and believes that her diplomacy would enable her to muddle through somehow in a conflict

between the two. United States hegemony must also be irking her. Britain has the tradition of having more than one string to her foreign policy, of pursuing more than one line of action with regard to a single event.

It is known that the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. had a series of interviews with the Russian foreign office within a week of the outbreak of the Korean war and it is also known that these related to a settlement of the Korean crisis. Members of the British Commonwealth also consult each other on any foreign policy moves, although they are not bound to accept each others views. Both on account of the general strategic position of West Europe and also because of the special diplomatic predilections of Britain, it is only fair to conclude that the inspiration for India's move lay in some West European capital.

The dexterity of British diplomacy was however lacking in the Prime Minister's note. No British foreign minister would have so crudely established a sequence between the Red China issue and the Korean issue. In order to smoothen the path of negotiations and so ultimately to achieve peace, he would have left vague as to which act of settlement was to take place first. It would still have been doubtful if the Americans and the Russians would have agreed on settling the two issues simultaneously. But a move which set up a sequence of one kind or the other was foredoomed to failure. The British foreign office or whatever other source was concerned might well be wondering if they should not have actually helped the Prime Minister of India draft his letter.

Abstention is the only desirable course for India to follow in disputes between the two blocs. This would give her an opportunity to project the new policies of peace. In course of time, both United States and the U.S.S.R. may come to respect India's abstention when they become sure of it. Uncertainty prevails today. The U.S.S.R. may well imagine that, inspite of deviations and zig-zags, India is in the ultimate instance tied to the Atlantic camp and her neutrality in the event of a war

would either be impossible or shortlived. The U. S. A. on the other hand may well regard India more a liability than an asset, as her conduct is very difficult to anticipate and her diplomatic moves may at any time strengthen the Soviet camp.

A course of abstention in the disputes between the two blocs had sometimes been ridiculed as Sanyas, withdrawal from life and its world current. Before examining if that is so let us recall that a policy such as that of India's Prime Minister may well be called unfunctioning priapism, all excitement and no fulfilment. Unable to give rise to new forces, such a policy may through some fluke postpone a war but can never avert it, and after another war, the post-war world would continue as of old.

The third camp must guard itself against a continual temptation. It may take up its duty to postpone a war so senselessly that it does not build anything new. Its actions may then be of no avail except that it secures to the two warring blocs a breathing space and an interval for piling armaments. Only they can avert a war who seek to unite the world or such parts of it as believe in a world law without prejudice or self interest. Even if they may not be effective enough to save the world from a war, they will certainly be able to put their impress on the post-war world. Too keen a concern with this problem of avoiding a war leads into a blind alley. In the matter of international rivalries, the post-war period, after world war No. I as well as No. II, was largely a continuation of the pre-war period. What is needed is to snap this continuity. The third camp must indeed strive to do all it can to avoid a war but it must also concern itself equally with the building up of such strength as will be adequate to open a new era in world relations.

The policy of abstention towards disputes between the two blocs does not at all mean a policy of withdrawal. There is a whole territory of international relationships where a people committed to such a policy may yet bestir themselves. I should think that the third camp has its immediate work in fields such as the various types of world unity movements, the anti-imperialist movements which are not attached to either of these

FRAGMENTS OF A WORLD MIND

two blocs, the international socialist movement in particular its Asian wing and cultural or no-war movements unaffiliated to either bloc.

The United Nations is also not to be completely discarded. Several of its activities do not strengthen the two warlike camps. It may also seek to combine all the world on such projects as a world development corporation, international projects of reconstruction and peace and a world food pool.

The most serious argument that has so far been advanced against the third camp is its inadequacy in arms. That argument may at once be conceded, but arms are a concentrated expression at least partly of a virile attitude. What is needed now is to set up a virile federation of the mind. The federation of governments will inevitably follow. To liberate the human mind from the octopus grip of the two camps is to build up this new federation of the mind.

*September, 1950.*

## INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF COMMUNISM

Communism is the latest weapon of Europe against Asia. For three hundred years, Europe has been the prince among continents and liberalism, Christianity or capitalism has admittedly served each in its own way Europe's imperial purposes. Old weapons are blunted. It may well be that Europe's undefeated intelligence is making use of yet another ideological weapon to retain its slipping hold over the world. Whether this latest weapon of communism, like liberalism or Christianity, was never intended by its makers to be used for such purposes, in other words, whether the original doctrine of Communism carried this inspiration or has later been distorted is of course an important question. But the first stage in this enquiry is the discovery of effects that communism has produced in Europe and in Asia.

Communism has apparently convulsed Europe for exactly a hundred years but what has been its effect on inter-European relations on the one hand and the civil condition of any one European country on the other. Throughout its hundred years, it has never once been the aggressor of a civil war within a European state, and the occasions when it was a defensive participant have been few and short-lived. It was together with democratic liberalism a defensive partner in the Spanish civil war of less than three years' duration. Earlier, it took part in the somewhat chaotic conflicts that were for a few weeks argued out in Mussolini Italy. In recent years, it took on itself the defensive role, for the first time singly, in the Greek civil war of less than two years' duration. That is all. A remarkable story it is, of a whole hundred years of a new doctrine occasioning not one civil war in Europe and taking share in the rather sparse blood-letting caused by others in small areas and for short periods, of a doctrine that claims to be more revolutionary than ever there was and whose opponents also challenge it as the most evil creed ever.

The story of communism in Europe is the story largely of peaceful but somewhat unconstitutional agitation and it has not

yet laid a single European state low nor damaged its vitality for any length of time or to any considerable degree. Such attempts at revolution that it has made have been quickly decided. The Russian revolution was a seven-day achievement. After communism had set up its state in Russia, it no doubt met with the stout opposition of foreign and native elements but that was never a serious challenge and, anyway, Russian vitality mounted. Russia is today probably the most vital state of Europe and communism has done this. It is too early yet to say what measure of vitality communism has bestowed on east-European states that it has captured by a combination of external and internal forces, but these appear somewhat stronger than before.

European countries have stood to gain by communism. Not one has lost its vitality as a result of it and one has indeed become the most vital state of Europe because of it.

In the sphere of inter-European relations, the story is no different and communism has not caused a single war. The prime and immediate causal agents of every inter-European war fought hitherto have been the non-communists of Europe. Communism indeed took share and a comparatively big one in the last war. But the destruction it caused to Europe was much smaller in comparison. The airforces of Britain and the U.S. and the land forces of Germany destroyed and killed in Europe far more than the Russians did. Communism has on the contrary assisted Europe, racked by destruction, to steady itself.

The inter-European wars so grimly and successfully fought by European non-communists have in conjunction with other factors promoted a shift of power and prosperity from Europe to other countries. Russia with its satellites has countered this shift. Had it not been for Russia, the balance of power against Europe would have been far greater. Communism has slowed this shift of power from Europe in the direction of America and almost halted it in the direction of Asia.

The future of Communism in Europe may conceivably be different from its past. As far, however, as it is possible to judge from the contents of the doctrine and the tendencies it is showing,

communism will never let out Europe's blood in civil wars. But it may in conjunction with doctrines that oppose it end up in an utterly destructive inter-European war. Such an end or relegation of Europe will not, however, be of its seeking. A somewhat similar phenomenon took place in Europe centuries ago. The Greco-Roman civilisation split up into its western and eastern counterparts with their rival centres in Rome and Constantinople, each violently combating the other. The inner impulsion of this split and combat appears to have been the rejuvenated unity of the Greco-Roman world. The impulsion fell short of its objective and dissipated itself.

European civilisation is today split up into its two great colossuses, west-Europe and east-Europe. The west-European colossus is of course spread over the American continent and that introduces a complication, although of little importance to this enquiry. The two roar with the voice of giants and all else is a whisper. Man is dazed into imagining their combat as being waged for world issues of democracy and socialism. But when the din of arms shall have quietened with the inglorious beggary of both combatants or the almighty supremacy of one of the two over the entire world, the war between New York-London and Moscow shall fall in the proper perspective of human history, a war waged not for the benefaction of the world, but one in which the issue was the inheriting of European civilisation and who was to be its saviour and rejuvenator and the ruler on its behalf of the planet. A civilisation never decays without a final effort of will, a split and a two-pronged but apparently contradictory attempt to renew itself. This effort is like the last glorious flicker of a dying flame.

For the European civilisation, communism is one prong of this effort same as liberalism is the other. Either prong is seeking to retain and renew, but the outcome shall probably not be of their wanting. It will be the strangest thing that ever happened to man and perhaps the most unfortunate, if one should defeat the other in a fashion so as to rule almighty over the world. True to their previous types in history, the two domains

will probably be relegated into the backyard. With the possibility that west and east Europe might in cooperation with the rest of the world build up a new civilisation of equality, we are not here concerned, for that is beyond communism as it is beyond liberalism.

The story of communism in Asia is around twenty years old. A few Asian communists lived in Europe in voluntary or forced exile immediately after the communist international was founded and these had negligible bunches of their colleagues in some Asian countries. But their story really starts with Sun Yat Sen's last effort to renew China. At this time, they make their appearance all over Asia. Of all Asian peoples, their dealings with the Chinese have been the longest and most intimate. The effect of communism in China is an uninterrupted process of blood-letting for almost its entire career except the first year. Communism has damaged China's vitality, hindered its rejuvenation and has almost succeeded in laying it low. No one can honestly deny that communism is the aggressor of the Chinese civil war. That however is not an essential argument. Nor is it necessary for purposes of this enquiry to judge between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in China. Whichever is the evil doctrine or even if either is wrong or perhaps a little less or a little more than the other, the fact is undisputed that China has been wasting herself for twenty years now as a result of this civil war.

Even if one took the side of Chinese communists completely, one would still not be able to deny that communism has been unable to score a speedy victory in China and that it could do no better than let out China's blood in a deadly continuous flow. In no country of Europe has communism caused or taken share in a civil war one-seventh as long as the Chinese. The peculiarity of the Chinese people and their social structure may be responsible for this, or the world situation and communists may assign a hundred and one similar reasons, but no amount of explanation can do away with the indestructible fact that China is at war with herself for twenty years now in the Kuomintang-communist combat. European communism has its most noted symbol in

Russia, which it has rejuvenated; Asian communism has its in China, which it has wasted.

The process of blood-letting and wasting has started in other countries, particularly Burma and Malaya. Of all Asian countries, Viet-Nam is the only one where communism has stood the ground well against imperialism but what measure of vitality it has given to that people is difficult to tell and, in any case, the area is small and the consequences to Asia must necessarily be scanty. Burma and Malaya are wasting themselves. To state this fact, it is not at all necessary to judge between Burman nationalism and communism, certainly not between imperialism and communism in Malaya. There is hardly a doubt that, without communism, Burma and Malaya and China would be on the road to vitality and new life; they would perhaps have not travelled fast enough or have made halts on the way, but they would have definitely progressed very much beyond their present state.

Communism appeared in India about the same time as in China but its role has so far been negligible. India, probably because it was the land of Gandhi, stood the communist challenge well and did not permit it to repeat its usual adventure. A fact of somewhat minor importance is the ranging alongside of capitalism and communism in their battle on India's renaissance during the last war. But India rejuvenated herself in spite of communism. In the sphere where India failed to renew herself, a failure that has cost her terribly and still there is no end to it, a most remarkable alliance of liberalism and communism showed itself. The idea of Pakistan has been supported by the British imperialist as well as the Indian communist, and they have both provoked the birth of the Pakistan state. A most breath-taking phenomenon indeed it is, something that reveals a secret and a mystery of these two doctrines, combating in Europe, but combining in India in order to wage war on her and cut her up into two; could there be a greater revelation than this of communism being with capitalism and liberalism a weapon of Europe against Asia.

The reaction of liberalism to the conflict in China is similarly startling. How many European and American liberals of different varieties have not expressed their preference for the Chinese communists! It appears that some cavernous urge of the European soul drove a number of liberals, perhaps unawares, to detest China's coming up to a great power position during the war. And they have been propagating ever since for diminution in the prestige of the Chinese people and their government.

While communism has brought internal disorder and exhaustion to many Asian peoples and renewal to none, its role in inter-Asian relationships has hitherto been negligible. Inter-Asian wars are caused and concluded by liberalism. Many times Asian countries warred on each other but always under the direct control of some west-European power or at its instigation. The sole exception to this is the recent Sino-Japanese war, for this war alone of all the inter-Asian wars of a century and more arose in the clash of native power impulses. But even this war lost its original character as it progressed and in the end merged like all other Asian wars with the European power-clashes. Asian peoples have undoubtedly caused much bleeding to one another, not as principals of a combat but as mercenaries of one or another representative of European liberalism.

Mercenaries sometimes acquire unexcelled skill and bravery but they bring no strength to the country of their origin. Inter-European wars have been an expression of Europe's vitality, which until recently increased continually despite them or because of them, but inter-Asian wars are an imposition of foreign liberalism and have therefore been a devitalising experience. It may here be added that, even in the sphere of internal order and strength, liberalism, whether in the form of capitalism or of certain organised varieties of socialism, had until recently done immense harm to Asian countries and is still doing it in some. To say this is, however, unnecessary. Capitalism is of course a weapon of Europe against Asia. The problem under study is whether communism is also one.

A very strange event in inter-Asian relationships is the emergence of Japan probably once again as the leading Asian power within three years of a devastating defeat. Undoubtedly, Japan is on the way to regaining her potential in morale, industry and war and is already perhaps stronger than her victor, China. In this strangest of developments may well lie the explanation of a mystery. The reference is not to America's recent niggardliness to China and her generosity to Japan, but to something that lies below its surface. Such speedy and bloodless reversing of the roles of victor and vanquished in Asia merely because the principals of European civilisation so wish bespeaks volumes. Asia is yet weak. It is in most parts free. It is however not the moulder of destiny, but its object. At any rate, that is the estimate of it by European liberalism. Under no other circumstances would west-Europe and the U.S. have ventured to juggle with Asian countries regardless of the principles or claims involved, whether it is in China and Japan or India and Pakistan or the Arab states.

European liberalism is confident that Asia and the whole of it shall still be its mercenary and that no Asian country, however badly treated, can afford to serve notice. On the surface that is true. Communism will naturally not have missed seeing it. Asia must appear to it as so many jackals following on the heels of west-European liberalism. None of the jackals appears like changing its master. Unable, therefore, to wean away any one Asian country from the toils of liberalism and to integrate it with its war and foreign policies, the best that communism can strive for is to infect Asian states with the deadly malady of unending civil strife. The stakes of battle are high; they are nothing less than the mastery of the world. Whether this mastery is to be exercised by the west-European inheritor or the Russian is a comparatively minor point; the real issue is whether European civilisation, through the one or the other, can yet open up fresh springs of energy and vitality to rule almighty over Asia, Africa and the rest of the world. In this combat, liberalism plans to use Asia as a mercenary and communism to infect it with civil

wars. That Asia may yet foil the plans of either is beyond the scope of this enquiry.

The question may now be taken up whether the imperious drive of the European spirit to retain its world supremacy evolved the communist doctrine or later distorted it to serve its purpose. That part of the doctrine which is directly related to the present enquiry is the Marxist law on civilisations, and its study may give the answer. Marxism has classified human history into various stages of civilisation from the pre-communist over the slave and the feudal to various forms of existing capitalism. The struggle of classes specific to a civilisation disintegrates it and leads to a new integration. Capitalism is disintegrating, so says Marxism, because its proletarian grave-diggers become more numerous and better organised exactly as the capitalist class gains in power and wealth. The proletariat which serves to develop capitalism becomes at the same time the agent to achieve the new classless integration of socialism. This integration is soonest achieved there where production is most social, where the numerous proletariat works in cooperative labour, that is, where capitalism is most advanced. Under the Marxist law of civilisations, therefore, the highest peaks of capitalism are also the pioneers of socialism; in other words, western Europe which rules in capitalism must inevitably lead in socialism.

Communist success in Russia instead of in west-European states has called forth numerous febrile attempts to explain this stubborn fact in accordance with Marxism. Not concerned here with a formalistic explanation of the Russian event so as to affirm or deny Marxism, a fact of some interest is the ease with which this event fits into the present analysis. If communism is a doctrine, in the fashion of liberalism, which the exuberant spirit of Europe evolved to maintain its rule, then, no matter what prejudices Marx has for west-Europe against east-Europe, the doctrine has realised itself famously by seizing hold of a European people and renewing it. In passing, let it be noted that culture diffusion, also of capitalist techniques of production and inventions, has been generously practised within the warring

European family, while the non-European world has generally faced a capitalism chary of lending it or selling it its techniques and inventions.

But, apart from a threadbare examination of the happenings in Russia, it has not occurred to the European advocate and critic alike of Marxism to view this law of civilisation in its fullness. If the leading countries of capitalism are also to be the pioneers of socialism on the ground that the new class and the new integration advances most where the old class and the old system have grown most in power and production, this reasoning should have been equally applicable backwards. The dame of history in passing through the feudal and the pastoral and other epochs should have smiled perpetually on Marx's favourites, the German and the British peoples or rather the Teutonic and the Anglo-Saxon races. History has however been a coquette in reality and this stupendous error in the Marxian law on civilisations is in fact a terrific effort on the part of a great European to make permanent what is impermanent.

The conscious motives of Karl Marx and his colleagues are of little relevance. Even so, if Marx had an abstract good-will for all mankind, he was concretely arrogant on European civilisation and its achievements. This arrogance was quite often uninformed. At the same time, his great intellect must have been impressed with that what class struggle and inter-European wars would ultimately do to Europe, which, therefore, stood in need of a doctrine that would overcome these. An ideology is a manifold construction whose elements are as much emotional drives as pursuits of knowledge. Often a national or continental interest bursts through unrecognisably in resplendent robes of universal humanity and the most successful deceivers are those who are not themselves aware of what they are practising. In any case, whether Marx was a great European with an abstract zeal for mankind or that his motives were universal is a question that need not be answered here. What matters for this enquiry is the relevance of Marxist teachings to their theoretical and practical consequences of today.

The practical consequences of communism to Asia and the rest of the world are in great measure related to the theoretical consequences of the Marxist law on civilisations. This law, in regard to the latest human phase of change from capitalism to socialism, equates the countries of capitalist power with those of emergent socialist power. With a great effort of dialectic skill, Marxism places the dawn of socialism just there where the sun of capitalism has been at its zenith. The rest of the world may indeed turn its eye in the direction of the approaching dawn and at best assist the approach in a minor way but its relationship with Europe is essentially that of the potter and the clay. In the very best circumstance Marxism seats the master-potter in Europe and apprentice potters all the world over must be guided and led by him. The non-western world thus loses its independence of thought and action. Its value consists in the service it renders to the great combatants on the stage of Europe. It is not the creator of the new socialist destiny of man; it is the object and the obedient soldier of the destiny being decided in Europe. If the non-western world cannot be of positive service to communism, it must rend itself and bleed so as not to be of use to capitalism. It must therefore play a dependent role alike in Marxist thought as in liberal thought.

The internal struggle of the western world between U.S. and western Europe on the one hand and Russia and east-Europe on the other is fraudulently made to assume the titanic aspect of a world struggle. Both liberalism and communism believe in this fraud and practise it upon the world. Nothing enrages the liberal and the communist so much, and the rage of either is akin, as the thought that their combat may after all be somewhat minor, that a greater struggle for equalising opportunities between the western and the non-western world is actually taking place and that, therefore, mankind is inescapably imperilled by its false division into the two camps of liberalism and communism. On account of its mistaken law on civilisations, Marxism gives to the internal combat of the western world the theoretical aspect of a world struggle.

Even the land of Gandhi is succumbing to this false but disastrous division of the world. Its foreign office is a priceless mirror to Europe and is manned by the stooges or innocents of liberalism and of communism. Just one man in it perhaps has a dim but ineffective awareness of what is happening in the world. While Gandhiji was alive India defeated liberalism and withstood the challenge of communism, and the world hoped for the emergence of a universal doctrine. That hope is temporarily eclipsed.

An inevitable corollary of the Marxian law on civilisations is the peculiar type of internationalism that communism has brought into vogue. In authorised documents of the Communist International and its later variations, countries of the world are ranked according to possibilities of a socialist revolution and the speed with which socialism can be achieved afterwards. Inevitably, Asian and African and such other countries occupy third and fourth places in this ranking. Only on the assumption of their receiving aid from a victorious European proletariat, this theory concedes to them the slow possibility of achieving socialism. Added to this is a later distortion of Marxism. In the original theory the working class through its party was the agent of the socialist revolution and, in the event of two or more working class parties existing side by side, the decision as to which was the true party was left to the actual unfolding of history. Since the Russian revolution, the doctrine has made this decision for all lands in advance of history, and whichever communist party in any country is hitched to Soviet Russia and has its approval is decreed as the true party of revolution. This makes subservience of the world to Europe complete both in theory and organisation. Communism is verily the latest weapon of western civilisation against Asia, Africa and similar regions.

From this negative critique of the international aspect of communism, it is easy to discern that the dominant factor in world history is shift of power and prosperity from one continent or region to another and that ideologies have hitherto been used to hasten or obstruct this shift. Europe, now with the U.S.A., has for long been the prince among continents, but the

world's biggest movement today, not always on the surface, is this continental rearranging of power and prosperity. If history proceeds along lines of yore, the perpetual cycle of prosperous and depressed areas will continue to move. Equally, the time is come for evolving a universal doctrine, a doctrine which will so regulate this continental shift of power as not to depress Europe nor elevate Asia, but to make continents and countries the equals of one another, a doctrine which will supply a method of international organisation so that all peoples may creatively and in their various independent ways combine to achieve the socialist civilisation.

*September, 1948.*

## THE FARMER IN INDIA

For the first time peasant delegates from all over India are meeting in a conference both as a movement and as an organisation. I feel greatly honoured by the opportunity given to me to preside over such a conference.

To make the peasant a stable and continuing influence in politics is a dream which many of us have dreamt. The peasant has no doubt often enough in history revolted and has through his revolts broadened the frontiers of freedom. But these have been in the nature of volcanic eruptions, long periods of quiescence interrupted by sudden and short activity. The peasantry take no part in day by day politics. Living in villages and close to nature and soil and beasts, away from cities where clamorous voices make themselves heard every day, the peasantry are probably the great unchanging mass through whom a civilisation preserves itself. But of creating a new civilisation they do little except to give a few massive strokes, and in building it up bit by bit and day by day, they take no share. I have wondered whether it would be possible for the peasant to influence the daily course of events, in brief, to become the builder of a new civilisation, a co-builder with others, and also what this would look like.

In very recent times, farmers of the United States and certain West-European countries have learnt to combine for continuing pressure on government and society. But their aims are strictly limited. They combat for high prices or arrange for marketing and the use of science. Such organisations take little part in the building up of a new civilisation; they strive merely to ensure their income in the old.

The peasantry of India have been on the move in the past year. They have frequently met and debated and often demonstrated and have sometimes struggled and suffered. The climax of the past year was reached in U.P. and Bihar in the last week of November on their respective capitals and they marched with a view to achieve immediate land reforms. A devout spirit seized

many of them, who walked over hundreds of miles for several days. They shook the country-side out of its torpor and brought it a ray of hope, at least, a puzzle and a question to its suffering but passive mind. Since then, peasant marches have taken place all over the country and are still taking place.

Farmers and land workers have also struggled against evils arising out of ejectment, bad harvest, unjust prices, low wages and halted land reforms. They have been beaten and jailed and have fallen martyrs to the cause of their people's renewal. From these I will not like to forget to my dying day the eleven-year old boy, Chintali, whom I met in a local hospital six days after he had been shot through the thigh and a day before he died, from whose face all expression save a deep sadness had been wiped out and who told me in what must have been among his last words that he could not drink water.

The organisation of the Kisan Panchayat has not kept pace with the movement that it has brought into being. The current year will answer whether movement and organisation will peter out for lack of support from the latter. Scattered over numberless little communities, away from centres of news, in a civilisation where power congregates in the capitals, the peasantry are a stubborn group and it will be a glory indeed if their movement equips them with an organisation such as would help them build up the new Indian Civilisation.

Peasant aspirations have crystallised during the past two years and, in particular, since the inception of the Kisan Panchayats a year ago. Vast masses of farmers all over the country have summed up their wrongs and their desires in the will to achieve six aims:

- (1) Land to the tiller by immediate decree,
- (2) Land army for uncultivated tracts,
- (3) Industrialisation through small-unit machines,
- (4) Re-division of land with the minimum of 20 bighas and a cow per family,
- (5) Parity between agricultural and industrial prices, and
- (6) The four-pillar state.

Although the voice of peasant India, these aims are not at all sectional, but relate to the general well-being of the people as a whole. I can draw some solace from the fact that the darkness thickening around us since the achievement of freedom has been shot through with the bright though yet tremulous glow of these aims.

#### LAND TO THE TILLER BY IMMEDIATE DECREE

To laws and practices of land-ownership must primarily be traced the inertia and selfishness of Indian character, the low level of agricultural production, poverty and the incapacity to act. Those who work on land are caught up in a prickly forest of laws and practices which press on them and leave them no time nor taste except to protect their marginal livelihood. The division of land workers into landlords of various sizes and types, tenants, sub-tenants, of various removes and holdings, agricultural labourers of registered and insecure holdings and landless labourers and artisans has, in conjunction with the insupportable pressure on land, produced in the village a war of each against all. No one thinks of improvements. Every one thinks of his own share. A snatch and grab from a larder that does not increase but whose sharers increase continually becomes the dominating feature of life. The mind is palsied, greed and fear prevail and the search for individual uplift and security loses its direction because no one seeks for general uplift and welfare.

A great moment was missed on August 15, 1947, when the Union Jack was pulled down and the wheel-tri-colour was hoisted. The skeleton of political freedom came but the flesh and blood of economic freedom did not. I had suggested to the Government a week before this memorable day, which will no doubt be equally remembered for this disastrous betrayal of missing a historic opportunity to issue a proclamation abolishing landlordism.

Poverty has stayed and even grown. Improvements have stopped. Trees have been cut down. Farmers are ejected. A class struggle is artificially created due to the delay in abolition

of wicked landlaws. By having earlier encouraged farmers to hope for economic freedom and by delaying in the realisation of those hopes, the government party have encouraged futile and meaningless group struggle, impotent greed and, helplessness, and have generally numbed the village.

The government party entered this dense forest of landlaws with the intention to cut it down but have obviously lost their way because of their effort to count and number the various trees and to prune them instead of destroying them. They are now adding other trees to this forest. The only solution for the land problem in India with regard to its aspect of ownership would be to think boldly and act courageously. Those who actually till the land must be made secure masters of their harvest. This simple principle has to be legislated. Further legislation may come in its own time. But the simple thing here and now is to secure the harvest to the actual tiller of land. Around 800 days have been missed for the issuing of this proclamation. When I suggested the abolition of landlordism within 24 hours, this was precisely what I meant. "Farmers of India—You are henceforth the masters of the harvest you till. Prepare to deposit Government revenue payable on your plot into the Treasury," continues to be the proclamation which alone can scatter the gloom that has settled on the village. Smaller landlords may be assured of a rehabilitation compensation through another proclamation.

It may well be that minor injustices to a small or large number of persons may be done through such a proclamation but what about the monstrous injustice of poverty that is suffocating all alike. If the constitution is a bar to the issue of such a proclamation, the reproaches of poverty shame that constitution and it must go.

Some people would prefer to call this revolution rather than legislation. I do not mind what word is used, if the fear of insecurity and the corresponding greed that is born out of it are removed and an active mood for general improvements replaces the present struggle for a miserable living. The village

to-day is a vast battleground of craven intrigues to save one's own plot or to seize another man's. This satanic war must end so that men's minds are enabled to think clearly.

A whole series of problems may arise with regard to land arrangements and also to the considerable numbers that may not yet gain a livelihood, even after the issue of this proclamation. These problems will necessarily have to be tackled and they might even prove stubborn to begin with but they should never be allowed to become a cause for hindering the basic law that the tillers of land are masters of the harvest. I need not add that this principle applies also to ryotwari areas, where, between the state and the tiller, an absentee tenant has stepped in and he must go. Litigation, a major curse of the village, will be reduced after the application of this principle.

#### LAND ARMY FOR UNCULTIVATED TRACTS

Considerable numbers without means of livelihood in the village and also in towns may be absorbed in the food army for uncultivated tracts. Undoubtedly, nearly a 100 million acres of cultivable land can be brought under the plough without doing any damage whatever to necessary forests and conditions of soil and climate. These cultivable tracts, however, lie largely in mass, away from settled villages and are not likely to yield immediate harvest. It would be idle to expect private initiative to cultivate these tracts.

A food army recruited by the State and fed, clothed and housed by the State provides the only answer. The British example may be recalled in this connection. In the year 1942, when war was at its peak and Britain was being bombed and man power, was scarce, the land army in Britain brought nearly four million acres of new land under the plough. With immeasurably greater resources in manpower and land, the food army in India should be able to bring at least 10 million acres of land under the plough per year for a period of two years.

The problems of financing and providing capital equipment for such a huge undertaking may appear to be immense. Con-

sidered in the light of efficiency and maximum output, they might even appear insurmountable, for India has no bulldozers, tractors and the like, cannot expect to receive them in any adequate numbers from outside and has neither the skill nor the capital basis to produce them at home. The test, therefore, for the food army shall not be that of efficiency but that of attainability. Whatever is attainable by way of agricultural tools, crude or refined, in our present condition of manufacture, should be brought to the aid of the food army. I need not point out that agricultural tools should be among the top priorities for iron and steel and also that they will be increasingly refined as manufacture proceeds.

To feed the hungry millions of India, there is no other way. Within a year or two of the inception of the food army, India will become self sufficient in food. Again, the spectre of retrenchment and unemployment that hangs over vast numbers in towns and villages can be laid low by their recruitment into the food army.

The world may still come to our rescue and we to its, if India undertakes to work out an over-all economic plan, of which the food army is the central pivot. Clare and Harris Wofford, world federalists of America, have mooted the suggestion that the rotting wheat harvest of the United States be gifted away, not for sale on markets but for consumption of needy sections e.g., the Indian refugees. Theirs may be a lone voice today but if India had the plan of a food army, I have no doubt that it would awaken some responsive chords in U. S. or France, Russia or England or elsewhere. I may also suggest that there is a whole volume of opinion ranging from that rare spirit, H. N. Brailsford and his wife Eva Maria to actionists like Robert Sarrazac and Cliff Dancer, and thinkers like Scott Buchanan and Stringfellow Barr who would like India to start her planning so that she may be able to invite the world through the U. N. or some other suitable machinery, for international collaboration on schemes of welfare. What a glorious vista for peace and welfare opens out if numerous teams e.g., Americans and Frenchmen and Chinese and Mexicans and Germans and Indians and others merge their

## THE FARMER IN INDIA

various nationalities into the world cause and work together in comradeship and joy in far corners of the world. I still remember that, as my plane was due to take off from Paris, Phillip Rupp and Norman Hart passed on a slip to me. These and numberless other men are only too willing to leave the comforts of their civilization if only they are enabled to participate in creating something new somewhere. Let us have international brigades of peace.

Even assuming that no talent nor resources were available from outside, whatever is attainable inside the country should suffice to get the food army going. Among benefits accruing from the food army would be not only the solution of immediate problems of food and employment but also the introduction of dynamic elements into the social structure and agricultural economy of our people. One can well imagine the effect of joint working on a project of peace by various castes and creeds on the social structure. It will be democratised in an enduring way.

Members of the food army will in due course become members of co-operative or collective villages according to their option.

The suggestion for the food army has met a whole round of fire from ridicule and irony to its nominal acceptance by the Congress and the Sarvodaya Samaj. Between the land army of a million men and more which the Socialist Party and the Kisan Panchayat have suggested and bands of advisers and experts whom the Sarvodaya Samaj has chosen to call as land army, there is not the remotest connection.

All cultivable and uncultivable land, no matter where they are situated, must be brought under the control of the central government. Provincial prejudices and separatism must not be allowed to play ducks and drakes with the food of the people, the unity of the country and the glorious prospects of a revitalised and democratic social structure.

## INDUSTRIALISATION THROUGH SMALL-UNIT MACHINES

The social and economic structure of the country is moribund beyond measure. Techniques of work prevailing centuries

ago are applied to this day and together with static techniques, the mind has also become an extremely sterile and loose mass. A pall of mental and material poverty is spread over the land. While changes in property and economic relationship are essential, in order to introduce the element of activity into Indian Life, change in technique is no less essential. The application of science to agriculture and industry is probably the biggest single requirement of the total situation in the country. Not until techniques have become dynamic and a spirit of inventiveness has seized the land, is there a chance of revitalising the people.

The rate of capital investments per man ranges from Rs. 150/- in India to Rs. 3,000/- in west Europe and nearly Rs. 8,000/- in the United States. Invitations to the Indian people to produce more wealth without equipping them with better tools may lead to certain virtuosities in advertising but nothing more. If an average Indian has only Rs. 150/- worth of tools to produce wealth with, while his west European comrade can command tools worth Rs. 3,000/-, the material and mental poverty in under developed economies receives adequate explanation. The number and quality of tools and fruitful practices have to be increased.

Science in agriculture has at least as much to do with the adoption of simple scientific practices as with mechanisation. Undoubtedly, the two pictures one from west Europe of revolving pipes irrigating a plot of land as though it was raining and the other from India of two persons swinging a small basket the whole day long in order to scoop water out of a pond on to their land cannot exist side by side in a world that wishes to banish poverty and war and to become one. Mechanical appliances will have to be introduced but the size and quality must undergo a radical change.

Even greater is the need for the adoption of scientific methods with regard to manuring, seeds, rotation of crops and the like. I do not know how many Indian farmers are aware of the fact that a mango tree beyond a hundred years is a liability, that it too needs manuring, that it eats up the soil deep down while

leaving the surface soil unused and that, therefore, a field of crops can profitably be planted where mango trees once stood. At the same time, a successful war on evils such as field pests and rats which eat up anywhere between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of our food production can be undertaken only when the war of each against all has ceased in the village and farmers have realised that their selfish interests can be served only through the pursuit of collective ends. The Village Panchayat may then be able to build a storehouse.

A cause and accompaniment of stark poverty is the inordinate pressure on land. The country has no industries worth the name. But industrial activity depends on inventions. Among the strange phenomena in the country today is the complete dearth of inventiveness. India cannot boast of a single technical invention in the present age. It is impossible to revive economic life with the help entirely of inventions made in Europe and elsewhere. While lack of savings is a bar to capital investments, let it not be forgotten that the lack of inventions is an even greater bar. Savings are transformed into capital only when inventions are made or imported machinery is available. India cannot build herself on imported machinery. Even a billion-dollar or billion-rupee loan, assuming that they were available through some luck, can barely suffice to raise capital investment from Rs. 150/- to Rs. 160/- per person. Let us recall the chasm between India and West Europe—Rs. 150/- to Rs. 3,000/-. Imported machinery may, of course, be necessary and desirable, particularly for schemes of river training, production of electricity and the like. But scientists and technicians of India are faced with a problem, of the colossal magnitude of which neither they nor the politicians seem to be aware.

Quite a few of the basic inventions and formulae with regard to heavy industry and chemicals may, of course, have to be adopted or rather adapted in our country. That is a big enough task for our scientists and technicians. Care will have to be taken that the result is not merely the expensive manufacture of prototypes.

The scientific problem in India, as in all undeveloped economies, is more stubborn than what a mere transplanting of western methods of manufacture would occasion. India has neither the skill and the resources, nor even the economic frame-work for large scale industry and large unit machinery. The west evolved its technique and its machinery side by side with the annexation of three-fourths of the world as its village. Large scale industry and techniques were possible in imperial centuries. I do not think that the effort can be repeated, even apart from the question of its desirability.

The world seems to progress only under some kind of a material compulsion; the desirable becomes possible only when it is necessary. India cannot for many decades to come raise her capital investments to the European level. She may not be able even to make a beginning if she plans her economic development on the large scale basis. Her only hope is the spirit of inventiveness in the sphere of small machinery. Perhaps this compulsion to plan small-unit machinery is also desirable from a social, cultural and world viewpoint.

Scientists and technicians of India hold the key to the future of under-developed territories and, therefore, to the future of the world. They have not yet begun wielding the key. They have shown little skill or few opportunities have been available to them in the development of heavy and chemical industries. They have absolutely no record of inventions and they shall not have it, until they direct their energies into the sphere of small-unit techniques.

Both the policy of the State and the attitude of the scientists have to change. The system of over-seas studies for Indian students will have to be planned and state-controlled, at least in the initial stages, so that public and private money is not wasted on futile subjects. I would much rather have teachers and engineers and foremen come from overseas to India. Again, the present practice of encouraging research on any odd subject, in any fanciful sphere, will have to be abandoned and a systematic planning of research, particularly for basic industries and small

machines, carried out. With regard to fundamental research, I have nothing to say for that must be left to go where it wills. But if a student of economics and politics is at all competent to advise scientists and technicians, I would request them to direct their energies into the invention of small-unit machinery. I am not unaware of the wants and indigenities of scientific workers nor of the fact that the bureau of Scientific Research with the Government of India has become, like every other administrative department, a bureau for individual preferment. But conditions will change. Scientists and technicians may prepare themselves for the time when inventiveness in the sphere of small-unit techniques will be appreciated and honoured.

Villages and towns of our country have abundant raw material of various kinds. It is being wasted. Its processing and manufacture would be possible only when small machinery is available. I foresee the time when over all our country, in towns and villages, will be spread millions of little power-driven machines for producing wealth and easing the pressure on land.

#### RE-DIVISION OF LAND WITH MAXIMUM OF 30 ACRES PER FAMILY

Excessive increase in population without any opening in new occupations has resulted in fragmentation and uneconomic holdings on the one hand and a large mass of agricultural labourers on the other. Some families, however, have become aristocrats and capitalists on land.

After acceptance of the principle that the tiller is the master of his harvest, re-division of land becomes inevitable. A ceiling of 30 acres must be fixed so that a family is unable to own more than thirty acres of land. Both the family and the acreage have to be measured in average; an acre means an acre of average fertility while a family means a family of five.

Ever since the minimum demand of 13 acres or 20 Bighas and a cow was made nearly two years ago, it has met with sneers and angers. People have wanted to know if land is a bit of rubber to be extended at will and cut into bits according to one's

fancy. Land may not be like rubber, although half over again of the existing acreage can obviously be added to it, the number of men and women who work on land is somewhat like rubber, extended under an incompetent administration and a poor economy and can be shortened with the help of planning and competent management.

Land available for cultivation is around 40 crore acres, while the number of families depending on agriculture may at present be estimated between 4 and 5 crores. An average of 8 to 10 acres is thus possible on the present basis. However, the three aims of the food army, small-unit industries and re-division of land, have to be taken together. When men are unable or unwilling to see the three aims as a complex unity, they only wave their arms around to question their listeners rhetorically where surplus land is available in their village.

The question of how to maintain re-division of land after it has been effected and to prevent a reverting to the old order is raised. Once it is admitted that no interest, selfish or otherwise, can be served without pursuing collective aims, the total economy of the country being so preposterously poor, egalitarian division of land is easily the end which laws of inheritance and the like must serve. In cases of distress, particularly as with widows and orphans, the Village Panchayat may take over the management of particular plots and distribute them for cultivation according to its decision.

#### PARITY BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL PRICE

The price factor in agriculture is decisive. Prices of agricultural produce are normally low and the terms of trade are unfavourable to agriculture. A large number of producers are spread over vast areas and it is normally difficult for them to control prices according to their will. On the other hand, in abnormal times when food production is not adequate to meet the demand, prices tend to go up rather sharply. In either case, unregulated prices of agricultural produce cause irritation. When low, they decrease the production of food and depress the standard

of living of what is yet the most considerable section in the world's population, and when high, they irritate the city dweller and the landless labourer and cause unnecessary fissures in social harmony. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance, for the well-being of agriculturists and of other sections of the population, and also for maintaining and encouraging the production of food, that agricultural prices should be regulated.

The principle of parity between agricultural and industrial prices does justice to all sections of the population and ensures production and well-being. In many developed countries, bureaus function whose main job is to work out costs of production, price indices, profit rates as between agriculture and industry. They arrive at a legitimate norm. When prices fluctuate from this norm, serious arguments take place as to how to restore the balance. The burden is then taken over by the farmer or the consumer or both partly or else the Government steps in with a subsidy so that no disturbance is caused in the relationship between the farmer and the consumer. While it may not be possible for a country like India to work out very accurate statistical calculations rough and ready solutions are attainable. Nevertheless, in the absence of any policy, the Indian Government have shown an inclination in the past year to follow the line of least resistance. It is easy for a government to make an attack on unorganised peasant masses as against combines of industrialists in the sphere of price policies. Such an attack was palpably made through the grain procurement polices of 1949.

The agitation that took place against grain procurement revealed how totally faulty government calculations were with regard to crop yields, surpluses and price behaviour. Government's anticipation that the gap between market price and procurement price would be narrowed to Rs. 5/- per maund was never fulfilled. The gap stood somewhere around Rs. 10/-; around Rs. 13/- being the procurement price and Rs. 20/- to Rs. 24/- being the market price. The costs of procurement were heavy. There was also a great deal of shady dealing by government servants. Food adulteration has also been common. The

Government had also to use the law in various cases and firings and arrests took place.

If the Kisan Panchayat were a farmers' organisation of the sectional pattern, it would have lobbied and agitated simply for increase in agricultural prices. That would have been the easiest course to follow. The issue then would have been crudely placed before farmers and they would have equally crudely reacted to it. But the Kisan Panchayat is an organisation of farmers of India aiming at the complete renewal of the people of India as a whole, for it thinks that sectional interests can have unhindered play only in maturer economies. The Kisan Panchayat put forward the principle of parity. It did not agitate against the reduction of agricultural prices. It agitated for a simultaneous reduction in the price of industrial and city produce. It suggested voluntary procurement by Village Panchayats and block trading between the city and villages, at least in selected areas. It also suggested the reasonable exemption limit of farmers under Rs. 20/- rental who had no surpluses to sell.

Leaders of the government in the centre and in the provinces were guilty of mischievous or ill-informed utterances. In one town the Congress Party even tried to stage a demonstration in order to set the city dweller against the Kisan Panchayat and the Socialist Party but the procession that it took out was so thin that it caused considerable amusement. While Government were guilty of tampering with the food of the people, an offence as serious as any other, the Government party indulged in a vicious campaign of misrepresenting the stand of the Kisan Panchayat. They misused Government resources and they had newspapers and the radio at their disposal.

Farmers may never forget the Suwana massacre which took place last year in Rajasthan when 20 peaceable protestors against the grain levy were slaughtered in a few moments.

It is possible that some elements in the Kisan Panchayat may not have fully understood the price policy of their organisation. They might have agitated for an increase in procurement price,

pure and simple. This they did in ignorance or error. But the majority of the Kisan Panchayat tried to bring home to the farmers and to the people as a whole that prices of all produce, cloth, cement, iron, kerosine oil, on the one hand and food on the other should be simultaneously lowered according to norms of parity. I may once again emphasise the importance of this price factor. Not all the village owns land. A considerable part of it is landless. It has to make purchases of grain from the market for a large part of the year. Village workers will do well to make a note of this factor. A simple demand of increase in agricultural prices would upset almost half the village, would cause great hardship to them, if fulfilled and, therefore, alienate their sympathies. It is always best to remember that in such a terribly depressed economy as the Indian, sectional selfishness is harmful even to the section that adopts it.

#### THE FOUR-PILLAR STATE

In order to achieve national harmony coupled with live faith, a vital democracy with a clean administration, the Kisan Panchayat has evolved the concept of the four-pillar state. In time to come, this will perhaps prove to be one of those great ideas which move mankind.

Through various forms of political organization which mankind has hitherto evolved, the hierarchical principle has almost always come on top. Whether in a monarchy, a dictatorship or a democracy, power tends to get concentrated in a few centres and in a few persons and the hierarchy of less and lesser power is then built up. It has of course not been a case of pure black and white, for the popular principle has ever been in combat with the hierarchical and has often achieved small but significant victories.

Federalism has been one of the most liberal principles in constitution making. But federalism as hitherto understood has been a simple matter of dividing state power between a centre and the federating units. Even the most liberal constitutions of the world have been two pillar constitutions. Some power has,

of course, been conferred on Municipalities and other local bodies by Parliaments. These powers are very limited. They deal with simple questions of sanitation, water supply, primary education and the like. They are a conferment from top and are not a part of the organic law of any land. They are certainly no legislative powers and not even executive in any full way. They do not deal with the way of life of any community but merely provide the local framework of health or education in which the community pursues the way prescribed for it by superior legislation or other agencies.

At no time perhaps was it possible for an ordinary citizen to take an intelligent or effective part in the total affairs of his country. This is even more difficult in the complicated conditions of to-day. He is therefore, left merely with the choice of persons whom he might prefer over others to think and act for him. In the act of choosing he may achieve some degree, large or small, of political understanding. This condition is difficult to change except by the pursuit of some novel directions.

If the total affairs of a country cannot be simplified so as to achieve the active participation of the common man, they have to be cut up in small and yet smaller quantities. Federalism must go whole hog. Sovereign power must not reside alone in centre and federating units. It must be broken up and diffused over the smallest region where a group of men and women live. The next great advance in constitution making will be when a country frames its constitution on the basis of the four-pillar state, the village, the district, the province and the centre, being four pillars of equal majesty and dignity. The Constituent Assembly of India might have done it. It missed its opportunity. It contented itself with a potpourri of European and American constitutions and the Government of India Act which foreign rule had framed.

The four-pillar state is obviously not a mere executive arrangement. It is not as if superior parliaments legislate and the village and district organs are left with the execution of the laws. The four-pillar state is both a legislative and an executive arrangement. It is a way of life and to all spheres of human activity,

for instance, production, ownership, administration, planning, education and the like, the four-pillar state provides a structure and a way. The commonalty of a state is to be so organised and sovereign power so diffused that each little community in it lives the way of life that it chooses. Through these various ways of life must indeed run a common bond strong enough to band the numerous communities into a state. How strong must these various bonds be in their four-pillar order must be left for time to determine. No precise list of federal or state or district or village or concurrent subjects can yet be drawn up. Experience and time and perhaps the next Constituent Assembly of India will make precise allocations. For the present there must be the unhedged will to diffuse power and to let each little community live intelligently consistent with the integrity and the unity of the nation.

I may straightaway say that the four-pillar state is not to be confused with the idea of the self-sufficient village. If that were so, it would not be a case of the four-pillar state but as in India 700,000 different states. Under the four-pillar state, the 700,000 villages and the hundreds of districts would have numerous bonds, economic as well as cultural, that make them interdependent and combine them into a nation. The idea underlying the four-pillar state is not that of the self-sufficient village but of the intelligent and vital village, although the two ideas cross each other at several points. Quite a bit of the pushing about of men and goods seems futile and yet villages are yearning legitimately enough for better and speedier postal connections.

I may be permitted to indicate certain illustrations of the four-pillar state which may or may not turn out to be valid in practice but which are adequate pointers of direction and policy. The armed forces of the state may be controlled by the centre, the armed police by the province but all other police may be brought under district and village control. While industries like the railways or iron and steel may be controlled by the centre, the small unit textile industry of the future may be left to district and village ownership and management. While price fixing may be a central subject, the structure of agriculture and the ratio of

capital and labour in it may be left to the choice of the district and the village. Several departments which are at present run by state governments through their servants, for example, those for Co-operative Societies, rural and agricultural development, a substantial part of irrigation, seeds, revenue collecting and the like may be transferred to the village and the district. I need not add that a substantial part of state revenues should stay with the village and the district, as in the case of U.P., anywhere between 15 and 20 crores out of a total state revenue of over 60 crores should by right belong to the village and the district.

The four-pillar state will provide some answer to the continuing debate on freedom and planning. Not through the mixed economy of social and private ownership but through spreading social ownership over the four pillars of the state will it be possible to diffuse economic power and the right to make decisions. No group of central planners will hold undisputed sway and cells of numberless little communities will judge and act and compel sovereign attention. Man will be free as part of his little village. I foresee variations in the ratio of capital and labour as a great lever of freedom. While the rate of capital investments in India as in other undeveloped economies must necessarily be raised perhaps between Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 per person, the wide margin between the two possibilities affords an infinite wealth of choices to each village. Some may like more capital and just that little bit which they like to add, while others may like unhurried labour and just that little bit less of tempo which they prefer.

The four-pillar state rises above the issues of regionalism and functionalism. It is a structure which gives meaning even to the functionalist agencies of government and society. One may well conceive of a functionalist splitting of power as between Co-operative Corporations, Trade Unions, Parliaments and the like staying confined to the top. For each functionalist agency may concentrate power in its top leadership. The concept of the four-pillar state diffuses power also within people's organisations and Corporations. I may here add that rancorous voices of provincial narrowness now being raised in India would have been

very much subdued, if, instead of two colossuses, a centre and a province facing each other, power, including the right to choose its language of primary instruction and commerce, were given to the village community.

The four-pillar state may indeed appear fantastic to many in view of the special conditions of the country, its illiteracy, its fears and superstitions and, above all, its castes. The village representative may indeed be selfish and ignorant and raise caste above justice. And yet to give him power seems the only way to deliver the people from inertia as well as an administration that is both top-heavy and corrupt. The dictatorial or hierarchical principle can never put life into the mass of the people, for they have sunk very low and are utterly disorganised and are yet very numerous; it must necessarily make permanent an administration by persons engaged in individual rather than general welfare. The popular principle of the four-pillar state may, on the other hand, cause great confusion and occasion numerous errors and upsets in the begining but will clean up the administration in the end by the process of forcing the vast mass to judge and act. For instance, the only way to purify controls is to leave their administration to the village, town and district Panchayats and to take them out of the hands of legislators and government servants.

The Congress Party has set its face against the four-pillar state. It has not even arranged elections to the village panchayats except in one province. Even in that province, it has sought to reduce the village representative to the status of the servant of a government servant, it has administrated a sinful oath to him and has, by ordinance, suppressed the system of annual elections.

The special conditions of agrarian economy and of a vast and illiterate mass have perhaps made possible the concept of the four-pillar state. And yet that is the way of the future for the world as a whole. The inadequacies of parliamentarian democracy have been met by the equal inadequacies of proletarian dictatorship and either is unable to prevent concentration of power and tyranny. By giving power to small communities of men where democracy of the first grade is possible, the four-pillar

state ensures effective and intelligent democracy to the common man.

In the outlining of the six aims, the agricultural labourer may appear to some to have been left out. However, he has always been there more so than any other. His immediate tribulations with regard to false registrations or the total absence of them and the insecurity of homesteads must be a major concern of the Kisan Panchayat. I have advised struggles in areas where false registrations of tenure are numerous and harvests are forcibly cut.

When the Congress got into power, the initial blunder it committed was to dissociate itself, for fear of unrest, from the weak, unorganised and illiterate peasantry, labourers, shopkeepers, salaried people, etc., who have neither time nor capacity yet to take part in politics. The situation that obtains today is that while the British have departed, their proteges, millionaires, princes, landlords and high officials remain. The task of new construction remains unaccomplished. If a ruler fails to show his worth at the very start, he is done for, and his potentialities are exhausted. The U.P. Government failed to abolish Zamindari in the very beginning; the result is that it committed the Tughlakian blunder of raising the Zamindari Abolition Fund.

The Congress is further guilty of becoming wise only after the event. It has not planned things, nor is it ready even to meet situations. The Congress has no policies, and I do not subscribe to the view that it is preserving capitalist policy. The Congress is like a person in a whirlpool reaching out its hands in whatever direction it can without success. Thus, while classless society is declared as its goal, the Congress in practice aligns itself with landlords and capitalists. It meddles with the affairs of all sections of the people, but none is befriended. Under such circumstances, conditions of the pond prevail where each small fish is eaten up by the next bigger one.

Owing to the planlessness and the initial blunders of the Congress, the country is at a standstill with an ever-increasing population; this means retrogression. Production is declining, poverty is on the increase, and there is disillusionment and distrust all round.

There has been no increase in the production of food; neither is it possible. The Government had in 1948 announced that import of foodgrains would be stopped in 1949. The Government could not succeed in this. Its fresh resolve to stop food imports by 1951 is certain to meet the same fate. In the meantime, famine conditions have already arisen, and from Gujarat and Rajasthan lakhs of cattle have been moved, resulting in considerable deaths. Human deaths too have sometimes been reported. When the food supply has not increased along with an increase in population, famine is a sure consequence. If land reforms do not come quickly and a food army is not immediately recruited, a famine will be impossible to prevent. For the eminently desirable task of controlling rivers, the government drew up about twenty schemes simultaneously, without regard for the resources. Several plans of similar nature also resulted in a kind of planlessness.

It has now been found necessary to close down several schemes. If these schemes had also included small scale projects, the means could be secured for their simultaneous implementation. But Government schemes are characteristically paper schemes which fail in the absence of material resources. Successful schemes in India can only be based on the four-pillar state; local effort and improvisation and workability shall be the test, not efficiency.

Industrial production has suffered a similar fate. Government have not yet learnt that accumulation of capital in this country cannot be achieved through private enterprise. On the one hand there is great need for new industries in the country, and on the other considerable capital has been sent out of the country recently. Among the many reasons for this transfer of capital to Europe and America a major one is that money can not be turned into industrial capital in the absence of scientific research and invention of machines.

The drain of capital out of India is through illegal means and mainly through foreign trade. Lately, foreign trade has presented a strange story. Government policy has, perhaps, been of allowing

enough cosmetics to be imported to keep the people happy. Till now we have been drawing on our resources, and therefore, the full impact of this suicidal policy will not be felt till the sterling balances are exhausted. Nationalisation of foreign assets is essential for the industrial development of the country, but this has not yet been taken in hand. At the present rate the resources are not likely to last for more than two years.

Even existing plants are being closed down, to speak nothing of new ones being started. The habit of learning from experience has resulted in closures of cotton and jute mills. Jute and cotton from Pakistan are not forthcoming; import of cotton from Egypt and East Africa should have been planned long ago. Due to these follies we have had to close down mills, when we should have produced surplus for export to South East Asia which would have strengthened our relations with that area. Sometime back there was talk about import of rice from Burma and export of cloth to Indonesia but nothing further has been heard in the matter.

That capitalisation through private enterprise is thoroughly useless is proved by the fact that much capital in the last few years was invested in the vegetable oil industry. Private enterprise seeks profit, whatever it may cost the nation. There are no signs of establishment of a National Investment Board.

Unemployment is on the increase and this is inevitable. As a matter of fact, the major part of the population is underemployed. And in the absence of new agricultural and industrial undertakings unemployment is bound to be on the increase. Neither have the Government any set policy in regard to high prices. Compared to war time prices, commodities are four times more expensive. Matters have been further complicated by various contrary policies adopted by the Government from time to time. At one time the currency was increased; its withdrawal was decided upon some four months back; the circulation has again increased in the past few weeks. In December the circulation was 1017 crores, and in January it was increased to 1122 crores. Due to lack of any policy no solution of the problem of high prices is

visible. Restrictions on business are either unnecessary or are operated by agencies which make honesty impossible.

The ignorance of the Central Government in economic matters is only matched by its complete failure to establish any standards in the political sphere. The working of democratic system is based on the four concepts of the state, the Government, the party and the individual and on the acceptance of certain conventions in regard to these. During the last four years there has been so complete an absence of any conventions that Government is gradually coming to mean only two persons. It would not be unfair to say that to-day there are only two Congressmen in the country. Misuse of Government privileges, Government services, the radio, arbitrary promulgation and use of laws and ordinances, recognition of pet kisan and labour unions and educational institutions—all these are on the increase. Disregard of standards reached its culmination when a sum of Rs. 20 lacs was paid from the Public Exchequer for the expenses of the Jaipur session of the Congress which was purely a party conference. When such conditions prevail, the stage is set for the free play of dishonesty, immorality, unrest, injustice and widespread despair.

Given below is an example of land distribution which shows how reactionary can be the results of a do-nothing policy. This is how the refugees from West Punjab have been rehabilitated in the East Punjab :

<i>Number of Claimants</i>	<i>Total Net allot- ments in acres</i>	<i>Average Net Allotment</i>
50	16,822	296.5
66	13,860	210.0
200	31,200	156.0
442	45,366	102.6
879	66,983	76.2
6,245	279,477	44.6
16,599	414,577	24.9
71,624	833,504	11.6
75,248	354,244	4.7
234,707	358,815	1.5
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
406,060	2,414,848	

In the absence of definite plans and policies poverty of the body and soul increases. In the resultant gloom men's minds unconsciously turn towards dictatorship. In a sense this country has always hankered after sadhus and incarnations for relief from distress. Acharya Narendra Deva has aptly called it a habit of seeking the easy path. Indeed, there are leaders among all peoples but when a people are robust their leaders are important only in so far as they symbolise ideas and programmes. Some people have appeared on the scene. There are some who under the garb of religion and caste are lying in wait to establish such dictatorships. Such dictatorships based on religion ordinarily prove upholders of reactionary systems and protagonists of monarchy manifested in millionaires and landlords and such other people. The wealthy consider poverty a natural and irremediable phenomenon of humanity. Attempts are being made to establish such a dictatorship in the name of religion. Even if such attempts were doomed to failure there is always the danger that these may result in national disintegration.

In fact, religion is now a growing influence over politics throughout the world. Whether in Europe or in Asia conservative elements based on religion are gaining in strength. It would be a welcome sign if politics thereby could become religious but the tragedy is that religion is becoming political.

One of the reasons of this communal danger is of course lack of planning. Another reason is not far to seek. Politics is in the main controversial in nature. In attempting resolution of political conflicts whenever such politics proves futile men's minds turn to religion which is mainly peaceful in character. People expect religion to bring peace and unity. Thus religion shows itself as a danger wherever politicians fail to bring solace to the soul even in the midst of political conflicts.

Communist dictatorship is another possible peril. There are people who think that the country will either remain Congressite or shall turn communist and that there is no room for a third camp. External events are the cause of such apprehensions mainly. American influence too, is increasing in this country.

In many cases Socialist propaganda gives the impression that the conflict is basically between communism and the Congress. Many Socialists are apt to prophecy that India's following China's fate was inevitable if the Congress Government did not improve. This would mean that communism can not be averted unless the Congress improves. In fact, if the Socialist Party could grow strong, it could lead the nation correctly whatever the Congress did. By expressing such helplessness, Socialists weaken their own ranks. The same mental attitude expresses itself in negative propaganda or criticism. Unless Socialists initiate positive constructive discussions on our programmes and policies the Congress will continue to hold the field, or else other dangers will appear. Dissatisfaction against the Congress is widespread and increasing; our task now is not to increase the dissatisfaction, but to draw people to the folds of the Socialist Party and the Kisan Panchayat. The great danger we have to ward off is negative criticism.

The biggest curse of non-Congress politics is its negativism. To direct the people towards a positive outlook is the main task. They must begin thinking as to what exactly they want and how to get it. I should think this can be done alone by a plan to end poverty. If all sections of the population, farmers and land workers, factory workers and shop-keepers, artisans and the free professions, begin to see their hearts' desire reflected in such a plan, an irresistible symphony of people's voice will be heard in place of the noises that cancel each other. Such a plan should include:

1. Lowering of prices on the basis of parity between agricultural and industrial prices.
2. Austerity and sacrifice to be shared by all so that no income or salary exceeds Rs. 1000 a month.
3. Industrialisation with the help of small-unit machines, the invention and manufacture of which to be promoted by the state.
4. Any factory running below capacity to be taken over by the State, and immediate nationalisation of basic industries.

5. Anti-corruption commissioners in every state and at the centre with departments independent of the government.
6. Land to the tiller and redivision of lands— $12\frac{1}{2}$  acres minimum and 30 acres maximum. Correction of wrong entries in Patwaris' registers.
7. Cultivation of 1 crore acres. of new land by a state-recruited food army.
8. Decentralisation of administration and of economy so as to achieve the four-pillar state. Repeal of discriminatory laws including the criminal tribes act.
9. Housing programmes and other economic activity to provide full employment.
10. Establishment of polytechnic schools and people's high schools and centres for youth and women for cultural activities.
11. Immediate adult franchise elections in unrepresented areas, that is, merged states and unions.
12. Pursuit of a positive policy of world peace through promoting full freedom and rights for all nations; social and economic equality among a people and between nations, and a peace bloc which can dictate truce to warring Power blocs.
13. Volunteer bands for agriculture, irrigation, road-making and the like.

If the Kisan Panchayat could release a passionate debate around such a plan in all corners of the country, it would most surely succeed in infusing positivism and faith in our people.

Reconstruction of the country is impossible through the ordinarily known ways. Funds through taxation could never suffice for such huge tasks. Increase in money circulation, though sound in principle when accompanied by activity and production, has great dangers, especially in an impoverished country like ours. Other means have to be sought.

Unemployment, widespread in the country, is of two kinds. There are people who are completely idle; there are others who have not sufficient work to do, even though employed. Utilisa-

tion of idle hours will perhaps be the greatest objective of successful government. This is impossible of accomplishment on the basis of money payment. It could only be done on a voluntary basis. If people would feel themselves the owners of fields and factories, this feeling would bring them the realisation that their personal gains are possible through social activity alone. In addition to the 7 or 8 hours' work for their livelihood, they could volunteer to work an hour every day for the nation. It is well-known that a major part of the reconstruction in Yugoslavia has been achieved through voluntary effort. I have calculated that if the 4 crores of adults in the country volunteered an hour's labour every day, the tasks accomplished would equal those which the Government of India gets done by a year's budget. Thus, without raising any new taxes, government's budget can be doubled, which would be impossible otherwise.

Such voluntary activity is only possible through socialism, which will accomplish the double task of bringing a sense of communal ownership and of achieving immediate results of planned production through voluntary effort.

In countries that have been free for a long time and are rich, politics can be based on periodic and scattered movements. But in our country we have to start building up national wealth. The prevailing mood of despondency is most unfortunate for the country in such a situation. It should be the task of an organisation like the Kisan Panchayat to instil faith into the people through constructive activity. The very sight of rural reconstruction through voluntary effort will bring confidence and faith to the hearts of men and women.

For another matter, it is not possible for more than a few people to be absorbed in propaganda work. Is the Kisan Panchayat to ask people merely to pay four annas and become members? Only when the Panchayat will be able to extract work out of the members and their associates, will its strength increase. On this idea is based the scheme of the irrigation army or the 'an hour to the nation'. I am happy to note that active volunteers in several places have started digging canals and ponds and con-

structing bonds. The Kisan Panchayat must undertake to spread this work further. It should be keen on undertaking all work that could be accomplished on voluntary basis. It shall even have to get down to small things. For example, if people would chew well while eating, and not merely swallow food, their health would improve and much food would be saved. If voluntary efforts spread in the villages, the battle for reconstruction as also for socialism shall have been won.

The Kisan Panchayat should be strong enough to help peasants get over their difficulties. Its membership should run into millions and its workers should be found in every village. Able workers are needed to achieve such ripeness of organisation. Ordinarily, our workers make little effort to equip themselves either for assuming power or even for working among the peasants whose many problems can be solved only through knowledge and understanding. Our future plans have to be directed towards training up specialists of various problems. This will bring the additional advantage of eliminating personal rivalries and bickerings.

The task of reconstruction must be accompanied by destruction: construction of the good and destruction of the bad. Old land laws have to be abolished, castism, nepotism have to be eliminated, conflicts within the poor class have to be resolved.

The system of education in the country needs drastic changes. It is conducive neither to research nor to technical accomplishment. Countries like Germany and Sweden have been developed by workers and peasants who have never been to technical colleges or universities, but have off and on been to polytechnics. The Peoples' Universities of these countries also deserve mention.

Possibly, the defects of our educational system are due to the prevalence of a foreign language, which has given an air of imitativeness to the whole country. Perhaps also, due to the foreign language the continuity of education from olden times has got broken, and the education of today has not found any roots in the Indian soil. I sometimes wish that all departments of the University excepting Science and Engineering may be closed for

five years. This might enable the educational system to be given new foundations.

In any case, the entire country should have a network of polytechnics and peoples' universities for the benefit of peasants, workers and the poor middle class.

The entire field of culture, including art, drama and music, has lost the vital contact with the people and soil of the country. The result has been disastrous. For example, the songs that have come into vogue induce moroseness and lethargy. There is great need of a network of culture centres, centres for young men and women where programmes of music, drama and discussions would be initiated. Governments should be helpful in such programmes. Kisan Panchayats should devote as much time and attention to this as possible.

As in the field of education, much needs to be done in the field of social medicine. The poor are broken down with the worry of disease and the expense of treatment. Government must take up this work, even if with small beginnings. It is also necessary to check the increase in population.

It is a strange India that has emerged after the attainment of independence. During slavery there was darkness without, but light within. Now it is the reverse. Nothing remains to attract millions together in pursuit of a common ideal. Disintegration is widespread. Blames in the national character which attend such disintegration are also shaping themselves. The passion for freedom had till now kept into the background faults of character and organisation, which are now visible and increasing in the absence of any ennobling ideal. Nevertheless, the hunger for equality has entered into national life. This fact has till now shown only negative aspects: it has assumed forms of hatred and vilification, but has not been able to mobilise people to militant positivism. The hunger for equality finds its constructive manifestation in the policies and programmes of the Kisan Panchayat and the Socialist Party. These policies are capable of satisfying the hunger both for equality and for a new civilisation.

A tragic phenomenon of Indian life today is that social disintegration is accompanied by centralisation of political power, while the ideal would be an integrated society with power decentralised. Constructive manifestations of the hunger for equality seem to be the only means of bringing about such a happy state of affairs. Rifts between different parties are natural, but rifts within parties are a new feature. Without a tangible ideal people are apt to become touchy, cliquish and power-seekers; the result is disintegration.

Negligence and irresponsibility are signs of such times. What greater negligence can there be than that workers of a party should be careless about subscriptions of new members? Who does not know that this great flaw is to be found at several places in the Kisan Panchayat? It has now become too common a fault to get delegates elected not by the general body of members but by the executive. While it is true that the only solution to this is the introduction of a purpose and an ideal, we must beware of this flaw of character and must not thereby seek any temporary advantage or gains.

The work of the Kisan Panchayat has upto now been a one-way flow. Organisers think they are teachers of the people. Such a psychology produces bad results: first, this is an incorrect assumption, secondly, the teaching itself remains incomplete. What is necessary is a two-way flow. Organisers should be prepared to teach as well as be taught by the people. In this alone lies the hope of developing the latent powers of the country and the peasants.

It is true that the Kisan Panchayat is drawing to its fold those who have been downtrodden for centuries. But its task is incomplete due to this one-way flow. I shall not forget the occasion when the wife of Sukhdev Choudhuri, disowned for centuries, came finely dressed to my meeting. Nor will I forget that a sweeper named Someshwar secured an advance payment of his wages to pay a donation.

The moral well-being of the nation can be gauged by its women, and the women of the so-called depressed classes at that.

While I have met brave and upright women belonging to the upper classes, Kamla reared by the non-English knowing Kisans of Narnaul, has demonstrated what great talent this section of the people has. That the talent has been dormant, or has, whenever it has come out, shown itself incompletely or in indisciplined ways is due to rigorous social traditions.

Communists have in one matter scored over us. I need not repeat that I consider the Communist Party harmful for the people. Nevertheless, the communists were able to bring to life the soul of a washer-woman, Munni, who, we hear, is leading an underground movement in some villages. Even if in her meetings she abuses the Kisan Panchayat and the Socialist Party, I salute this woman because she symbolises those classes on whose awakening depends the awakening of the nation. Real success will be achieved only when washer-women, char-women and such others will join the Kisan Panchayat and the Socialist Party and work for these.

The country has got into a morass. It will not be enough to argue that the Kisan Panchayat has nothing to do with castism. We must awaken the down-trodden classes and bring out their mettle. Unless this is done, the Kisan Panchayat too will bog into the familiar politics of to-day. We would start manipulating the chiefs of castes and sects; we would commit the fatal error of counting on the womenfolk following their men. By such ways the Kisan Panchayat will always be a loser: immediately, because the Congress will invariably succeed in such methods; in the long run, because no real awakening is possible through such methods. Our task is to break the shackles of society, to bring flow to the waters that have grown stagnant. This is possible only when there is a real flowering of the social forces that are now dormant.

While we have such mighty tasks before us, the poverty of the mind and body of the nation is increasing. Elections are yet far off; the malady may become irremediable by then. Despondency may take deep roots, making awakening impossible for years, or else there may be sporadic uprisings in the absence of organised effort, resulting in disintegration. Peace and plenty

must go together. Where there is no plenty, peace can prevail only if the people grow completely despondent; if there are sporadic attempts at revolt, firings and lathi-charges disturb the peace. I foresee both these dangers. It thus appears fatal to wait for the elections and do nothing else.

We must find a way out. One such way is that everyone should select for himself a sphere of work which would satisfy the hunger for equality. The plan to end poverty should so enter the minds and hearts of all sections of the population that people will again rally round a single objective. If such a unification takes place in the coming months of this year, the government may then be invited to implement the plan. If the government refused, Satyagraha may be launched.

It is sinful to be idle spectators of the collapse of the nation. It becomes essential to declare oneself a fighter against injustice. If the people express themselves in a peaceful manner the government shall have to act according to the wishes of the people; else, the government itself shall be changed. But change of government cannot be the objective of Satyagraha; the demand will be for a change of policy.

It is argued that there is no place for Satyagraha now that we are independent. Governments are always likely to err. And in these abnormal times, the entire policies of the government have been wrong. To correct wrongs and to fight injustices, Satyagraha is justified even in a free country. It may become inevitable to use this weapon in the coming year, because continuance of existing conditions will be disastrous. I realise that governments will be difficult to run if Satyagraha was offered every day. But the Satyagraha I visualise will not be for anything less than the good of the entire nation. Further, the distinction between state and government has not yet got established, which will take time. After this tradition has been established, the need for Satyagraha will diminish.

While I talk of Satyagraha as a means of removing poverty, the government demands the co-operation of the people. Ministers

have been heard saying that their governments could achieve nothing without the people co-operating. In no other country could a minister talk in this strain; such a complaint would mean acceptance of government's failure and its consequent resignation. But it is true that a government is a reflection of the people, and many hold that we can get a good government only when the people become hard-working, improve in character and grow politically mature. Undoubtedly such improvements are essential. A first essential to such an improvement of the people is that they should no longer tolerate bad governments. The people should demand from the government the end of poverty. If government fails to take appropriate steps, the people should resort to Satyagraha. This will bring strength to the people, and they will also get over the habit of tolerating everything.

Such Satyagraha would be a true means and form of co-operation between the government and the people. Today government has neither the means nor any plan to end poverty. So the people should accept the plan and then press government to accept it.

To answer the question if class struggle is valid as a mode of agrarian organisation in India and similar lands, one has to find out if the class struggle actually exists in agrarian relationships and if so, of what order it is. When class struggle is a reality, it can and must become the method to achieve its own abolition. The issue is simple where big estates are ranged against masses of tenants, share-croppers or agricultural labourers. The clash of class interests exists and class struggle becomes a potent mode of organisation in the areas of big estates. This is so in India as elsewhere.

Around 10 per cent of cultivated lands in India are held in holdings of more than 30 acres and the vast majority of the agrarian population consists of small landlords, tenants of various types, unregistered tenants and share-croppers and landless labourers. They are all very poor but their mutual relationships are exceedingly complicated. They fight among themselves, for, they are the submerged classes of an imperialist economy and their

poverty is colossal. Each wars against all for his share in the national larder that does not grow but whose sharers multiply with each year. A static larder and a growing population give rise to a fight among themselves which is as cruel as it is meaningless, as only the fight among the poor can be. A further complication is caused by the factor of caste. It makes the fight hideously cruel. The illusion of conflict, that has no valid existence in economy, becomes a deeply cherished emotional reality. Nothing has robbed the Indian people of vitality as much as caste; it has cut them up into a multitude of stagnant and turbid little pools.

But the class struggle does not exist in the relationships of this vast agrarian population. What exists is a number of group tensions, often exceedingly cruel. The tensions among the poor may be overcome in the realisation of a greater identity, of a casteless and egalitarian village building itself up co-operatively. Damage of no small dimensions will be caused if these tensions assume the illusory shape of class conflict and if peasant agitators get tempted to imitate the traditional modes of factory unionism. Organisation of agricultural labourers, for instance, must be treated as an auxiliary to the wider peasant movement. It is true that, in the overcoming of these tensions, the twin principles of an egalitarian village, that to the tiller belongs the harvest and that caste should not exist, must never be lost sight of.

Traditional socialism has treated the farmer cavalierly. European socialism and communism have drawn their main strength from the vast masses of factory workers and they have disliked the farmer, both because he is an owner of property and an exactor of high prices for their food. They have, therefore, dubbed him a reactionary and, even after the Russian experience, tacitly presume him to be so. During favourable times and at his best, he may become a helpmate and ally, but, with the success of the revolution, he must be cured into the worker of a collective farm. This absurd theory, universalised from a partial European and American experience, has done some damage to the cause of socialism among the peasantry.

Indian socialists have long given up this theory in their practice, even if some of them occasionally betray loose ends in their thinking. In fact, a contrary swing is evident. The behaviour of factory workers in the national struggle, the paucity of their numbers and the variety of their organisations are directing Indian socialism into an agrarian expression. That is right. But a theory as absurd as the one that raised the factory worker into the sole agency of the revolution, is being propounded to elevate the farmer into the sole instrument of the new order and as the source of vitality. Undoubtedly, the farmer in India, as elsewhere has a great role to play, than whom none is greater, but others may have equal roles to play. The talk of subsidiary alliances between farmers and workers and artisans and city poor must be replaced by the concept of equal relationships in the revolution.

This concept of the farmer as the builder of the new order has a basis in reality. As to the price of agricultural produce, the principle of parity with industrial produce removes either way exploitation between farmers and the rest of society. As to the fact of property in land which the farmer uses, the principle must be recognised that no denial of socialism takes place if the property used does not entail employment of another's labour. Actually, it may be an affirmation of socialism and an enriching of its ways hitherto unknown.

After land has been redivided on an egalitarian basis, the hunger for land and the sense of possessing will disappear. What will remain is initiative and independence of spirit coupled with the desire of collective well-being. Farmers of the future may evolve multiple patterns and hues of village life, from co-operation in the minimum to collective living of a type unattainable by others. They will be able to make use of such technical aids as they choose. A rich variety of socialist living and experimenting will open out. It is the picture of a casteless and egalitarian village that beckons us into overcoming existing group tensions. The vast agrarian masses of India, except the big landlords, are the great builders of socialism, one and all of them.

A civilisation in the building of which workers on land have taken their full share may yet achieve the brotherhood of egalitarian and co-operative living. It has no use for the frenzy, which results in tyranny and wars. Close to the soil and Nature, the farmer is naturally responsive to the call for peace and world government. If only he can be roused from the stupor and inertia into which he has fallen in Asia, Africa and South America, he can yet build a civilisation of tranquil activity. Towards this end, let the Kisan Panchayat strive. Farmers all over the world are only too willing when, in strength, he can give them his hand with the hope of a better world.

*February, 1950.*

## PROGRAMME TO END POVERTY

Indian poverty is largely due to dearth of capital and lack of tools. The Indian has to produce wealth with tools and capital worth Rs. 150/- while the West European commands over Rs. 3,000/- worth of production equipment.

Foreign capital cannot bridge this gap. Not even a billion dollar loan can raise the per head capital in India by more than Rs. 10/- so that it could at the most be raised to Rs. 160/-

Native capital is wholly incapable of this task. The last five years have conclusively shown that Indian capital does not invest in the industries that support life and give health. Its largest investments have been in the artificial ghee industry and the cinema and pharmaceuticals have probably followed. This is only natural. The industries and occupations of food, cloth and housing although highly necessary for the health and well-being of the people retain no scope for quick and high profits. A dairy means a long period of waiting and rather low and uncertain profits at the end of five years and more, while a plant of artificial ghee means quick and high profits. By its own showing, capitalism has condemned itself.

The State alone can form capital and provide tools and organisation for new and healthy occupations and to do that it must have a plan on the basis of social ownership of new capital and must plan for the nation as a whole.

The 13-point programme to end poverty contains two main items of capital formation: (1) Food Army, and (2) Industrialisation, particularly with the help of cottage industry machines. No industrialist or federation of industrialists can promote the invention of machines or their manufacture. Indian record in inventing machines is to date zero. The State must now step in.

Capital is past earnings turned into tools. In the first place, Indian savings are very low and in the second place even these cannot be turned into tools for lack of production goods industries. The State alone can step up both savings and tools. Among savings available to the State for capital formation would be the normal yearly balance and additions to it from profits out of nationalised industries and sterling balances and, of course, money can also be created in reasonable amounts if it is put to the use of capital formation under a national economic plan.

India is living in a state of deferred death. She is eating her past earnings and the rest of the sterling balances will be spent up in another two or three years. Famine will stare her in the face and then it will be too late. The key industries of the country must be nationalised during the current year if catastrophe is to be avoided. A plan of capital formation must be put into immediate operation.

In addition to the food army and small machine industrialisation, volunteer labour is a third item of capital formation. Even if one out of every ten in the adult population were to give an hour of free work to his village on some work of digging and building, the country would be able to finance capital works worth more than one billion rupees without spending anything at all. This will be possible only after the destruction of feudal and capitalist ownership and when the people are enthused into a feeling of mastery over their wealth. Meanwhile, volunteer bands of the more conscious elements in the population must set to work immediately.

The destruction of feudalism and capitalism is not alone a dictate of justice or equality but a simple life and death issue for the Indian people. In another two or three years it will be too late and famine will stalk the land.

## 2

Politics consist of four elements—State, Government, Party and Individual. In a democracy, each element has its place and

a corresponding chart of duties and rights. In a dictatorship, all barriers are pulled down and distinctions and limitations erased so that all the four elements are mixed into a blur.

The Indian State has become the Congress Government. The Congress Government has become the Congress Party and the Congress Party is fast becoming the Prime Minister. The process has gone on before our eyes. Events are heading towards a natural culmination where the Prime Minister would be able to say and act as if he were the Indian State. Pure dictatorship prevails in the ruling party in India. Luckily, India has also an opposition and that is why democracy has still a fighting chance of asserting itself.

Some opposition elements want to fight a Congress dictatorship by building up a more efficient and ruthless dictatorship of their own. That way lies disaster and ruin. No dictatorship can knock the inertia out of the old and lazy bones of India. A Socialist dictatorship will be as inefficient, corrupt and policy-less as the Congress dictatorship.

To put activity into lazy bones, distinctions and limitations among the four elements of which politics is composed must be maintained. Some men must be willing to abdicate power. Even though able to have it they must refuse to possess it. But this is perhaps an unattainable ideal glimpsed only once in recent history.

Partial abdication of power is, however, possible for everybody and should be so in a democracy. Recognition of limitations is partial abdication of power. From the national to the village politician, every one in India must restrain himself in the accumulation and use of power.

The four-pillar State is an inevitable consequence of such a recognition. Power of the State must be broken up into as many fragments as there are villages and reposed in the village community. Naturally the central limb of the State must have power enough to maintain the integrity and unity of the State and the rest of it must be fragmented. I do not know of any other way of introducing change and activity into Indian life.

The 13-point programme to end poverty, therefore, makes the four-pillar State the framework into which the other twelve items must fit in. A great load of responsibility rests on the Socialist rank and file. In addition to being an agitator, the Socialist must now learn up all that he can about soil and water conditions, raw materials, processing possibilities, common lands, thinking habits—in short, industrial and economic possibilities of his village or town community. He must at the same time be seized with the revolutionary passion of the four-pillar State. Furthermore, his relations with his community must be responsible and he must be aware of his limitations.

Socialists must now unfold a warm and live debate around the programme to end poverty in their communities. These centres of debate and agitation will in time and if necessary become the centres of revolutionary power for the destruction of feudalism and capitalism, for the setting up of the four-pillar State and for the removal of poverty.

## 3

Adulteration is the keynote of Indian life. Food is adulterated and so is oil and ghee and all mutual dealings are adulterated. No one can be quite sure about anything except that falsity and bribery is almost a part of every transaction. In such a national situation many men are losing faith in political changes and insist on raising up character as a pre-requisite for everything else.

How is character to be built up? In the situation that exists today, the greatest danger to character comes from greed and big money, wasteful expenditure and the social prestige that is falsely associated with it. Men want money, those at the top want more of it and anyhow, in order to maintain themselves in luxury and prestige, and those at the bottom want a little bit more so as to fill their belly. The attack on greed must, therefore, take place at the top. This is the only way to rid the population of its present obsession with money.

The programme to end poverty lays down a maximum expenditure of Rs. 1,000/- per average family. It is futile to lay down such a maximum for the services alone because capitalists and landlords who have much higher incomes can easily corrupt them.

Total loss of national character and austerity conditions prevailing in the country dictate such a ceiling on people's incomes and expenditures. That is the only way to make people think and feel along lines of general uplift in place of their present obsession with individual uplift. No amount of religion or education can achieve this diverting of people's attention from individual uplift to general uplift unless the law steps in and makes punishable all spending above Rs. 1,000/- per family. Once this is done, prices will fall, habits will change, speculation will no longer be useful and education or religion can then step in to root out other remnants of falsity and bribery.

Education is at present built up on the same premises as the general falsity of Indian character. It neither trains the person's mind nor equips him for a living. An increasing shift from barren education into the subjects known as poly-technical or technical education is required. Parents and sons and daughters will heave a sigh of relief at such a shift.

A very large part of what is known as university education today will in the years to come be taken up by a network of people's universities and high schools. Such institutions are meant for young men and women who take to some occupation after the matriculation, work in it for some years and then take a six months' or a year's leave to attend them. Such men and women in Europe obtain an education superior to that of the Indian graduate.

Education and culture must take roots in the soil and this can be done only if the national language is made compulsory in the universities straightaway. A master campaign of literacy can be easily undertaken in a four-pillar State which has been rid of landed and capitalist ownership.

Recreational education is as false and barren as any other aspect of Indian life. Often young students have no other diversion except to march up and down the main road of their town and look at the fashion and vanities of women. Of any adventure in the realm of ideas and human relationships there is but little. Strains of songs also produce a mental state of impotent complaint. All this must stop.

The programme to end poverty makes it incumbent upon the State to start or help in the starting of cultural institutes, youth clubs and women's clubs. This will undoubtedly bring variety and joy into the songs and talk of the people.

Finally, the Anti-Corruption Department of the State must be, like High Court Judges, independent of the Government. The four-pillar State, by making the village or the city community largely responsible to itself, by handing over a large part of the administration to it, will remove such corruption as inevitably comes in India with the system that rules from above.

The philosophical elements in character formation are very decisive but they form a different story.

## II

## RIGHT WORD: RIGHT ACTION

## 1

To say that the Socialist Party is not what it should be is meaningless; there is always a lag between the ideal and the actual. But the Socialist Party is also not what it could be. That implies a judgment and a criticism. The Party suffers from some lack somewhere. All of it may be due to the objective situation but a considerable part of it is removable through effort of will and organisation. This lack in the Party is shared by all alike, members as well as leaders and that the Party is not effectively led is a proposition I am increasingly compelled to assent. At least, I have failed. Of course, one does one's best. But everybody else must also do his best. This is the difference between an individual and a party. It is not enough if a leadership be wise and hard-working; it is partly to blame if the members are also not that. The Party's failures have to be known and removed and leaders as well as members must make an effort to infuse an unity into its strivings-and purposes.

Negativism is a major failing of the Socialist Party. It is an easy enough sin in the country today and so luscious. All India is a vast complaint house. Almost everybody has a grouse or a growl. But there is no positive purpose shooting through this negative dissatisfaction with what exists. The deception that came upon the people after the advent of freedom was too big for most of us. It has left the people in a state yet strong enough to complain but too weak or dazed to think and act.

The Party's resolves and programmes are ever positive. It has in almost every case a concrete enough solution to offer. But that solution often enough stays on paper and when conveyed to the people by word or act is thickly overlaid with the negative spirit. One has only to hear the speech of a village or a national functionary of the Party to sense this peculiar dissimilarity between the positive content of resolutions and the negative spirit in the

general propaganda. Of acts as distinct from words, they are few and far between.

Although natural to Socialists, as to other sections of the people, this negativism increases that upon which it feeds. It has its origin in distrust and disbelief. It makes loss of faith total. For a people who is on the way of losing faith, those preachers are pleasant who talk about faithlessness, for then neither the preacher nor the taught are compelled to act. To loss of faith is matched inertia.

Among peoples whose states have long existed and whose way of life is set, negative politics are not so harmful. An opposition party in such countries is inevitably taken up with the cataloguing of the defects of the Government party. But India's way of life is not yet set and almost nothing exists and there is an enormous amount to create. In such a creative phase, it is the positive word and the positive act that matters. Furthermore, whenever socialism is caught between the two fires of a left and a right reaction as in India, it tends to become other-regarding. It is either anti-Congress or anti-Communist. Its own positive features are a blur and its enemies can with some reason describe it as an 'anti' rather than a 'pro' doctrine. Socialist speech-making by and large is often enough a complete analysis of the Congress Party or the Communist Party but it is very rarely a complete analysis of the Socialist Party and its programmes.

The trouble is not that there are too many words spoken in India today. They are negative words and that is the trouble. Positive words can never be too many. The Socialist Party will improve only when its propagandists on all levels, the village as well as the national, take to positive speech-making. No harm will be done if for sometime Socialists forbid themselves to talk of anything except their own creed and programmes.

Another difficulty of the Socialist Party is its externalism, a failing which has been so peculiar to Indian thought and striving for the past ten centuries. Why let the mind grapple with

## THE FARMER IN INDIA

problems when the eye can so easily see the distinct symbol and the throat utter an equally distinct slogan? The history of Indian thought since Shankaracharya is the history of certain visible symbols on the forehead, the number of horizontal or vertical lines, their colours and whether a dot of one colour or the other is set within. Indian thought has been so easy to see and there is no possibility of mistaken identities.

A political party has necessarily its symbols and slogans. They cannot be dispensed with, at least not until the human mind comes into its own and no one can say when that will happen and if ever.

To carry this symbolism to personal dress and appearance is to continue the disintegration of the past one thousand years of Indian history. Our nation will never mature if its parties and castes wear identity costumes. I trust the day will soon dawn when to see a person's dress and appearance will not mean to know whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim, a Socialist or a Congressman, in fact, whether he is a saint or a sinner and, in any case, I will not add anything to complicate an already complicated situation.

Socialists all over the U.P. know my dislike for an identity dress, a dislike that has been consistent and freely expressed for a year or more and that was strong enough to resist the clamorous insistence of the peasant demonstration in Lucknow. If the Gandhi cap has become a protection to swindlers and worse, the Socialist cap is also a protection to equally major vices. External extremism may well cover up internal moderation and a lot of deception is thereby practised. In any case, to lead a nation to the surest road to decline is to invent trade marks in dress and appearance for virtue and for sin.

Substantialism alone can lift up a nation and, therefore, the Socialist Party. Externalism will always give aid and succour to the Congress Party, for the ignorance that externalism generates and maintains is precisely the ground on which the vulgarity of Congress propaganda will thrive.

Negativism has in the present context resulted in two major drawbacks, electionism and insurrectionism, the two sides of the same medal. In the absence of a positive and uplifting ideal, the obtaining of power becomes a good in itself and Socialists are also pursuing it hotly though not often very intelligently. An active but foolish chase after power is foredoomed to failure and, so, is not even interesting. Who would like to see a race where horses fumed and frothed and sped like maniacs but not at a signal nor in the scheduled direction?

Elections are indeed the meat of democratic politics. On their outcome depends the regulating of a people for a period and who shall rule. Political parties naturally enough make them the centre of their activity. But elections in a comparatively mature democracy are basically different from those of a nation that has just started on the democratic way. A democratic people has acquired a political mind. It is aware of issues. Long and arduous work has given it certain organised attitudes. A rigidity of outlook indeed comes to prevail; political parties can count, due to their past work and propaganda, on certain well-defined sections of the people. This rigidity is not often conducive to progress. Nevertheless, whatever eleventh-hour intrigues and stunts and misdirecting of the electorate takes place at a general election in a maturer democracy, is in the context of a people that is politically somewhat educated.

The Indian people do not yet have a political mind. A very long past weighs on them heavily of castes, of life led undisturbed by political changes and the like. Recent experience of the freedom fight has indeed given them a new direction. However, loss of faith has also come a little too sharply and politics and self-seeking are becoming synonymous in men's minds.

Socialists find themselves with the good intention of effecting a speedy change in government but not as good an equipment in political understanding. They easily construe dissatisfaction with the Congress Party as support of the Socialist Party, which it certainly is not. An unbelievable self-deception occurs. It is impossible to get an intelligent forecast of the electoral position

in a constituency. The Socialist lives in an electoral dream world. Patent and hard work is replaced by counting of the chicken before they are hatched. Pleasing though somewhat dull gossip-clubs are a main object of constituency activity, interspersed by lecture-tours of visiting leaders.

An inevitable result of this dream-activity is the search for an easy way out at a time of need. Pacts and manœuvres take the place of success sought through political education and awakening. It is disgusting to see Socialists seek for influential men in a locality so as to catch votes; little is done to promote genuine change in ways of thinking. The mass does not stir and the influential men disappear at the last moment. This attitude reflects itself in the approach to women's vote; if one gets the men's vote, one would automatically get the women's vote. Nothing can be more disastrous than this supercilious attitude to a people's thinking, no matter how backward or illiterate the people may be. One neither gets the vote nor does one accomplish one's real function of arousing the people.

While the electionists do not accomplish their proper function of endowing the people of India with a political mind, insurrectionists in the Party fail as disastrously in swinging to the other extreme of an easy way out. Of their ultimate belief that insurrection is the only way to destroy capitalism, I shall say nothing here. This belief has certain immediate and practical 'consequences. It leads them to desire any kind of direct action at all possible or impossible moments. They are not worried about preparation, either psychological or organisational, and do not care for the various stages through which a movement must pass. A movement must be so scheduled as to be reasonable and to carry the people with it. I have been told that insurrectionists were vociferously angry at the peasant marches not being followed up by a no-rent campaign. Again, it is a case of insurrectionists same as electionists living in a dream-world and spinning out their dream-activity though of a different pattern. A no-rent campaign is not a joke; it requires a stage of mind and organisation such as was never attained even during the twenty-five years'

freedom fight. I am convinced that it can now be attained, provided a schedule of constructive and combative activities is adhered to. But towards such a schedule, insurrectionists contribute as little as the electionists.

What could have been tried out was the egalitarian redivision and occupying of land in select areas owned by the big landlords. I have from time to time made suggestions to this effect, but no unit of the Kisan Panchayat or the Party undertook the heavy day-by-day work that must have preceded it.

Insurrectionists as well as electionists are negative. They act and react upon each other, so as to bring out the worst in either. The failures of either encourage the other to persist in their own brand of error. With regard to their faction's power-impulse to control the Party or the country, they are equally to blame and no purpose would be served in trying to distinguish one from the other in this respect. What distinguishes them is their distinct brand of error, the one resorts to electioneering as an easy way out, with the means of intensifying dislike of the Congress and of securing dubious eleventh-hour support, the other resorts to struggles as an equally easy way out with the means patterned on a similar charlatancy and lack of work. They achieve the like result of deepening the gloom and inertia prevailing in the country.

If the positive character of the Party's resolves and programmes had been infused into its speech-making and activities, a schedule of constructivism and combatism would have long ago replaced this barren electionism and insurrectionism. For any fruitful endeavour, a mixing up of constructive work with combative activities is the only way. Constructive workers have hitherto achieved no appreciable success, for they have been divorced from militancy and thus have been unable to inspire zeal among the people. Militant elements have likewise been unable to expand their scope among the people and to achieve steadiness for lack of construction here and now. If the one does not inspire fire, the other does not inspire trust. To destroy evil and to build up good should be conjoint activities. Militant

## THE FARMER IN INDIA

construction and constructive militancy should go hand in hand and be the property of Socialist workers in all spheres.

Among the most painful experiences of recent years in U.P. has been the failure of the constructive programme following upon the peasant marches. Considerable energy was released among millions of people. The peasantry was astir. Although, I take this opportunity to say that I had expected three to four times as many farmers as did march in Lucknow on that memorable day. Districts whose politicians marched all the way for scores of miles with the farmers did well, but they were not the majority. The populace of Lucknow did not demonstrate its solidarity with the marching farmers. Nevertheless, it was good work done; the first rays of faith and hope had dawned. The movement for redivision of land and the four-pillar state had done its first steps. Before it could enter into its last stage of acceptance as government policy or direct action in the alternative, an intermediate stage of constructive activity in the mass had to intervene and an organisation would have inevitably resulted. The decision was taken. Thousands of "one hour a day to the village" volunteers were to have been enlisted in each district. These were to work with their spades on whatever activity suited their area most—tanks, canals, roads, manure-pits and the like. This has not been done except at half-a-dozen places out of a possible few hundred and the energy released by the peasant march has been frittered away.

What the spinning-wheel was to the freedom movement, the spade is to the socialist movement. Around the spade can revolve a myriad of constructive activities, so as to do some concrete good however small, and to awaken trust. At the same time, the volunteer who wields the spade for a minor construction must know it himself and communicate to his people that redivision of land and the four-pillar state are the aims of his political activity. Such constructive activity in the mass is a little difficult in the town. Schemes of literacy, adult education, welfare or community centres can well be evolved around trade unions and the like. Organisations of factory workers

and clerks and others may also throw their weight into the campaigns against social evils, something which they have not hitherto done.

The combative urge must at the same time be given full play by Party units and members, even such as engage in constructive work. A division of personality, constructive and combative, would be disastrous. Daily and in every locality, acts of injustice mount. If injustice, even of the flagrant variety, were the sole occasion for a direct action, India should have become a vast battlefield of local struggles everyday and everywhere. But the readiness to suffer and strive is as necessary as an act of injustice for occasioning a fruitful struggle. It is this readiness that has to be assiduously prepared for, wherever Party members wish to combat evil.

Partial struggles are for a revolutionary group such as in India what the act of breathing is to a living being. And yet, socialism is no longer, at least in India, the battle for a small increase in this wage here or that farmer's earning there. Indian economy is static, or even contracting. Therefore, every partial struggle must be viewed as a preparation for that general struggle against poverty and capitalism, which must soon come, if India is to survive. Capitalism has become in India, whatever it may be in Europe or the United States, a functionless institution like landlordism. In fact, apart from perpetuating monstrous inequalities in incomes, the sole function that capitalism seems to perform is to prevent new capital-formation. It perpetuates not alone injustice but also poverty. As long as it survives, it will keep India debased, demoralised, inert and corrupt, filthy and wicked. The destruction of capitalism as of landlordism is a precondition for building up the national character.

I had hoped that around the end of 1950 or the beginning of next year, such a full-blooded offensive on capitalism and landlordism would be possible. The thirteen-point programme to end poverty was a preparation for that offensive. Since the Patna Conference of the Party, I had a schedule in mind, what-

ever vagueness there was in it was to diminish with the development of the movement. The Patna resolution on our concrete desires and the peasant marches preceded the thirteen-point programme to end poverty. The programme itself was to be propagated alongside of constructive activity in the mass. The climax was then to be reached at the end of the year. The schedule has obviously been upset and one may only hope for the best during the next year.

Time is all-important in the Indian situation. Our poverty does not leave us much space or time for manoeuvring. I do not think that a party such as ours can assert itself after another two or three years have passed. The reign of Congress inertia will then be unchallengeable, or, as an improbable but possible alternative, communist or communalist chaos will have come to prevail.

On the Socialist Party depends in some measure the destiny of India and the world. Is it then not heart-rending to hear the negativism of its slogans and speech-making or to look out for but fail to see its positive action? Away from the Congress is a spontaneous movement of the people and Socialists merely waste their breath in trying to propagate it. The people of India are increasingly turning away from the Congress, but they stand at the crossroads and refuse to move towards any other organisation. The Indian people today are pre-eminently a people at the crossroads. They are a splendid material for inertia or chaos. I am convinced that a schedule of constructivism and combatism together with the thirteen-point programme to end poverty alone can move them on to a new effort for creating an order of equality and plenty.

Groupism would be an inevitable accompaniment to the evils earlier outlined. Things are falling apart, instead of holding together. India is caught up in a centrifugal phase. The Socialist Party is also a victim to it. Party splits into groups which further split into sub-groups; standards of behaviour do not exist, an empty battle for power that is yet to come starts and all is fair in this battle; Socialists, like other sections of the

Indian people, are rapidly unlearning the art of living together and striving together. The wells of sympathy are drying up. Where there is no sympathy, all is a petty squabble and an arid waste.

A great ideal can awaken sympathy so as to hold people together. I should have thought that socialism was adequate enough for such an ideal. But obviously it is not, for it has come to mean many things to many people. It can become a creed of spite and envy, not even of vital anger and hatred, much less of sympathy. It is easy enough to become a Socialist against those above oneself, but much more difficult to be a Socialist towards those below. In a country inordinately poor and caste-ridden a socialism of envy rather than anger and sympathy is easier. Much has yet to be done by way of outlining a philosophy of socialism. Suffice it to say here that equality as the idea of a maximum and a minimum—for instance, the maximum of 30 acres and the minimum of 12½ acres per farming family, or incomes ranging between Rs. 1,000 per month at the top and Rs. 100 at the bottom—may be that something concrete to which a Socialist can purposefully adhere.

Socialists are quite good debaters, also theoreticians, although of an indifferent variety, but they are seldom competent. Very few try to train themselves up for their future calling; they do not prepare themselves. They do not study conditions of soil or water, nor possibilities of dairying or small-unit industry, nor industry or trade in their respective areas. Of any serious concern with habits of thinking and culture, there is but little. Training for competence would be an antidote against groupism as much as it would restore political faith of the people.

The Party is now meeting in its various annual conferences. I hope members will think of the days that lie ahead and of what is expected from the Party. The ineffectiveness of the Party must go. The present hiatus between positive resolutions and negative execution must go. Water must find its level, whatever that level may be. I am sure that, with office and responsibility, the larger number of those of us who are elec-

## THE FARMER IN INDIA

tionists and insurrectionists will be able to grope their way towards a more positive position.

Negativism, externalism, electionism, insurrectionism and groupism are the five deadly foes of the Socialist Party. The Party will do well to acquire the virtues of positivism, substantialism, constructivism, combatism, and, above all, sympathy.

## APPENDIX

### Thirteen-point Programme of the Hind Kisan Panchayat

For two years since the achievement of national freedom, India continued suffering from slow fever. The people wore the wrinkled looks and tattered garments they did before the achievement of freedom. One change for the worse took place. Faith was broken. The darkest night of slavery in the Gandhi era was streaked with the bright flash of hope. With the dawn of freedom that rose on the land, darkness enveloped the heart. Such a shattering of people's hope was unparalleled. The will to believe, to hope and to have faith was gone. To the chronic disease of poverty was added an additional complication of cynicism.

At the core of every problem in the country is the stupendous poverty of the people and it is directly traceable to the dearth of productive occupations, the denial of social justice and an increasing population. Land and its use are fixed, farms are sub-divided, there is more toil but the produce keeps constant. The number of shopkeepers and salaried men increase, but trade keeps constant and there is less for everybody to "go round. Landless labour has a choice between speedy death at a calling like the rickshaw pullers and a languorous end at a grain picking on harvested fields. India toils, but without reward. In other countries, a person is either employed or unemployed; in India he is both at the same time. He works sometimes quite hard but the returns to the labour are scanty. India's productive equipment is what it was two thousand years ago, but there are many more men and a developed technique from outside hurts them in addition. From an unvarying national larder, an increasing population struggles ferociously or passively to secure a share; each is enemy of the other and cooperation for increasing the total output is absent.

A little after its inception the Kisan Panchayat entered into this dark situation with its programme for land reforms, for social

and economic equality, for just prices, and against ejection from land and homes. The struggles and demonstrations and in particular the long marches of the peasantry that have been taking place under its leadership have brought a ray of hope to the countryside and at least a healthy question to many minds that were numbed. But the gloom that has settled upon the people is still thick and poverty is growing and the forces that work for paralysis or chaos are maturing. To be speedy is as necessary as to be right and the Kisan Panchayat will be judged not merely by the correctness or otherwise of its programmes, but also by the test whether it puts them through speedily enough.

India is a vast poor house whose inmates are on the one-hand being asked by their warders to keep quiet and submit passively and on the other being egged on to chaos by mischievous elements. If another year passes without an effective victory for progress and democracy the situation may be irretrievably lost and, for decades to come, the Indian people may have to suffer poverty or inertia or the breakdown of law and order.

On the Indian peasantry hangs a heavy responsibility, for they are the big brother in the country's population and their example infects. By waking up, they can awaken the entire people out of inertia and into democratic progress. The Kisan Panchayat has therefore drawn up a people's programme to end poverty, a programme designed to serve all exploited sections.

The following are the thirteen points of the plan:—

- (1) Lowering of prices on the basis of parity between agricultural and industrial prices.
- (2) Austerity and sacrifice to be shared by all so that no income or salary exceeds Rs. 1,000 a month.
- (3) Industrialisation with the help of small-unit machines, the invention and manufacture of which to be promoted by the state and organisation of multi-purpose co-operatives of the producers.

- (4) Any factory running below capacity to be taken over by the state and immediate nationalisation of basic industries.
- (5) Anti-corruption commissioners in every state and at the centre with departments independent of the Government.
- (6) Land to the tiller and immediate redivision of land so as to plan a maximum of 30 and a minimum of 12½ acres per family. Stoppage of ejectments from land or homesteads. Cancellation of all agricultural debts.
- (7) Cultivation of one crore acres of new land by a state-recruited land army and to devise necessary means for proper feeding and breeding of cattle.
- (8) Decentralisation of administration and economy so as to achieve the four-pillar state. Repeal of discriminatory laws such as criminal tribes laws, civil liberties and equal treatment by the Government to trade unions, peasant and other organisations. Administration of economic controls by appropriate organs of the four-pillar state.
- (9) Housing programmes and other economic activity to provide full employment.
- (10) Establishment of polytechnic schools and people's high schools and centres for youth and women and for cultural activities.
- (11) Immediate adult franchise elections in unrepresented areas, that is, merged states and unions.
- (12) Pursuit of a positive policy of world peace through promoting full freedom and rights for all nations, social and economic equality among people and between peoples, and a peace bloc which can dictate truce to warring power blocs.
- (13) Volunteer bands for agriculture, irrigation, road-making and the like.

The Indian people, in particular the peasantry, must evolve sufficient strength in the course of the year so as to persuade the Government to adopt this programme of increasing production and social justice as immediate ends of legislation and policy.

The Kisan Panchayat invites trade unions, clerical and technical associations and all other people's organisations to take part in this work of equipping the people with a positive and united outlook, in place of the negative and mutually destructive voices that prevail today. In particular, it directs its branches and members to carry this programme to the farthest concerns of the country and to concentrate the mind of the village on it.

In addition, the Kisan Panchayat directs its branches and members to engage in mass construction of earthworks, irrigation, roads, compost-making and the like through volunteer labour. Now is the time when on the zeal with which they carry out constructive activities will also depend the militancy of the kisans for the achievement of the programme to end poverty. The Kisan Panchayat authorises the Executive Committee to undertake action in furtherance and fulfilment of this programme.

## HINDUISM

The greatest war of Indian history, the war between the liberal and the fanatical in Hinduism, has raged for 5000 years and more and its end is not yet in sight. No attempt has been made, as it should have been, to make of this war the loom on which India's history could be woven. Even incidental mention of it is rare and sketchy in books of history. And yet it is the continuing motive of much that moves in the country.

All religions have in the course of their career suffered from a conflict between the liberal and the fanatical. But with the exception of Hinduism, they split up and have often drawn blood and, after a long or short period of slaughter, succeeded in overcoming the conflict. With Hinduism, a perpetual see-saw between the liberal and fanatical goes on and, while open slaughter has never taken place, the conflict remains unsolved to this day and a haze covers up the issues involved.

Christianity, Islam and Buddhism have all had their schisms. The fanatical elements that the Catholic faith had at one time accumulated led to what was then the liberal challenge of Protestant Christianity. But every body knows the Reformation led to the Counter-reformation. Catholicism and Protestantism still differ in many of their doctrines but it would be hard to call one liberal and the other fanatical. If Christianity stays split on doctrinal and organisational issues, the Shia-Sunni schism in Islam relates to a detail of chronology. Buddhism likewise split into the two sects of Heenayana and Mahayana and, although they never drew blood from each other, their differences relate to doctrine and have nothing to do with the ordering of society.

Hinduism has known no such split. It has indeed continually disintegrated into sects. The innovating sect has as often come back to it as an additional unit. Doctrinal issues have therefore never been sharply defined and social conflicts have stayed unresolved. While Hinduism is as prolific as Protestantism in giving birth to sects, it casts over them all an undefinable

mantle of unity such as is secured by the Catholic organisation through the prohibition of sects. Hinduism has thus become a system of expanding exploration as much as it is the hunting ground of the irrational and the fanatical.

Before an attempt could be made to discover why Hinduism has so far been unable to work this conflict between the fanatical and the liberal out of its system, it is necessary to recall the broad differences of view that have always prevailed. On four major and concrete issues, those of caste, woman, property and tolerance, Hinduism has suffered from a perpetual swing between the liberal and fanatical attitudes.

Over four thousand years ago and more, molten lead was poured into the ears of some Hindus and their tongues pulled out by other Hindus, for the caste system ordained that no untouchable shall hear or read the Vedas. Over three hundred years ago Shivaji had to agree that his dynasty shall ever choose its ministers from among the Brahmins in order to be crowned king according to the Hindu custom. Around two hundred years ago when the last battle of Panipat was fought, and the crown of India passed into British hands as a consequence, one Hindu general quarrelled with another for he wanted to pitch his tent on higher land corresponding to his caste. Nearly fifteen years ago a zealous Hindu wished to save Hinduism by throwing a bomb at Mahatma Gandhi, for he had then set out to destroy untouchability. Until recently, and in certain areas to this day, the Hindu barber would not shave untouchable Hindus, while he would be only too willing to serve the non-Hindu.

At the same time two formidable revolts seem to have taken place against the caste system in ancient times. A whole Upanishad is devoted to the complete and entire demolition of the caste system. From the nature, tone and compass of attacks made on the caste system in ancient Indian literature, these appear to belong to two different periods—a period of criticism and another of condemnation. While this question may be left to future investigations, it is obvious that the two bright periods of the Mauryas and the Guptas follow a comprehensive attack on the

caste system. But caste never quite dies out. It is at times severely rigid while it loosens during other periods. The fanatical and the liberal continue intertwined in respect of the caste system and the difference between any two periods of Hindu history consists in the dominance of one or the other strand. At the moment, the liberal is dominant and the fanatical dare not become vocal. But the fanatical is seeking to preserve itself by entering into liberal thought. If it is too late in the day to talk of caste by birth, people are talking of caste by vocation. Even if men will not argue for the caste system they rarely act against it, and a climate grows in which the reasoning mind and the habitual mind of the Hindu are in conflict. Caste may slacken as an institution in some of its forms, but as a habit of mind it has not yet been dislodged. The conflict between the liberal and fanatical in Hinduism in respect of the caste system threatens to continue unresolved.

While modern fiction has made us aware of the woman alone knowing who the father of the child is, Jabala, 3,000 years ago or more, was not herself sure who the father of her child was and her name is remembered with pride as a truthful woman in ancient literature. In parenthesis it may be remarked that the caste system swallowed her up by turning her son into a Brahmin. Literature of the liberal period has warned us against too close an enquiry into genealogies of families, for like the sources of rivers they too are muddy. Rape under coercion which could not be fought successfully brings the woman no harm nor dirt, for, as this literature says, she renews herself every month. The woman has also the right to divorce and property. While this liberal attitude towards woman prevails in the luminous periods of Hinduism, fanatical periods reduce her to a bit of property to be taken care of by the father, the husband or the son.

At the moment the Hindu woman finds herself in a strange situation, both liberal and fanatical. She finds it easier than anywhere else in the world to rise to positions of eminence. But her claim to a single standard with men in respect of marriage and property continues to be assailed. I have read fanciful leaf-

lets denying the claim of Hindu woman to property on the plea that she might fall in love with a man of another faith and so change her own, as if this could not happen perhaps even more frequently to a Hindu man. That land should not be further fragmented is quite another question and applies both to male and female inheritors, and some way should be found to keep a holding, under the permissible maximum, intact. As long as law or custom and habits of thinking discriminate between man and woman with respect to property and marriage, the fanatical in Hinduism will not quite die out. The hankering of the Hindu to see in his woman a goddess who never descends from her pedestal opens the most liberal among them to dull and dubious wishes. The fanatical and the liberal shall remain intertwined as long as the Hindu refuses to accept his woman as a human being same as he.

The sense of property in Hinduism is liberalised by its faith in non-accumulation and non-attachment. Fanatical Hinduism, however, so interprets the theory of Karma as to give the men of wealth and birth or power a superior status and to sanction as right whatever exists. The question of property in its present form of private versus social ownership is a recent one. But in its old form of non-attachment versus sanctioned order, it has continually been present in the Hindu mind. As with the other issues, the Hindu has never been able to carry his thinking on the question of property and power to its logical conclusion. Hinduism has varied both in time and with the individual only in so far as the one or the other concept of property holds primacy.

Tolerance is commonly reputed to be an unfailing feature of Hinduism. That is not so except in the sense that open slaughter has hitherto been abhorrent to it. The fanatical in Hinduism has always tried to establish unity through uniformity, through the suppression of sects and faiths other than the one that was seeking to dominate, but such attempts have never achieved success. These have in the past been treated more or less like the antics of little children, for Hinduism until recently was called upon to apply the principle of unity in diversity only to its own sects. The

element of tolerance in Hinduism has therefore been almost always stronger than the element of coercion. But this tolerance must be distinguished from a similar attitude of mind which European rationalism has brought into the world. Voltaire knew his opponent to be wrong and yet he was willing to fight the battle for tolerance, for his opponent's right to say what he wanted. Hinduism on the other hand bases its case for tolerance on various possibilities of what is right. It concedes that doctrines and usages may vary with climes and classes and is not prepared to arbitrate among them. It wishes for no uniform pattern in the conduct of men's lives, not even a voluntary uniformity and what it wishes for is that undefinable unity in diversity which it has in the past so successfully threaded through all its sets. Its quality of tolerance, therefore, rises out of the creed of non-interference, out of the belief that variations need not necessarily be wrong, but are perhaps different expressions of what is right.

Fanaticism has often tried to impose the unity of uniformity on Hinduism. Its motives have not always been suspect. Its driving power may well at times have been the desire for stability and strength, but the consequences of its acts have always been disastrous. I do not know of a single period of Indian history when fanatical Hinduism was able to give India unity or well-being. Whenever India has been united and prosperous, the liberal in Hinduism in respect of caste, woman, property and tolerance has always predominated. The upswing of fanatical fervour in Hinduism has always led to the social and political break up of the country, to the disintegration of the Indian people as a State and as a community. I do not know if all those periods when India got broken up into numerous states and kingdoms were characterised by fanatical zeal, but it is undisputable that the unity of the country took place only when liberal Hinduism held sway over the Hindu mind.

Some great failures of modern history to integrate the country stand out. What started as the liberal faith of Gyaneshwar reached its climax in Sivaji and Bajirao but fell just a little short of ultimate success by degenerating into the Peshwa fanaticism.

Again, what started as the liberal faith of Guru Nanak reached its climax in Ranjit Singh but degenerated early into the fanatical squabbles of the Sikh confederacy. These efforts that once failed have also sought bitterly to repeat themselves in contemporary times, for some deep and dark stirrings of the soul connect them with the fanatical streams now flowing out from sources in Maharashtra and Punjab. To a student of Indian history, all this is rich material for study from various angles such as the close connexion between the teacher of the religious word and the political effort to build an Indian union or the problems of where the seeds of degeneracy lie, whether right at the beginning or as the result of a later mix-up and of the drive that impels groups to repeat their fanatical failures. A similar study of the Vizianagram effort and whether it had its roots in Shankar or Nimbarak and what rotten seed lay beneath the glory that Humphi once attained would be of great interest and benefit. Again, what lay at the source of the liberal efforts of Shershah and Akbar and why did they lose to the fanaticism of an Aurangzeb?

The recentmost effort of the Indian people and Mahatma Gandhi to integrate the country has succeeded, but only partially. Undoubtedly, all the liberal streams of five thousand years and more have pushed forward this effort, but what lies at its immediate source, whether Tulsi or Kabir and Chaitanya and the great line of the Sants or the more modern religious politicians like Rammohan Roy and the rebel Maulvi of Faizabad, apart, of course, from the liberalising influences of Europe. Again, all the fanatical streams of the past five thousand years seem to be combining to deluge this effort and, should fanaticism meet its defeat, it will not rise again.

The liberal alone can unite the country. India is too ancient and vast a country. No force can unite it except the voluntary human will. Fanatical Hinduism cannot by its nature mould such a will, while liberal Hinduism can, as it has often done in the past. Hinduism of course is not a political religion, in the narrow sense, a religion of doctrines or organisation. But it has been the eminent medium and inspiration for the great impulsion of

the Indian political history towards the unity of the country. The great war between liberal and fanatical Hinduism may well be called a conflict between the two processes of unification and disintegration of the country.

Liberal Hinduism has, however, been unable to solve the problem completely. Within the principle of unity in diversity lies concealed the seed of decay and disintegration. Not to talk of the fanatical elements which always sneak into the most liberal of Hindu concepts and which always hinder the achievement of intellectual clarity, the principle of unity in diversity gives rise to a mind which is both rich and lethargic. It is tiresome to watch Hinduism continually splitting into sects, each with its own jarring noises, and, however much liberal Hinduism may seek to cover them with the mantle of unity, they inevitably produce a weakness in corporate living of the state. An amazing non-chalance comes to prevail. No one worries about the continual splitting, as if every one is sure that they are parts of one another. This is what gives fanatical Hinduism its chance and driving power, the desire for strength, although the result of its endeavour produces further weakening.

The great war between liberal and fanatical Hinduism has at present taken the outward form of their differing attitudes to Muslims. Nevertheless let it not be forgotten even for a moment that this is only an outward form and all the old unresolved conflicts continue and are potentially more deciding. The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi was not so much an episode of the Hindu-Muslim fight as of the war between the liberal and the fanatical in Hinduism. Never had a Hindu delivered greater blows on fanaticism in respect of caste, woman, property or tolerance. All the bitterness was accumulating. Once before an attempt had been made on Gandhiji's life. It was then obviously and openly for the purpose of saving Hinduism in the sense of saving caste. The last and successful attempt was outwardly made for the purpose of saving Hinduism in the sense of protecting it from Muslim engulfment, but no student of Hindu history can be in doubt that it was the greatest and the most heinous

gamble that retreating fanaticism risked in its war on liberal Hinduism. Gandhiji's murderer was the fanatical element that always lies embedded in the Hindu mind, sometimes quiescent and sometimes pronounced, in some Hindus dominant and in others passive. When pages of history shall try the murder of Mahatma Gandhi as an episode in the war between the fanatical and the liberal in Hinduism and arraign all those whom Gandhiji's acts against caste and for woman, against property and for tolerance had enraged, the composure and non-chalance of Hinduism may well be shattered.

Why the liberal and fanatical have continued intertwined in the Hindu faith and have never hitherto challenged each other to a clean and decisive battle is a subject rich in exploration to students of Indian history. That the complete cleansing of the Hindu mind in respect of the fanatical never took place is beyond doubt. The disastrous consequences of this unresolved conflict are also beyond doubt. As long as caste is not completely erased from the Hindu mind or woman treated as an equal being with man, or property dissociated from the concept of order, the fanatical will from time to time play havoc with Indian history and also impart to it a continuing lethargy. Unlike other religions, Hinduism is not a faith of doctrines and the church but a way of social organisation, and that is why the war between liberalism and fanaticism has never been fought out to its end and the Brahmin-Bania combination has ruled India for good or evil through centuries, a rule alternating between the liberal and the fanatical.

Mere liberalisation of the four issues will not do; they have to be once for all resolved of the conflict and eliminated completely from the Hindu mind.

Back of all these unresolved conflicts is the metaphysical problem of the relationship between appearance and reality. There is indeed little difference in the attitudes of liberal and fanatical Hinduism with regard to this problem. Hinduism by and large seeks to go beyond appearance in search of the reality, does not indeed decry phenomenon as false, but only of a lower order to

be submerged in the mind's ascent to the higher reality. All philosophy in all lands has indeed concerned itself with this problem. What distinguishes Hinduism from other faiths and theologies is that, while this problem has been largely confined to philosophy in other lands, it has in India seeped into the faith of the mass of the people. Philosophy has been set to tunes of music and turned into faith. But in other lands, the philosopher has generally denied appearance in search of reality. His effect on the modern world has therefore been very limited. The scientific and secular spirit has hungrily collected all data of appearance, sifted them, tabulated them and discovered laws that hold them together. This has given the modern man, his type being pre-eminently the European, a habit of life and thinking. He accepts ardently facts as they appear. The ethical content of Christianity has furthermore lent to the good acts of man the status of the works of God. All this works towards a scientific and ethical exploitation of the facts of life. Hinduism, however, has never been able to get rid of its metaphysical basis. Even the common faith of the people goes beyond the visible and sensible for a glimpse of that reality which appears not. The middle ages in Europe had also shared such a perspective, but, let me repeat this was confined to the philosopher and denied appearance altogether or took it as a reduction of truth, while the mass of the people accepted Christianity as an ethical faith and to that extent accepted appearance. Hinduism has never denied facts of life altogether, but only concedes them the status of events of a lower order and has always, so to this day, tried to go in search of reality of the higher order. This is the common faith of the people.

A vivid illustration comes to my mind. On the great but half destroyed temple of Konarak, one can see thousands upon thousands of sculptured images carved on the stones of the building. There is no miserliness nor coyness in the artist's acceptance of appearance; he has indeed accepted them in all their rich variety. Even here there seems to be a certain order of arrangement. From the lowest to the highest block, the sculptured images run in the series of unassorted variety to that of the hunt, to the love play, to music, then to power. Everything

is rich movement and activity. But, inside the temple is almost bare and such images as there are speak of stillness and peace. From a moving and active exterior to a still and static interior seems to have been the basic design of this temple. The search for the ultimate reality was never abandoned.

The comparative development of architecture and sculpture as compared to painting might well have its own story to tell. In fact, such paintings as are still available to us from ancient times are more architectural than otherwise. Man has probably greater scope to project his notions of ultimate reality into architecture and sculpture than painting.

The Hindu has therefore acquired a split personality. At his best, a Hindu accepts appearance without losing insight into the ultimate and is ever striving to enrich his insight, at his worst, his hypocrisy is matchless. The Hindu is probably the world's greatest hypocrite, for he not only deceives others as hypocrites all the world over do, but he also deceives himself to his own disadvantage. His split mind between appearance and reality often encourages him to do so. What an amazing spectacle has Hinduism presented in the past and does so today. Hinduism has given its votaries, the commonest among them, the faith of metaphysical equality or oneness between man and man and things, such as has never fallen to the lot of man elsewhere. Alongside of this faith in metaphysical equality goes the most heinous conduct of social inequality. I have often wondered if this metaphysical Hindu when he is well placed, does not treat the poor and low caste as animals and animals as stones and everyone as everything else. Vegetarianism and non-violence obviously degenerate into concealed cruelty. While it can be said of all human endeavour hitherto that truth at some stage turns into cruelty and beauty into profligacy, this is perhaps more so true of Hinduism which has attained scales of truth and beauty unsurpassed in other lands, but which has also descended into pits of darkness unplumbed by man elsewhere. Not until the Hindu learns to accept the facts of life in the scientific and secular spirit, facts relating to work and machine and output and family and

growth of population and hunger and tyranny and the like, is there any hope for him to overcome his split personality or to deal a death-blow to fanaticism which has so often been his undoing in the past.

This is not to say that Hinduism must give up its emotive basis and the search for oneness of all life and things. That is perhaps its greatest quality. The awareness and universalising of that sudden onrush of feeling, which makes a village boy pick up the kid of the goat and clasp it as if it were his life, when the automobile speeds along or which sees the tree with its gnarled roots and green branches as part of oneself, is perhaps a quality common to all faiths, but no where has it acquired a deep and abiding emotion as in Hinduism. The God of Reason is completely without the God of Mercy. I do not know whether God exists or does not, but this I know that the feeling that makes one kin of all life and things exists although as a rare emotion yet. To make of this feeling a background for all activity even of strife is perhaps an unrealisable adventure. But Europe is dying of strife born out of a too one-sided acceptance of appearance and India is dying of stagnation resulting from an equally one-sided acceptance of the reality behind things. I have no doubt that I would prefer to die of strife than of stagnation. But are these the only two courses of thinking and conduct open to man? Is it not possible to adjust the scientific spirit of enquiry with the emotive spirit of oneness without subordinating the one to the other and in full equality as two processes of like merit. The scientific spirit will work against caste and for woman, against property and for tolerance and of course yield the processes of producing wealth such as will dispel hunger and want. The creative spirit of oneness may secure that ballast without which men's highest endeavour turns into greed and envy and hatred.

It is difficult to say whether Hinduism is capable of acquiring this new mind and to achieving adjustment of the scientific and the emotive spirit. But then what exactly is Hinduism? To this there is no one answer, but a series of answers. This much is

certain that Hinduism is no precise doctrine nor organization, nor can any one article of faith or conduct be considered indispensable for Hinduism. There is a whole world of memories and mythology, of philosophy and customs and practices, part of which grossly evil and another which can be of service to man. The whole of it makes the Hindu mind, an essential quality of which some scholars have seen in the principle of tolerance or of unity in diversity. We have seen the limitations of this principle and where it needs to be revised so as to dispel mental inertia. A common error however in the understanding of this principle consists in the belief that liberal Hinduism has always been open to good ideas and influences no matter where they came from, while fanatical Hinduism is not. This is to my mind an illiterate belief. I have not come across in pages of Indian history any period when the free Hindu searched for ideas and objects in foreign lands or was willing to accept them. In all the long connection between India and China, I have only been able to list five fancy articles, including vermillion, imported into India, and of imports of ideas there is nothing at all.

Free India had essentially a oneway traffic with the outside world, no import of ideas and very little of objects, except silver and the like, unless when communities of foreigners settled in India and tried to become a Hindu sect or caste with the passage of time. On the other hand enslaved India and with it Hinduism have shown a remarkable alacrity to ape the conqueror, his language, his habits and ways of living. Self-sufficiency of mind in freedom is matched with its total supineness under slavery. This weakness of Hinduism has never been recognised and it is unfortunate that liberal Hindus in their illiteracy are spreading contrary ideas for propagandist purposes. In the state of freedom, the Hindu mind is indeed open, but only to events taking place within India's frontiers, but remains closed to ideas and influences from outside. This is one of its major weaknesses and a reason for India to fall a prey to foreign rule. The Hindu mind must now become open not only to what happens in India, but also to the outside world and it must apply its principle of unity

in diversity to all the achievements of human thinking and practice. Strenuous effort must be made to rid it of its habit to alternate between outright indifference to and unco-ordinated acceptance of foreign thought.

The war between the liberal and the fanatical in Hinduism has today taken the surface expression of the Hindu-Muslim conflict, but no Hindu who is aware of the history of his faith and country will fail to take equal notice of the other unresolved conflicts raging for 5000 years and more. No Hindu can be genuinely tolerant to Muslims unless he acts at the same time actively against caste and property and for woman. Likewise, a Hindu who is genuinely against caste and property and for woman will inevitably be tolerant to Muslims. The war between liberal and fanatical Hinduism has reached its most complex stage and it may well be that its end is in sight. Fanatical Hindus, no matter what their motives are, must break up the Indian State, should they ever succeed, not only from the Hindu-Muslim point of view, but also from that of caste and provinces. Liberal Hindus alone can sustain this state. This war of five thousand years or more has therefore entered a stage in which the very existence of the Indian people as a political community and a State depends upon the victory of the liberal over the fanatical in Hinduism.

The religious and the human problem is today eminently a political problem. The Hindu is faced with the serious choice of accomplishing a complete mental revolution or else of going under. He must be a Muslim and a Christian and feel like one. I am not talking of Hindu-Muslim unity, for that is a political, institutional or at best a cultural problem. I am talking of the emotional identification of the Hindu with the Muslim or the Christian, not in religious faith and practices, but in the feeling that I am he. Such an emotional identification may appear difficult to achieve, for, often it may have to be one-sided and bear the pain of murder and slaughter. I may here recall the American Civil War in which brother killed brother for four years and six hundred thousand died, but Abraham Lincoln and the American people crowned their hour of victory with precisely such an emotion between the Northern and Southern brother. No matter what

the future has in store for India, the Hindu must turn himself inside out to achieve this emotional oneness with the Muslim. The Hindu faith of emotive oneness of all life and things is also the political necessity of the Indian States that the Hindu shall feel one with the Muslim. On the path may yet lie setbacks and defeats, but the direction that the Hindu mind should take is clear.

It may be suggested that the best way to put an end to this war between liberal and fanatical Hinduism is to combat religion. That may indeed be so, but the process is tardy and where is the guarantee that the clever old rogue might not swallow up the anti-religious as one of its numerous sects? Furthermore the fanatical elements in Hinduism obtain their systematic supporters, when they do, from the semi-educated and from the townsmen, while the illiterate village-folk, however much they might get excited for the moment, cannot be their steady base. The long wisdom of centuries makes the village-folk as much as the educated, tolerant. In their search for sustenance from anti-democratic doctrines like communism and fascism that base themselves on somewhat similar concepts of caste and leadership, fanatical elements in Hinduism may as well assume the anti-religious garb. The time has come when the Hindu must bathe his mind and cleanse it of the dirt that centuries have accumulated. He must indeed establish an honest and fruitful relationship between the facts of life and his awareness of ultimate reality. Only on this base will he be able to crush for ever the fanatical elements in Hinduism in respect of caste, woman, property and tolerance, which have so long vitiated his faith and disintegrated his country's history. In the days of retreat the fanatical has often sneaked into the liberal in Hinduism. Let that not happen again. The issues are clear and sharply defined. Compromise will once again repeat the errors of the past. This hideous war must now be brought to a close. A new endeavour of the Indian mind will then start which shall combine the rational with the emotive, which shall make of unity in diversity not an inert but a vital doctrine which shall accept the clean joy of the sensible world without losing insight into the oneness of all life and things.

*July, 1950.*

## INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a bit of India torn away from her on 15th August, 1947 and constituted into a separate state. This would indicate clearly that India-Pakistan relations are as much a matter of internal as external policies within the two territories. Pakistan that was a part of India until three years ago would be a far more truthful and objective description than that suggested by the conjunction between India and Pakistan.

Three years is not a long time for a newly created state achieved out of an unpleasant partition to become enduring in history. Whether Pakistan will endure will ultimately rest on the solution of a question that has vexed the Indian people for 700 years and more.

Are the Hindus and Muslims of India two nations or do they constitute one nation? Seven hundred years of Indian history have been of two minds over this question and a continual settling and unsettling of answers has taken place. Brave efforts have been made to smelt the two faiths into the political communion of one nation and they have often come within an ace of success. But the irritant of difference in faith has been too strong for the melting pot to settle down and fanatical fires have as often posed the question over again. One outcome is nevertheless undisputed. The Muslim of India including Pakistan has greater affinity with the Hindu than with any other national including the Muslims of other lands. Likewise, the Hindu of India is related with the Muslim of his land more than with any other national.

Under British rule, the two processes of smelting Hindus and Muslims into one political community and of estranging them further apart were simultaneously at work. Hindus and Muslims had almost become one nation. But the British made use of the old irritant in order to prolong their rule. Whether they partitioned the country as an inescapable consequence of their past acts or out of a conscious or unconscious desire to continue their game between the two states is indeed an interesting question.

To throw the entire blame on imperialist cunning would, however, be wrong. What could the British have done, had not the old irritant helped them to unsettle the melting pot once again.

It is easy enough to point to a number of mistakes made by the national movement in the last 50 years. These were all tactical mistakes related to communal or weighted representation and provincial autonomy and residuary powers and the like. Behind them all lay the strategic weakness of the national movement, its inability and unwillingness to run risks and to master the processes of history.

At the time that India was partitioned, Hindus and Muslims were at the same time one nation and two nations. They were in a fluid state of communion as well as estrangement. Partition suddenly separated them into two states, but the corresponding task of national separation is not so simple nor easy. Divisions of states may be effected with a suddenness but the division of a people is troublesome and tardy. The people of India have separated into two states but, as a nation, they are in a fluid state, neither one nor two, perhaps more one than two.

The question of 700 years has now crystallized in the form: shall there be two nations in the image of the two existing states or shall there be one nation and therefore one state?

In order to endure, Pakistan must continue the process to which it owes its origin. It must drive Hindus and Muslims further and further apart so that they become two nations irrevocably. That is an inescapable necessity of the Pakistan state. The temporary rulers of Pakistan may or may not be conscious agents of this necessity, and the Indian people may only hope that they will realize the horror that it entails and therefore reverse the process.

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nation of some of them to imitate Pakistan, they cannot act otherwise unless an unforeseeable accident overwhelms their sanity.

The problem that partition set out to solve stays unresolved and the answer to the question of India's destiny is yet unsettled. Partition was accepted in the hope that it would achieve peace between Hindus and Muslims but after it was brought into being an era of bloodshed and uprooting has followed. A large scale war would probably not have claimed more than 600,000 dead and 20 millions uprooted. It is idle to guess what would have happened if the people and the Indian National Congress, which was then their instrument, had continued fighting foreign rule without accepting partition. But one thing is certain: Pakistan has not solved the problem that gave it its birth.

Indian civilization is once again confronted with this question: two states and therefore two nations or one nation and therefore one state. Whatever tragedy and horror may yet pile on the Indian people, awareness of this question will hinder ugliness and advance civilization. Bearing this background in mind, a study of the issues in dispute between India and Pakistan may now be attempted.

The issues that have in the past caused disputes between India and Pakistan and may continue to do so can be grouped under four heads, those relating to minorities, territory, trade and foreign policies.

As the minority in one state is the majority in the other, the problem of minorities acquires a far wider significance than is elsewhere the case. It is not only a human problem but more so a political problem involving the integrity of both states.

Around 8 million Hindus still live in Pakistan and 35 million Muslims in India. If the security of either is violated, it produces conditions in which the security of the other is also in danger. Not only the cycle of barbaric acts is thus set in motion but the state itself is threatened with extinction either due to unsuppressed mob frenzy or because of the excessive use of repression.

If the faith of a population or its sections were to denote the character of the State, India is as much a Muslim state as Pakistan is. Likewise, Pakistan is also a Hindu state.

The continuance of large masses belonging to the Hindu as well as Muslim faiths in both states makes it impossible for Indo-Pakistan relations to function purely on the foreign policy level. To say that what happens in Pakistan is Pakistan's own concern and India has no business to interfere with her internal affairs and *vice versa* is to talk as if this two-way link-up of whole masses of men did not exist. Gruesome deeds anywhere cause an aversion of feeling in other parts of the world, or at least they should. But, in the relationship between India and Pakistan, the effect does not stop at an emotional reaction but leads to another chain of gruesome deeds. Suppression of a minority is always an attack on human civilisation but, with regard to Indo-Pakistan relationships, it is also an act of aggression by the offending state. It is, therefore, an act of war and a threat to the peace of the world. It is very much Pakistan's business that India should treat her minority well same as it is very much India's business that Pakistan should also treat her minority similarly.

Should the Muslim minority in India be suppressed and slaughtered, Pakistan will have every right to counter this act of aggression from India and to invade her. Similar right belongs to India should the Hindu minority in Pakistan be suppressed and slaughtered. To suggest that this is fanatical behaviour and that one might as well seek militarily to restore civilisation wherever it suffers setback, whether in Europe or Africa, is senseless. Any state worth its name must secure equal citizenship for all its citizens and must put down ruthlessly efforts by one section of the population to disrobe another. In the event that such disrobing takes place either in India or Pakistan, the other state is compelled to make a choice between two courses of action, similar disrobing in its own territory or counter-attack upon the offending state.

The Minorities' Agreement between India and Pakistan concluded after a series of barbaric acts begun in Pakistan which

later led to somewhat similar acts in India, is based on an implicit recognition of this principle. Violation of this agreement means war, and as just a war as any can be. It is true that a distinction will have to be made, as was done by government benches in the Indian Parliament, between isolated incidents of barbaric character and a mass outbreak of barbarism, which alone can justify a counter attack and marching of troops.

Slaughter, loot and arson are not the only forms of attack upon a minority. A continuing sense of insecurity or an economic and social boycott also imperils its existence. That such a situation obtains is evident from the heavy exodus still going on. Nearly 20 million people have been uprooted in both states. Such numbers of refugees have rarely disfigured human civilization. Nearly 15 million were uprooted following upon the first series of expulsions immediately after partition, the numbers of Sikhs and Hindus on the one hand and Muslims on the other being nearly equal. The account is nearly even also with regard to the slaughtered 6 lacs. In the second series of expulsions, however, which are still continuing, 4 million Hindus have already been uprooted against one million Muslims. What part actual conditions and their unbearable character or a sense of fright at what is to come have separately played in these expulsions is difficult to say. To put them down to the cowardice of those who flee is a bad joke about the eclipse of civilisation that the Indian people in India as well as in Pakistan have suffered.

Although these expulsions do not yet amount to a violation of the Minorities' Agreement and therefore to an act of war, they certainly signify its partial failure. No amount of false hallelujahs sung in praise of the Agreement can obscure the glaring fact that, at the present rate of exodus, there shall be no minority left in Pakistan. One would have thought that the existing transport system stretched to its maximum capacity would not be able to remove over 12 million Hindus from East Pakistan within less than 10 years or so. 4 millions have come away in eight months of the current year. Group passions obviously make mince-meat of statistical expectations.

Whether Pakistan consciously desires the total expulsion of the Hindu minority and the achieving of a homogeneous people belonging to one faith, the Muslim faith, is anybody's guess. The drive of the Pakistan state, however, even in spite of the conscious intentions of its rulers, would tend to be in the direction of a homogeneous faith. A number of people in Pakistan are also reportedly happy at what is happening. They believe that they are damaging the economic and social life of India or at any rate, of Eastern India, which can only be a source of joy to the fanatic opponents.

Exchange of population has rightly been ruled out on the Indian side, although some people continue to advocate it as a solution. A deliberate acceptance of exchange must inevitably add to the process which is tearing India and Pakistan apart into two nations. No matter if Pakistan desires to convert itself into a homogeneous religion, the continuance of Muslims and Hindus in India and their growing equality of citizenship will effectively block the division of the Indian people into two nations. The choice for India, therefore, is between a willing acceptance of refugees from Pakistan and pressure on Pakistan to mend her ways and, not at all the present course of namby-pamby conduct; perhaps the two choices are not so much alternatives as complementaries.

A calamity of such vast dimensions as has already driven away 20 million persons from their homes and into far corners of the country was bound to produce an effect on the morale of the entire people. It might well have steeled them into a harder and cleaner life. Instances are not wanting where the refugees themselves have put up an example of endurance and economic improvising which the rest of the people might follow to their advantage. The sudden stab always excites more interest than the long pain, but whenever the full story is told, these uprooted men and women will have been found to have woven elfin stories of common life. On the whole, however, the nation has declined further in its stature which was none too high.

Callousness has deepened and men have tried to make money out of people's misery. Both in its direct effect on Hindu-Muslim relationship and in its indirect effect on the morale of the people, the tackling of the refugee problem on a plane cleaner than hitherto would also contribute towards the resolving of the Indo-Pakistan problem.

No matter what happens, the Indian people must determine not to treat the minority in India or allow the minority in Pakistan to be treated as pawns and slaughter material in a game of politics played on other fields.

The only outstanding territorial dispute between India and Pakistan concerns Kashmir and no other is even theoretically in sight. On the basis of international law as understood and applied in the U.N., Kashmir is part of India and Pakistan has waged war as an unashamed aggressor. That commensurate action has not been taken against Pakistan by the U.N. is due to complications of foreign policy to be considered later.

Pakistan is determined to acquire Kashmir anyhow, for otherwise its effort to divide the Indian people irrevocably into two nations suffers serious setback. On its frontiers would stride an area the majority of whose population practice the Muslim faith but which would be a part of the Indian state and committed to smelt the entire Indian people into one nation. Pakistan has already used war and all its works to achieve this Kashmir objective. India too cannot let Kashmir go, for that would be a defeat of her effort to build up a collective existence in which the religious denomination of the individual does not matter. Kashmir is a symbol of the conflict between two ways of life, one that leads to separation and conflict and poverty and the other aimed to achieve integration and prosperity.

The outside world does not realize the full implications of the Kashmir issue. For it, India has placed herself in the wrong by seeming to create difficulties in the way of holding a plebiscite and ascertaining the will of the inhabitants of Kashmir. The mis-handling of the Kashmir situation by India's representatives

in the U.N. and their starched approach to the smaller states of the world have in no small measure contributed to this misunderstanding. India does not know how to stick to any one line of thinking. Good luck saved India from the harm that her representatives would have done her by their successive changes of front with regard to Hyderabad. Subtlety and elasticity are always commendable in diplomacy but the fact of Pakistan's aggression on the small but gallant people of Kashmir should not have been dropped out of any picture. And around it should have reared up the great drama now being enacted between India and Pakistan, integration versus disintegration.

India is pledged to a plebiscite in Kashmir and must fulfil that pledge. It is a democratic pledge. But democratic conditions must be created before the pledge can be carried out. Invading troops must be cleared out of Kashmir. U.N. may send observers but the authority that shall hold the plebiscite must be the lawfully constituted Government of Kashmir. I know that these democratic conditions will not be acceptable to Pakistan unless the U.N. dictates, but India should also make it clear that no other conditions will be acceptable to her. Too long has the India Government slid from one concession to another and that process must be halted.

The hesitancy of India in regard to the secular outlook has also weakened her in Kashmir. The maharaja of Kashmir should have gone much earlier than he did. A Minister of State in the Indian Cabinet should have been made resident in Kashmir. Land reforms should not have been delayed. These are not after-thoughts, for I had submitted a report on these lines over two years ago after visiting Kashmir on the outbreak of the war. The India Government has been hesitant and has taken no bold action, with the result that it has half lost the ideological battle in Kashmir. Pakistan and Moscow are now entrenched in Kashmir, and with Pakistan stands the Atlantic Camp as well. Perhaps it is never too late.

While Kashmir is an obvious territorial issue between India and Pakistan, various parts of Pakistan and relationships among

them may perhaps become the indirect cause of future disputes. That does not apply to India for there are no parts not naturally belonging to her or wanting to get away from her. Pakistan on the other hand is a highly artificial construction, two major parts of which are separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. West and East Pakistan cannot stay in their present relationship. East Pakistan must either become the colony of West Pakistan or continually loosen its present relationship in favour of that with the neighbouring areas of India. West Pakistan does not possess the armed resources to reduce East Pakistan to a state of subjection. The ideological hold is, of course, there but it is difficult to say how long it will last. The likelier outcome therefore is towards independence rather than colonization of East Pakistan.

Historical destiny is inescapable. Although India may do nothing to help achieve this destiny, Pakistan will be suspicious and will throw the blame on her for something which develops naturally. Already issues of trade and language and the bureaucratic caste have caused friction between East and West Pakistan and more are to come. Instead of working out this friction rationally, Pakistan has sought the dangerous expedient of obscuring it and transferring it irrationally into Hindu-Muslim and Indo-Pakistan relationships.

While this unnatural union between West and East Pakistan contains dangerous possibilities, the inclusion of the Pushto area in Pakistan is no less explosive. Nearly eight million Pushto speaking people live in the Frontier Province and the tribal areas and their demand for Pakhtunistan is only a logical continuation and a bitter fulfilment of Pakistan. The tallest among living Indians in many ways, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, lives in a Pakistan prison and his adherents are also imprisoned. The Pathans have also suffered gruesome massacres like the ones at Charsadda on 12th August 1948 and later at Swabi. They have a tenacious friend in Afghanistan. Things look black for Pakistan in this area, however much it may count on its well-equipped armies to rain bombs and bullets on the tribal Pathans

in order to hold them in subjection as it again did on 19th August, 1950 on the Ahmadzai areas, Pagin and Damanzai, Musababa and Miranshah.

The territorial mal-adjustment inside Pakistan is so heavy that it may at any time start falling like nine pins but, before that happens, it may seek to avoid its historical destiny by making India the scapegoat and waging a policy of riots and war. Already the Indian people have been guilty of the infamous perfidy of betraying the Frontier and its Khuda-i-Khidmatgars. The India Government may yet stay neutral in the face of their agony or that of East Pakistan. The Indian people, however, must not. Any democratic aspiration of the people in East Pakistan or in the Pushto speaking area will awaken responsive echoes in the rest of the Indian people and nothing should be done to stifle them. The Indian people must not suppress their yearning for a complete integration of their own whole and also with Afghanistan if it were willing. The only wise course for Pakistan would be to reverse its course from separatism to integration but such wisdom is rarely known in human affairs.

Another issue of friction revolves around problems of trade and currency between these two territories whom geography and economic resources have designed as parts of one another. An attempt on the part of the two governments to regulate the exchange value of their currencies not on economic but on extraneous grounds is bound to cause dislocation in trade and decrease the earnings of people on both sides of the frontier. Everybody knows that the suppression of the minority and the eclipse of civilization which started with East Pakistan in the beginning of the year was itself preceded by a sharp and continuous drop in the earnings of East Pakistani's jute growers. Whether there is any connection between these two happenings and whether other factors were not equally important in the occasioning of East Bengal's riots can be fully answered only by the administrators on the spot. That trade and currency between the two territories should be so regulated as not to violate geography and economic compulsions is undeniable. But

Pakistan's effort to create a nation wholly distinct and separate from the Indian militates against this desirable policy.

Trade between the two territories has another aspect. It can best be illustrated by what was happening in the tribal areas until recently. Russian sugar was sold there at As. 5 to As. 6 a seer while Pakistani sugar cost a rupee. This naturally awakened the curiosity of the Pushto people and disposed them towards receiving information about the Soviet system that made living so cheap and easy. Perhaps the greatest lack in the relationship of the peoples on both sides of the frontier has been the utter stagnation of their economic systems and the fact that man has not improved his lot in either territory. If India had kept her pledge of social justice and economic well being, she would have awakened echoes of sympathy or at least an interested curiosity in the Pakistani people. India has not made use of her best argument with Pakistan which is also conducive to economic and armed strength. Even if Pakistan had sought to stifle trade with an India marching towards prosperity and justice, Lahore is not so far away from Amritsar nor Dacca from Calcutta and news would have travelled. The more of well being there is in India, the greater will be the resentment of the people in Pakistan at their own economic stagnation and, possibly, regret at the futile division of the country.

When socialism is proclaimed as a cementing force between the two territories and an instrument for their re-integration, it is with two possibilities in mind. Should socialist governments come into being in both territories, they will have no communal loads to carry and may be expected to start on the process of re-integration. The setting up of a socialist government in India irrespective of what happens in Pakistan is another possibility. This incident would be a mighty irritant to the internal affairs of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan would either see the wisdom of increasingly friendly integration with India or the people of Pakistan would be resentful and even rebellious. That landlordism and capitalism should go and that land should be redivided or industries socially owned is a necessity not only for

the well being of the people but also for strengthening India and its processes of integration against Pakistan and its processes of separatism.

Indo-Pakistan relations are a part of the wider complex of international relations and therefore problems of foreign policy vitally affect the former. Any divergence in the foreign policies of the two territories is bound to be exploited by the Atlantic or Soviet camp in its own interest. Likewise, both India and Pakistan are tempted to exploit the Atlantic or Soviet camp against each other. It is these weaknesses and temptations of foreign policy arising out of the partition of the country that have reduced and even nullified free India's capacity to intervene for the world's peace and progress.

A vivid illustration is afforded by the Kashmir incident. It is hard to believe that the great powers of the world retain, if they ever had it, their ability to judge a dispute solely on the merits of the case. They have also in mind the alliances of the disputants and which one is on their side. They can also rationally justify this wicked attitude on the very highest principles of a world law. Their side, they firmly believe, is the one to bring peace and law to the world and therefore whoever is on their side is the morally superior party to the dispute.

Pakistan is on the Atlantic side very much more so than is India. Atlantic personnel of all description is welcome in Pakistan and they hold good positions or have influence with Pakistan's key-men. Pakistan has also been inclined to tow the Atlantic line and made no reservations about it. Pakistan's alliance with the Atlantic camp in the event of a war with the Soviet is in no doubt, her air and sea bases are readily available and she is a nearer neighbour of the Soviets than is India. Whether the Atlantic camp is reasoning well from the long range point of view is quite another question. Clouded in its vision by its immediate needs, it is probably acting against its own interest but of this there is no doubt that it is surer of Pakistan than of India as an ally against the Soviet camp.

Kashmir or the Pathan demand or even the entire basis of Pakistan is judged not on merits but in the background of Pakistan as an ally against the Soviet camp. The U.N. was pretty fast in judging the Korean aggression but has tarried to this day on the issue of Pakistan's aggression against Kashmir. Nor is it ever likely to understand the evils of insanity and slaughter that arise out of the separatism which is Pakistan's basis.

The Soviet camp possesses no such direct influence over India or Pakistan as does the Atlantic camp. But it has its adherents in both territories and the quality of its conscience is at par with that of the Atlantic camp. Before going into the reasons why that has been so, two remarkable attitudes of the Soviet camp with regard to recent Indian developments may be noted. For a whole two years, India's Communists did their utmost to sabotage and kill while Pakistan's communists lay low. India's Communists have always supported separatist demands from the initial demand of Pakistan to the subsequent ones of Gurkhistan, Jharkhand and Sikhistan.

The reasons for such attitudes are obscure and may be manifold. It may be that Pankistan does not provide the same legal frame-work for communist activities as does India and that communist violence would be met by the combined fury of the government and the people in Pakistan. It may also be that the Soviet camp considers Pakistan an appendage and believes that with the fall of India to Communism Pakistan would follow suit. Perhaps the entire policy of the Soviet camp to Islam is another reason, for it has always been rather slow going in the Islamic states, with what reasons and motives it is difficult to say. More specifically with regard to Kashmir, the Soviet camp as known to everybody has put forward the idea of an independent Kashmir. Furthermore it is now securely entrenched in Kashmir both within the government and among the people.

It is too much to expect that the Atlantic and the Soviet camps will desist from exploiting differences between India and Pakistan for their own aims. Not unless the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. realise the short-sightedness of a policy that seeks to

capture the alliance of a corrupt people, would they be willing to help India and Pakistan achieve an honourable integration or at least not to aggravate the conflict. The desirability of India and Pakistan coming together on their own on issues of foreign policy is therefore greater. Apart from aggravating internal conflicts, divergent foreign policies may ultimately see India and Pakistan on opposite sides in a war or one may be neutral and the other a participant. India and Pakistan should be on the same side whether as participants or as neutrals. Such a consummation is possible only if either state follows a policy of creative independence from the two blocs, the policy of the third camp and of abstention in warlike disputes of the two camps.

This overall situation in respect of minorities and disputes regarding territory, trade and foreign affairs is forbidding enough but there is always a possibility of a rational solution being achieved. Whether or not India and Pakistan may ultimately wage war on each other, the basic question to answer is whether Pakistan will be able to complete the process of dividing the Indian people into two nations and to form a Pakistani nation in the image of the Pakistani state. The answer seems to be plain. Whatever further tragedies the Indian people may yet have to pass through as a result of the Pakistani effort, its failure seems to be certain precisely owing to the various factors already noted.

No people can be suddenly divided into two nations if they have had for long centuries a common history and a common language, although the communion may be incomplete, and ties of geography, economy and foreign affairs can be sundered only at grave peril. Whenever such a situation has occurred as between Austria and Germany or in the separate continued existence of Switzerland, it is due to factors which are totally absent in the case of Pakistan. Austria could remain separate from Germany only as long as she had a large colonial empire in Eastern Europe. Pakistan cannot even dream of annexing Afghanistan or Iran as its colonial empire; hostility at least in one case is evident. Nor is Pakistan a brave little Switzerland

whose neutrality respected by the world may become a strong enough base for a sense of nationality. As these possibilities of leaning towards other neighbours and of Swiss type neutrality are absent, Pakistan does not have the necessary international background in which to form an exclusive and distinct nation.

The world wide Muslim sentiment may aid Pakistan in some ways but it is totally valueless in her effort to form a nation. The tomb of Zaglul Pasha bears such symbols of the infidel as the snake and although Egypt is a Muslim state she has a long memory which is essentially Egyptian. That applies equally to countries like Iran and Indonesia. In her search to form a nation, Pakistan will inevitably have to draw from sources of history which are common with India. Already, over six hundred years ago, Ghiasuddin's tomb bore Hindu symbols, the pitcher on its pinnacle and the lotus on its walls. If Pakistan were to aspire for the impossibility of creating a Muslim nation which spreads from Egypt to Indonesia, not only would her effort be foredoomed to failure but it could also not be started effectively in view of her contradictory desire to form a Pakistani nation.

This is not to say that troublous times are not ahead. The gap between India and Pakistan in respect of names and language is widening. Efforts are being made to deck out the Pakistani woman in garrara instead of the saree, an unhappy development in view of the fact that the unveiled Hindu and Muslim woman more than the man have been indistinguishable from each other. At the same time, it is worthwhile to recall that grammar is the hard core of a language and, no matter how much Hindi and Urdu may temporarily depart from each other, their community can never disappear. Furthermore, the desire to be modern is as strong in Pakistan as it is in India and dangerously external symbols such as the beard and the top tuft which have so long distinguished the Muslim from the Hindu are fated to disappear.

Certain groups of Hindus are also pursuing their separatist inclinations. In a burst of uncultured revivalism, they want to miss the substance for such empty satisfactions as naming their country Bharat. They are also inclined to give up words, most

of whom are derived from Sanskrit, which have been rounded off by the wisdom of centuries into simple and sonorous symbols of meaning for the doubtful originals. The source for such insanity is not far to seek. Islam came to India as a conqueror and such Hindus have not yet grown virile enough to conquer the memory of that period. They are anti-muslim in their outlook, but they forget that whoever is anti-muslim must necessarily be pro-Pakistan and anyone who wishes the end of the Pakistani idea must necessarily be pro-muslim. These people might well be astounded when they are told what they really are. They probably imagine that a powerful Hindu Raj, which treats Muslims as second grade citizens and worse, will one day conquer and subjugate Pakistan and they may therefore resent being called friends of Pakistan. That day indeed may never occur, not at least on the basis of conquest and subjugation. Meanwhile, they give succour and support to Pakistan with their separatist action and are therefore her friends.

An argument derived from recentmost experience has subconscious hold over the Hindu mind. In a secular and perhaps federated India, some Hindus fear that Muslims will have weighted representation and privileged consideration. That is an irrational fear, a hangover in memory from the period, when Britain played the Muslim against the Hindu. Not appeasement of any group, but equality among all citizens in law as well as in social and economic practice is the goal of secular democracy. Whatever some people may think, the Government of India and its Prime Minister and his Deputy are no appeasers; they are sentimentalists. That the Deputy Prime Minister may at times give a disastrous slant to his sentiments in the internal sphere is of no special consequence in view of the fact that he is more or less a carbon copy of his chief in all major matters of Indo-Pakistan relationship and it is therefore the sentiments of the Prime Minister which merit some study.

The utterances of the Prime Minister following upon the Indo-Pakistan minorities' agreement throw an interesting light on his mind. At that time his popularity was high, as any-

body's would be who had somehow been associated with the averting of a crisis, and he made full use of it by fulminating against those whom he styled as war mongers. He also included among war mongers those who had described suppression of minorities as an act of war, and who had advocated that in the event of another barbaric outbreak this act of aggression should be countered by a defensive war. For a whole two weeks he continued his rhetoric relentlessly. Then suddenly while on his way to Indonesia he made a speech that he had given marching orders to his troops, that they stood poised to strike on the Indo-Pakistani frontier and that a last minute settlement averted the catastrophe of war. No statesman could ever have made such a speech. What is worse, no man anxious to be truthful could have spoken like that. On his own admission, the Prime Minister was a worse war monger than those whom he had decried, for they had only wanted a counter attack in the event of a repetition of barbarism, while he had decided to counter attack as a result of something that had already happened. Finally, he told the Indian Parliament that while the minorities crisis was in full swing he had thought of resigning and of going to East Bengal as a man of peace and in the footsteps of Mahatma Gandhi. Whether these utterances derive from a conscience intent to lie or they are the consequence of a mind without a well thought out purpose is indeed a subject for psychiatric enquiry. But one thing is certain that the Prime Minister is a sentimentalist and, apart from the swaying sentiment of the hour, the weightiest consideration with him is not so much the long range solution of a problem as the need to retain the confidence and esteem of his people. In the three years since the attainment of freedom, the Prime Minister has acted like a superb politician but his statesmanship has been of little worth. These utterances are on a level with another frivolous observation he made equating the Pakistani base of the Islamic state with the illustrative phrase of 'Ram Raj'. One cannot also sufficiently condemn his riot making speech made in the midst of a severe crisis of mass emotion in which he spoke of gold bangles that he saw on the wrists of women who had been hounded out of Pakistan, a speech

which contributed in no small measure to the outbreak of barbarism in India.

Ever since the partition, the India Government has adopted a sentimental approach to Pakistan. It was effusive in sponsoring and welcoming Pakistan's admission into the United Nations. If it could not have voted like Afghanistan, it should at least have maintained a dignified silence. These warm effusions are attenuated with strongly abusive epithets against Pakistan on other occasions especially when an emotional crisis overwhelms the Prime Minister and his Deputy over Kashmir or Hyderabad and the like. The Government of India and its spokesmen are obviously no appeasers; they are sentimentalists living from hand to mouth without purpose or policy. Unless the people bestir themselves or a miracle intervenes, I see it plain enough that this Prime Minister whom insane Hindus look upon as an appeaser will without preparation lead his people against a possible aggression of Pakistan and ride the war horse. The people will do well to force their Prime Minister to become a statesman or else to drive him and his deputy out of office. I may be pardoned for having written at such length about an individual, whose worth to history is yet little, but my excuse is his deadening grip over the mind of his people and the distress to which he has brought them due to lack of purpose and policy.

The people and the government of India must adopt a realistic policy towards Pakistan, a policy that will indeed satisfy the need of the hour but will never lose sight of the great question that history is asking. If it is at all possible to answer this question by the method of negotiations and peace, no effort should be left undone. Even in the midst of the severest crisis, India should never abandon the method of negotiation. She may even strive to answer the historical question by a move seemingly contradictory to the purpose of creating one nation and therefore one state. India may give Pakistan the guarantee that it sought to obtain in the United States. She should go on record for her readiness at any time to guarantee the frontiers of Pakistan should Pakistan be in turn willing to enter into a bilateral guarantee of

common policies on minorities, trade and foreign affairs. Violation of one guarantee would automatically involve the violation of the other. If Pakistan is only anxious to lead a separate but civilized existence, it should have no difficulty in entering into such a contract with India.

In a crisis of relation between two states, one yearns for a supreme world authority that will be guided alone by justice and world conscience. If there were a world Parliament elected on the basis of adult suffrage and a world government constituted out of it, no one should object taking disputes between India and Pakistan to it and submitting to its verdict whatever that might be. That such an authority may come into being will depend on how soon the world is able to throw up leaders who are internationally responsible and when it is willing to accept dictates of world law over-riding national or separatist interest. The Indian people will do well to put this proposal before the people of Pakistan and of other lands, no matter when it may finally mature.

The people of India must in any event remember that their supreme weapon against the two-nation objective of Pakistan is the treatment that they mete to the minorities within the Indian Republic. Only when Hindu is willing to fight Hindu, through the Government as well as people's action, in order to protect the Muslim and raise him to equal citizenship not alone in law but also in social practice, will it be possible for India to answer the question that has plagued her for 700 years and that brought Pakistan into being. Whether it is peace or war, this is an essential condition for the success of India. Whatever else might happen, the integration of Muslims and Hindus within the Indian Republic will make the effort of Pakistan to create two nations impossible. A socialist revolution within the Indian Republic moreover must inevitably hasten the re-union of the people. Finally, the people and the government of India must ever be ready to meet any eventuality.

In 1948, a few months after the partition I had ventured to foresee the end of Pakistan in any one or all of three possible

ways within a period of 5 years; increasing federative unity through negotiation, socialist revolution in India and counter-attack in the event of Pakistan's aggression. This speech had irked Mr. Jinnah who was then the Governor-General of Pakistan. Mahatma Gandhi was then alive, but there is no reason to change this opinion except that his death has slowed all processes of healing. The responsibility for whatever delay occurs lies squarely on Hindu fanaticism.

September, 1950.

## INDIA AND PAKISTAN (*Continued*)

### STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNALISM WITHIN AND ACROSS THE BORDER

I have received some letters and telegrams about conditions in East Bengal. Until I read Maulana Azad's reassuring statement on Calcutta I hesitated to write. But obviously events must not be allowed to happen without plan or purpose. Lack of purpose is making Hindu-Muslim and Indo-Pakistan relationships unnecessarily gloomy.

I believe that it is sinful to touch the hair of a single Muslim in the Indian Republic because of happenings in Pakistan, a sin not only against man but also against the Indian people, including Hindus. However, to make this belief the common property of Hindus and to avoid all retaliatory actions on Muslims in the Indian Union, a just, consistent and firm policy towards Pakistan is necessary. Such a policy must entail the recognition that Pakistan is an artificial construct, born out of the selfish and short-sighted policy of British Imperialism even at its wisest moment and the lack of grit in the Indian national movement at that time.

An artificial construct can become a natural organisation only after it has waded through a long and bloody period of conflict and crisis. The simple issue accordingly is: Will India complete the process, already achieved, of becoming one nation and therefore one state or will the continuance of two states be ensured through a further tearing apart of the Indian people into two nations? The India Government must overcome its sense of shame for complicity in the imperialist and communal game to weaken the Indian people by partitioning the country. It will then cease to be of two minds with regard to Pakistan, one mind purposelessly appeasing and the other equally purposelessly aggressive.

The policy towards Pakistan must be built out of the fresh premises of an honest federative approach on the one hand and

a lively interest in the happenings across the unnatural frontier on the other. The Indian Government has done well to offer a no-war pact to Pakistan. It must go further. It must offer a foreign policy union and be ready to offer any other kind of federative or confederative solutions. At the same time the fullest winds of publicity must blow on happenings inside Pakistan. Killings, rape and arson taking place across the frontier must be made known to the world, in particular to the Arab countries, Iran, Afghanistan and Indonesia. The world does not even know that 40 million Muslims live in India as against 50 million Muslims in Pakistan. When the India Government cannot do this in full, other agencies must be allowed to do so and also to trace the poison of communal states and their imperialist midwifery. I cannot understand the suppression of my persistent efforts, over a year and half ago, to agitate against the massacre of over six hundred Khudai Khidmatgars by the new Frontier Government and against the imprisonment of the Khan brothers.

Everybody knows that the continuance of the Indian Union in the British Commonwealth is largely due to India's desire to awaken Britain's moral conscience in regard to Pakistan. That policy seems to have partly succeeded for what Britain cannot now do to encourage Pakistan is taken over by the United States! I have no intention to list the blunders made by India's delegation at U.N.O., starting from the initial sponsoring of Pakistan by India and ranging over the policy-changes in the Hyderabad debate. These blunders, presumably made at British insistence, have only stiffened the attitude of small nations in the U.N.O. against India. Let the Indian people understand that the large number of small nations at the U.N.O. instinctively tend to take the side of the smaller state in a dispute with a bigger state. India will do well to understand this psychology and stick to frank and honest policy without giving in to or making use of legal subtleties.

Additionally, India must make a positive appeal to the smaller nations, particularly for a policy of revolutionary peace, of complete freedom and political equality for all nations, of increasing

approximation to economic equality among nations, of commanding a truce between the Power-blocs and more umpiring between the Power-blocs. In this connection, the India Government might make an approach to the U.N.O. for international brigades of peace consisting of teams from all nations including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to work jointly on projects of reconstruction all over the world.

The India Government's weakness towards Pakistan and in world affairs generally is also largely due to the total lack of an economic policy at home. A programme to end poverty pushed through with speed will awaken nostalgia in Pakistan for reunion with India and also earn the affectionate respect of the world. Refugees from Pakistan must be more rapidly absorbed into the social and economic life of the republic. The pursuit of such an over-all policy will enable the India Government to adopt a firm line with Pakistan and, in course of time, firm action, should that ever be unfortunately necessary. The knowledge that the India Government has decided to pursue a purposeful policy will give hope to the religious minority of Hindus and the political minorities of Muslims in Pakistan and will sustain them through gloom, however dark or long. Undoubtedly, it is the duty of the India Government as well as that of every Hindu to protect Muslims of the Indian Republic, no matter what the cost, and this duty is unconditional, no matter what else happens or does not. The discharge of this duty will, however, be facilitated by the adoption of a positive Pakistan policy.

If no other argument prevails with certain sections of Hindus, they must be speedily educated into the realisation that an opponent of Pakistan must necessarily be a friend of Muslims in the same way that an opponent of Muslims is inevitably a friend and agent of Pakistan. To oppose and persecute Muslims is to uphold the two-nation theory and, therefore, to ensure the continuance of Pakistan. Furthermore, the India Government must take the sternest and readiest police action against communal rioters. The Indian people will welcome such action, once they know that it is also part of a wider policy towards Pakistan.

## INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India's policy towards Pakistan must be above parties. Efforts should therefore be made to get the political parties of the land to agree to a common policy and then to pursue it with consistency and vigour.

February, 1950.

## A PEACE BASED ON FACTS

The scheduled meeting of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan is likely to result in the easing of tension between the two states. But peace is something more than a mere lessening of tension. When peace will be ushered in will depend on how far India and Pakistan agree to work together, to begin with, in certain restricted spheres, with well-defined rights and responsibilities, as a result of the meeting. One of these spheres must necessarily be that of protection of minorities. A well-meaning statement will not suffice.

There must be a treaty or concordat of bilateral guarantees to minorities, so that if a minority is oppressed in either territory both states acquire the right and duty to protect it. Such a concordat would be an ideal solution based on equality of sovereign rights between India and Pakistan. India must go on record as having proposed such an arrangement. Other agreements, resulting in monetary and customs unions, should be sought. Preliminary explorations for a common foreign policy, so that India and Pakistan strive together for a World Parliament and a World Government and seek to achieve combination of peoples and governments, of the world in order to keep war out of it, would be welcome. Even in the midst of the darkest hour of crisis and pre-war conditions, statesmanship demands conciliatory and federative approaches between disputing States. They never come to nothing. Should a war prove unavoidable, such approaches help in constructing a healthier post-war peace.

Over four months ago, I had suggested to Mr. Ben Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, and the leaders of the Arab League that informal consultations between them might take place. Mr. Ben Gurion unhesitatingly accepted the idea and volunteered to travel to Rhodes Islands or anywhere else in order to meet the Egyptian leaders. My argument with the Egyptians as well as the Israelites was that such a meeting might perhaps achieve peace and that even if a war became unavoidable it will have acted as the beginning and a base for a post-war conciliation. I

hope that such a meeting will now be possible between the leaders of the Arab League on the one hand and the leaders of Israel on the other.

A peace-maker, however, is not "that man with the umbrella." I am no minister and therefore under no obligation of silence. The interests of a nation and the cause of peace are served not by men of the Opposition adopting an unmeaning silence but by speaking out freely and frankly on the evil forces of war.

Two great conflicts of Indian history are drawing to a close. The five-thousand-year-old conflict between Hindu liberalism and Hindu fanaticism, which seems to have begun with the pouring of molten lead in the ears of such Hindus as were not authorised to hear the Vedas and whose last pitilessly evil act was the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, has neared its end. Likewise, the one-thousand-year-old conflict between the unitive single-nation theory and the disintegrating two-or-more-nations theory has entered its final phase. The two conflicts have interpenetrated each other. Everybody knows that the serpent goes into hibernation. Evil forces lay off for a while and then they re-appear. I do not want the Indian people ever again to be unprepared for the outbreak of evil. In order to overcome events of the future and mould them to the advantage of civilisation, the mind must move faster than them. This is no time for doubts and hesitation. A great movement of the mind must sweep over India so that all barriers are annihilated, the Hindu and the Muslim, the Brahmin and the non-Brahmin are smelted together into one community, and an emotional identification of everyone with everyone else takes place. I think such a movement of the mind is immediately possible, provided it becomes part of the needs of the Indian state and a security of its continuance.

An inevitable counterpart of such a belief would be the liveliest of concern by the people and the Government of India in the happenings of Pakistan. The recurrence of barbarism in Pakistan would then not be an internal matter but an act of aggression. The halting of such an aggression would then be the automatic duty of the Indian state.

April, 1950.

## ARAB WORLD AND IRAN

The Arab peoples, in their West-Asian as also their North-African areas, are a natural constituent of the Third Camp. But the natural situation is thickly overlaid with artificial crusts. To remove them is therefore a main task of Arab statesmanship.

A number of these areas are not yet completely free. Even those which are comparatively free are subject to some kind of foreign hold. Dynastic ambitions and rivalries interplay with these various imperialistic influences to prevent the Arab peoples from enacting their natural destiny. They are poor in economy and poorer yet in that basic emotional and ideological motivation which propels a people to great deeds. Not even the conflict between the monarch and the people, as to who is the ultimate repository of power, has been fully resolved. In this already complex situation the question of Israel has become another indigestible ingredient. Not unless the Arab mind is able at least to straighten out this complex and confusing situation into its various strands, can it free itself from the temptation to apply changing and ineffective remedies dictated under fleeting pressure.

But the Arabs are a gay and a logical people and their potential contribution to the growth of a free and happy mankind is as great as that of any people. What they need is to get a firm grip on the various problems that confront them, dynastic, imperialist, economic, jewish and ideological and, in the midst of varieties of tactical moves that may yet be necessary, never to lose sight of the long-range and all-Arab solutions, which are also in consonance with the enduring interests of mankind.

The dynastic question should no longer present any ideological difficulty. Whatever may be the practical difficulties that have yet to be overcome, the Arab mind must have already grasped that the existence of monarchs as a political factor not only confuses internal issues but also provides hunting ground for imperialist adventures. Whether or not monarchs should continue as constitutional rulers is a secondary question best left to each Arab

people to decide, but their political power must be broken so that they can no longer keep alive the feudal ownership of land nor act as colonial instruments in schemes such as the Greater Crescent Union.

Dynastic ambitions are not indeed the only source of such separateness as exists among the various Arab peoples; in some cases, one might speak of different ways of Arab life. Nevertheless, the pull towards some kind of federal or confederal union of the Arab peoples would have been irresistible, had dynasties not acted as a check and a confusion. In fact, this peoples' urge towards union is being used by dynasts for their expansionist rivalries, who also permit themselves to be used as imperialist agents so forcefully illustrated by Transjordan and the Greater Crescent scheme. The effort to combat imperialist influences in the Arab world or to form some kind of a federal union must inevitably be linked up with the movement to curtail dynastic authority.

Imperialism operates also in director ways as on the Suez Canal zone and over almost all of North African territory. The banishment of imperialism from all this area is not a matter of opinion; the only question is how to do it. Undoubtedly, the principal actors in this drama are the subject peoples themselves but their need for support from the outside world, in particular from India and the Third Camp, cannot be denied.

Egypt enjoys a peculiar position of responsibility as well as opportunity. Situated in the Eastern tip of the African continent, Egypt has for ages been the meeting-place of Asia and Africa. An excessive interest in West-Asian happenings to the detriment of the North-African, in fact, of the entire African question, is unnatural and unhealthy and a balanced approach must be restored. The time is now come to prepare the final blow on all imperialisms in Africa. While the Egyptian people may be more directly and emotionally affected by the North-African issue they and all the North African Arabs might consider the high desirability of encouraging and uniting an all African drive for freedom. What little they might lose in their ability to play one

imperialism against another, they will more than make up by the great access to the peoples' passion for freedom that will ensue as a result of their high ideal. In this, they will have the unstinted support of all the Third Camp of freedom and peace.

Two questions arise, one related to the tactical feasibility of ending all imperialisms in the African and the Arab world while the great Atlantic—Soviet tension lasts and the other related to the capacity of Arab States to do without foreign money and arms. Before considering the ideological and practical aspects of these questions, it is necessary to think of the Arab world as it ought to be and not as it is. That brings to the fore the internal question, not alone in its dynastic impact, with which political groups of Arabs have hitherto and unfortunately shown little concern.

An internal policy that provides prosperity and discipline to a people is a necessary condition for a foreign policy of independence and effect.

Asian statesmanship suffers from a grievous lack in this respect. Asian statesmen wish to play a grand role on the world stage without any corresponding grandeur in their internal policies. This may be due to either the almost insurmountable weakness of Asia's economy or the mistaken belief that a world role is possible without a national role. Asia's statesmanship must now bestir itself to correct national poverty and indiscipline with the proper use of internal resources rather than adventitious aids from outside. The question of property is a serious obstacle in the way of enriching and disciplining the Asian peoples. I have no doubt that West Asian nations as much as all Asian nations must destroy feudal property and carry out an equitable distribution of land before they can renew themselves. Likewise, whatever free enterprise may mean to other parts of the world, enterprise will stay shackled in Asia until it gives up its base of private property and acquires a social character. Arab politics will continue stultified until dominant political groups grow in all Arab lands that are committed to redivision of land and the social ownership and planning of industry.

Except for such ineffective communists as Arab peoples possess, such an internal policy has not been advocated by any substantial groups. Communists however suffer from the grievous error of solving the question of private property without solving the political and technological questions, so that their doctrine has no applicability to the non-European world. Communism is a doctrine of the rich or the semi-rich peoples. What Asia including West Asia needs is a doctrine that will make use of the small-unit machine, of capital formation that may not be sufficient but will be spread over all the land, of political power that is decentralised and can therefore encourage local initiative. Political and technological decentralisation is therefore as essential as redivision of land and social ownership of industry.

That raises the question of the great ideological tension that is dividing the world today. However much capitalism and communism may quarrel with each other, they are both irrelevant to Asia. Both of them believe in the efficiency unit for agriculture as well as industry, which is for Asia as impossible as it is undesirable. Before they can play a significant role on the world stage, Arab lands must form dominant socialist parties that advocate the community unit as distinct from the efficiency unit, that advocate political and technological decentralisation as much as abolition of private property.

Asia, including the Arab peoples, must keep out of the Atlantic-Soviet struggle not alone in the interest of world freedom and peace but also because of questions relating to their bread and internal economics. The Socialist ideology of the Third Camp is alone a guarantor of bread and freedom to the non-European world, for communism can give it as little bread as capitalism can give it political freedom. The Arab mind must therefore rid itself of sentimental vacillations in its attitude to the two great camps. The Atlantic or Soviet camp may from time to time favour one or the other Arab interest but that should not be permitted to distort or disfigure the ideological neutrality of the Third Camp. Only they can serve the cause of the Third

Camp in Arab lands who reject communism as much as they reject capitalism, and regard both of them irrelevant.

The question of foreign aid is indeed of vital interest. Arab peoples receive military and capital assistance from foreign lands. The question may well be asked if such assistance will not be refused if Arabs pursue the socialist policy of Third Camp. Our answer to that is two-fold. This policy will so renew the Arab peoples that what may be lost in foreign assistance will be more than made-up, perhaps several times over by the increase in internal prosperity and discipline. Furthermore, a policy that rejects communism and the Soviet camp as much as it rejects capitalism and the Atlantic camp is bound to arouse attention and respect and in time, lead to the growth of a world wide climate of opinion in which the idea of a world development corporation can become a reality. Foreign aid will then flow to areas where it is needed, not of course out of charity, but as an intelligent business transaction.

A question as important as the ideological stand with regard to the Atlantic and Soviet camps is the attitude of the Arab peoples to religious fanaticism and religious politics. As long as political groups which base themselves on Muslim sentiments are dominant, Arab peoples can neither renew themselves internally nor play a fruitful role in world politics.

The question of Israel is indeed of deep significance to the Arab people. If Israel regards itself as a part of Asia and West Asia, she must strain her utmost to remove the tension with the Arabs. Federative approaches at least in matters of economic and foreign policy must be initiated. An island of prosperity cannot for ever exist in an ocean of poverty. Not only must problems relating to refugees and territorial guarantees be resolved as soon as possible, the effort to treat all West as an economic unit must grow at least in some direction. All this depends on what the foreign policy of Israel is likely to be. Should Israel align herself with the Atlantic camp and there are growing dangers of this, this policy with regard to Israel falls and Arabs of the Third Camp will then have to face another difficult ingre-

dient in their situation. In any event, efforts at Arab-Jew amity on the basis of the policy here outlined must be initiated. Israel will do well to assist the Socialist and anti-imperialist urges of the Arab peoples, even of North Africa.

Should Israel accept the Socialist policy of Third Camp and make federative approaches to the Arab nations in matters of economic and foreign policy and make a joint effort with the rest to treat West Asia as an economic unit, a lasting solution of the Arab-Jew question will be found. It is thus that the Jews, who have a world mind, can help find the long range and all Arab solutions, which are in consonance with the enduring interests of peace and of mankind. The Arab mind can then free itself from the temptation to apply changing and ineffective remedies dictated under fleeting pressure.

The problem of Iran has come to the fore. The dispute about the Iranian oil is nothing else but a part of the world wide conflict that is raging between the haves and the havenots of the worlds nations. A cursory glance at the comparative position of Iran with other oil producing lands shows to what extent profits out of oil flow overseas and the Iranian people are deprived of the chance to abolish their poverty. All those who stand for an equal world can have nothing but unstinted support for Iranian efforts to nationalise their oil company.

The question naturally arises as to who shall be the recipient of the power and prosperity that shall flow out of such nationalization. I am not merely thinking of the internal class position of Iran but more so of the dominant groups in Iran that are committed to a policy of support to the Soviet camp. In our desire for equality in the world, we have of course to beware against the possibility that the recipient of the existing power and profits of the Atlantic camp may not be transferred to the Soviet camp and thus, inspite of a shift of power, perpetuate world inequality. It is heartening in this connection to note that the national front and its leader the Prime Minister of Iran belong to a school of thought which is a potential supporter of the Third Camp.

FRAGMENTS OF A WORLD MIND

Even among the pro-Soviet Tude party and the religiously fanatical Fidiyan Islam, there are considerable members who would, if they had the opportunity, accept the policies of socialism and Third Camp. To all such we should like to make an appeal. While extending our unhedged support to the Iranian effort to nationalise their oil we would like all elements of religious fanaticism or communist disruption to weaken and parties like the National Front that can travel in the direction of Socialism at home and Third Camp abroad to grow.

Delhi,

June 9, 1951.

## UN VOTE ON "CHINA—THE AGGRESSOR"

India's abstention in the U.N. vote on supply of war materials to China was an hour of victory for all votaries of world unity and peace, and in particular for the Socialist Party of India. The India Government deserves the world's appreciation for thus reinforcing a constructive policy of building the new world.

For four long years India had followed a policy of vacillation and alternate service to the Soviet and Atlantic camps. It has opened the Indian people to Soviet as well as Atlantic infiltration, sapped their resources of the mind and inclined them to surrender in a moment of crisis. This policy was often enough mistaken for one of independence and neutrality and consequently brought into great disrepute all those who have been wanting to build up a constructive force independent of the two great power camps. We hope that this vote reflects the India Government's desire to cast away the role of a weak mediator and a harmful meddler and to take to the honest toil of a genuine builder in however small a way. From Indonesia to Egypt stretches a belt of peoples which can be gathered together in a network of ideological, economic and military security and which has its far outposts in countries like Sweden also. By going beyond capitalism and communism which are both doctrines of centralization and violence and leadership of one government over all the world and by advocating the principles of equality within a people as well as among all the peoples and of decentralised reconstruction, the Socialist Party has tried to provide ideological security to this belt. Had the Party been the Government of India, it might have gone a long way towards acquiring economic as well as military security.

India's Prime Minister is a thoroughbred, who, when Mahatma Gandhi rode him, produced fine results, but ever since he has been riderless, has been bringing the country to the brink of ruin. An eleventh hour security may yet be achieved, if the Indian people choose to ride him well and compel the India Government to endure in the course of abstention, and of pursuing the positive aims of securing the neutral belt and of achieving

equality and prosperity for all the world. The hour of victory was however somewhat saddened by the breach of Yugoslavia from the world front of abstentionists to which she has claimed such firm and principled adherence. We would urge upon Marshal Tito and his brave people to return to the abstentionist fold, notwithstanding that considerations of national security may have become overwhelming.

While the India Government's policy of abstention has brought fresh hope and cheer for all mankind, the Prime Minister's answers to questions of Japanese and German rearmament have again reflected an unintegrated mind. It is ridiculous for a Prime Minister of a state which has an army and wishes to retain it and even enlarge it to wax morally eloquent over clauses in Japanese Constitution that forbid an army. Japan will rearm anyway inspite of these moral vapourings and the complete rout of Japanese parties that stood by these clauses of the Constitution in recentmost municipal elections of Japan proves it. Germany will travel in a like direction. There is disarmament either for all the world or for none. So long has India been used to her internal caste system that she has found no difficulty in acknowledging and accepting the international caste system that reduces the world into five brahmin nations and sixty or so pariah nations. India can serve the world only by outright rejection of the Big Four or Big Five theory, of secret agreements of Potsdam, Yalta or elsewhere, of distinctions between victors and vanquished nations. In consonance with her policy of abstention in the disputes of an old world, India should boldly assist the claims of a new world, that recognises no imperialist, capitalist or communist privileges.

Delhi,

May, 24, 1951.

## AN INTERVIEW ON KASHMIR

From the freezing cold of Gulmarg to the heat of Delhi and Nagpur, all in the course of a day, is an experience, and shows how vast our country is. It is perhaps this vastness that has given India her tolerance and understanding during the brighter periods of her history. To cut away from this vastness is like a stab in the heart and in any event reduces the possibility of tolerance.

Secondly, the lie has gone round the world that Kashmir is the only outstanding issue between India and Pakistan and it must now be nailed on the head. There are any number of other issues like Pakhtoonistan, the East Bengal separatism and questions relating to minority as well as economic arrangements, each one of which can cause trouble. Even if the Kashmir issue could be settled to the satisfaction of Pakistan, these other issues may yet disrupt her and she will lay the blame on India. No enduring and mutually satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir question is possible unless Pakistan sees her way to reconstruct herself.

Thirdly, should Kashmir be handed over to Pakistan on the ground of religion, that will not only amount to sacrificing innocent people but also drive deeper the poison of religious fanaticism into the body of Asia. One of the main perils that confronts Asia is precisely this fanaticism and religious separatism and to appease Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir would necessarily result in making India and all Asia a still greater prey to forces of fanaticism and disruption.

I am sorry for the people of Pakistan that they have been so badly indoctrinated into a longing for Kashmir. I can easily imagine what difficulties such a longing can create for the Government of Pakistan. But the solution to all such dark longings is not appeasement but a thinking-out afresh the foundations on which to order one's life.

Fourthly, the United Nations Observers in Kashmir are not playing the game. I heard the story of a Major-General attached

to the U.N. Staff who told the Bengal Minister, Dr. R. Ahmed, that the grand processions and meetings of the Kashmir National Conference were only 'surface shows'. The Major-General probably thought that he could confide in a Muslim, forgetting that there are Muslims and Muslims. This only shows how the poison has entered even into such a body of men as the U.N. Observers. The staff of an organization, apparently striving for peace and justice, should be better trained. But perhaps that is not possible; for the United Nations organisation has become a clearing house of international intrigues and a stage for the manoeuvrings of the 'Great Powers'. No issue is today judged except against a background of alliances and possible military assistance. The Atlantic camp can probably count on Pakistan as a safe ally against the Soviet camp. This naturally prejudices the Atlantic camp in favour of Pakistan; but the disastrous consequences of such an attitude to the framing of a universal law based on justice can be easily imagined.

Fifthly, when I have said this about the United Nations my attitude should not be mixed up with that of India's Foreign Minister. He is prone to hysteria and treats every issue, whether it is that of postal delivery on Sundays or of Kashmir, on a highly personal level. No principles, whether of world unity or India's national interests, have guided him.

If he can accuse the United Kingdom and the United States of aiding and abetting Pakistan, so can he be equally legitimately accused of alternately aiding and abetting the Atlantic and Soviet camps. The twists and turns of his exceedingly futile foreign policy have made India's position extremely suspect and no nation can trust her even as a neutral.

I can well understand the desire of other nations to re-insure themselves against uncertain moves by India. If the Foreign Minister of India could only rid himself of his vainglorious desire to play a supreme role on the world's stage without any ideological or material strength inside the country to back him, he would probably not throw his weight about futilely and would stay

strictly neutral between the Atlantic and Soviet camps and thus arouse some kind of confidence.

Sixthly, the United Nations consists not only of the Big Four or Big Five but of 56 other nations. Not all these nations are anti-Indian or guided by base motives. That none of them has shown any genuine understanding of India in relation to Pakistan proves conclusively the despicable failure of India's foreign policy. Only a bad dancer blames the floor for his faults.

Like the parvenu, the India Government has been consistently shabby in its treatment of these smaller nations. India's Foreign Minister has never once declared himself against the international caste system that divides the world into five Brahmin and 56 pariah nations. If he would only do that and base his foreign policy on the destruction of this international caste system and on the equality of nations, he would rouse a pure and healthy ferment for world equality and peace which would necessarily contribute to a better understanding of the Indo-Pakistan problem. In any maturer democracy, India's Foreign Minister would have been dismissed a long time back.

Seventhly, there has been a great deal of hurtful delay in solving problems, varying from the institution of the ruling family of Kashmir and the arranging of elections, to the formulation of an economic policy for Kashmir. I hope there will be no further delay in abolishing the rulership, electing a Parliament and initiating a sound economic policy.

Eighthly, the Government of Kashmir cannot afford to imitate the rest of India in such directions as seeking of power and money and favouritism and nepotism. I understand that a great deal of heart-burning is caused among the people of Kashmir by such acts. Matriculates with a pull are selected for service in preference to graduates who have no such pull; and in any event the present Rulers of Kashmir have to keep their conduct austere and pure so that Pakistan may not obtain a handle.

Ninethly, I hope larger numbers of our people will go out to Kashmir and seek their holiday there and thus help to steady the

economy of Kashmir. I must however warn these tourists to remember always that Kashmir is perhaps the final battleground of the two-nation theory, where it will either be buried for ever or live a resurrected life. If they give themselves over to defeatism or to unkind treatment of their Kashmiri brethren, these tourists will have done more harm than good.

Tenthly, I should have thought that delegations of organisations of youths in Europe and elsewhere would have come out to Kashmir and report on the problem of Indo-Pakistan relationship. The youth may be expected to take a long range view of human affairs unsullied by baser motives. Except for the lack of money the Socialist Party of India would have attempted to organise such youth delegations. Likewise a delegation of Kashmiri youths should be encouraged to visit other countries.

Eleventhly, I should also like to mention such fine names as Maulana Saeed (General Secretary of the National Conference), Janab Mohamed Shaffi and Jialal Tamiri, in addition to Sheikh Abdullah, whose deeds of unexcelled physical and moral bravery should be better known in the rest of India.

A curious coalition between the disruptionists of the R.S.S. variety and the Communist variety has been in existence for some time past in Jammu, which led at one time to the threatened resignation of Maulana Saeed. I hope that the National Conference will know how not to allow such elements.

I should like to express in the end my confident hope that Kashmir, which is a part of India, shall stay a part of India, in the interests of a free and equal world, in the interests of a resurgent Asia purged of disruptive fanaticism and in the final instance because the people of Kashmir as an integral part of the people of India, wish it..

June, 1951.

## A HIMALAYAN POLICY

The fairest and the most frigid hills of mankind are warming up. On both sides of the mighty Himalayas, around 80 million people are astir and their old stability is gone. Warring ideas and armies are competing for their souls and, should they lose their freedom or fall under the influence of other peoples, they as well as the world will lose and the Himalayas will cease to be the traditional sentry of India.

From Afghanistan to Burma over Tibet and Nepal spread these peoples who are tempting missionaries of the idea and the sword. Beyond are the Russians and the Chinese and somewhat uncertain peoples like those in Sinkiang. All these are bearers of the Soviet idea and sword, at least for the present. What yet remains to decide, therefore, is the fate of Afghanistan, Tibet, Nepal and Burma.

A peculiar feature of these territories and peoples may be noted. Corresponding to each one of them is a territory and a people closely related to them on the Indian side of the Himalayan frontier, thus, the tribal areas at both ends and the Pathans of the west and the Tibeto-Burmans of the east and, in between, Indians of Nepali ancestry as well as Tibetan such as those in Sikkim and Bhutan. A responsive relationship between these allied groups on both sides of the Himalayas exists. This provides an instrument of state policy to whoever can get hold of one group or the other.

Neither the snows nor the unscalable heights of the Himalayas can now do sentry duty for India. Contentment to the body and anchor to the mind of these 80 million people alone can provide security to India. Old concepts of foreign and defence policies must change. The strategic is now also the moral, the national is the all-world and the interests of India, the world and the Himalayan peoples coincide. India, her people as well as her Government, must evolve a Himalayan policy, which is both strategic and moral.

China's invasion of Tibet which can only be likened to baby-murder has brought out into the open trends and clashes already visible to the more discerning. There is no such thing as an Asian mind. There is perhaps an Asian necessity. But three types of mind are trying to give expression to it and have given birth to three mutually incompatible Asias, status-quo Asia, communist Asia and socialist Asia. Status-quo Asia has collided with communist Asia in Tibet, but neither can express the needs of Asia or the Tibetan people.

A corrupt and cowardly bureaucracy has clashed with a reactionary communism intent on slaughter and rule and, to most Asians including Tibetans, there is not much to choose between the two. In the war between the Tibetan Government representing status-quo Asia and the Chinese army representing communist Asia, the Tibetan people find no place nor, in fact, any Asian people who desire the new civilisation of active equality and tranquil activity. It is clearly enough a defeat of socialist Asia that it could not quicken the people of Tibet into a socialist consciousness. That the India Government, despite warning, spoke of Tibetan sovereignty in imperialist terms or forgot Tibet's relations with India, which have been closer than with China, is a miserable episode.

Is it at all possible now to bring the people of Tibet into the picture? The answer is partly provided by the revolution in Nepal that took place close on the heels of the invasion of Tibet. At a time when the world's mind was overwhelmed by the Atlantic and Soviet armies and cynicism had so deepened that the line between liberation and conquest was hard to draw, the people of Nepal stood such a dramatic witness for people's force and the Third Camp. For four years the people of Nepal had prepared for this revolt and this preparation has its lessons for Tibet as well. The Nepali Congress thrived for a long time on the labour of Indians of Nepali ancestry. Indians of Tibetan ancestry can similarly strive on behalf of a free and socialist Tibet.

Die-hard Indians and the Atlantic camp have been none too pleased by the Nepali revolt. They profess that unstable condi-

tions in Nepal are an invitation to the Soviet camp to step in. Everybody knows that the contrary is true. With status-quo tyranny ruling, the Soviets would walk through Nepal like a knife through butter. Alone a democratic and socialist Nepal, however unstable, is a guarantee against invasion and foreign rule. It is true that a democratic Nepal shall no longer be a recruiting ground for Atlantic Gurkhas and that has perhaps frightened the Atlantic camp. It is also true that a democratic Nepal must increasingly travel in the direction of socialism and redivision of land and that has perhaps frightened India's landlords.

India's ruling party has been of uncertain mind. Unhelpful in the preparation and even abusive of the socialists who helped build up the Nepali Congress, the ruling party of India has adopted a policy of non-intervention towards the Nepali revolt. Non-intervention means support to status-quo and tyranny. In any event, the Nepal policies of the Government and people of India must differ. Whenever the India Government adopts rightly or wrongly a policy of non-intervention towards the issue of freedom in the Himalayas, the people of India must with greater determination help their neighbour achieve or maintain democracy. That is both strategic and moral.

Four years' experience with Goa and Nepal has proved that any further effort at democracy in neighbouring lands had better be frankly named as a socialist effort. What's there in a name may be all right for poetry, but, in the Indian context of the clash between the Congress and the Socialist Parties, much depends on the name. No matter that the Goa and Nepal Congresses have been assisted by socialists rather than congressmen of India, their names mislead and produce certain reactions and are likely to obstruct radical reforms. Nevertheless, Delhi is a great attraction and temptation and the ruling party of India can always and without exertion pull to itself a section at least of the democratic forces in neighbouring lands and play mischief. The prospect of help from the India Government makes these democratic forces lose initiative and weaken in self-confidence and the spirit of sacrifice and they take to lobbying rather than work

on the spot. One hopes fervently that the Nepali revolt spreads into all hills and plains and enters every hamlet so as to pull down the usurpers' authority and form committees of people's power and that all elements of the Nepali Congress will work on the spot. A revolution as far-reaching in world-significance as that of India will then have taken place in Nepal. It will give the people of Nepal bodily contentment and mental anchorage, justly redivided land and power distributed into villages and, thus, dramatically project the Third Camp into world affairs.

Indians of Tibetan ancestry have a significant role to play, if only they become aware of it. They have already done so in some measure. Sikkim was saved for India, against the Maharaja and almost against the India Government, by persons like Tashi Shering and socialist C. D. Rai. Delhi however has no use for men like Tashi Shering and has deputed civilians to rule Sikkim and supervise affairs in that area and Tibet. Raja Dorje lives more in Darjeeling than in Bhutan and is better known for his horse-racing than for his Prime Ministership of Bhutan and such men appear to suit the India Government's policies very well. Bhutan, however, has begun experiencing unrest. Incidentally both in Sikkim and Bhutan, Indians of Nepali ancestry constitute the majority, but a feudal attitude continues to associate these two areas with their Tibetan princes. In any event, democracy must prevail in Sikkim and Bhutan and Darjeeling before Indians of Tibetan ancestry can become carriers of Democracy for Tibet.

Such Indians as Durgasingh on the western approaches to Tibet like Almora and Tashi Shering on the eastern approaches like Kalimpong and Gangtok can make the Tibetan people aware of the need to redivide land and to reform administration and yet to stay free and follow the policy of the Third Camp. Inside Tibet, the vast masses of the people and the monks including the Sunda Sum (Three Pillars or the three great monasteries of Lhasa) will respond to such a policy of socialism at home and the Third Camp abroad.

What urgency attaches to this Indo-Tibetan problem can also be gauged from the uncertainty that prevails on our Assam frontier. The Ballipara tract is not known over a width of more than a hundred miles and how many persons have visited that eerie place called Sadavasanta (eternal spring) within sixty miles of Tejpur. The Daflas, Abors and Nagas are potentially agents of the Third Camp as much as of the Atlantic or the Soviet and what shall they be. The people of India may be astonished to learn that the Naga heroine, Rani Guiallo, of whom congressmen had once sung romantic praise, was forgotten and stayed interned for two years of freedom until I drew the Assam Governor's attention to it. The India Government has no policies.

Nearly two years ago, certain policies with regard to the tribal areas in Assam were outlined and they may be here repeated. A large part of the income from Hindu religious endowments may be diverted to mission work in these areas, in the sense of education and social reform, the Gauhati University may open departments for the major languages and literatures of this area, a food army may begin work on these enormous uncultivated lands and excursions of pleasure and adventure may be arranged from all over the country to the Ballipara and Sadiya tracts.

Frontiers are always so exciting, for their smell of romance as much as of battle. What a strange experience is it to travel through a hundred miles of Naga hills and then to reach the last outpost of Indianism in Imphal, where India's vitality has striven for a deeper impress than in the earlier abodes. The smell of battle must fade forever but that of romance will do good to both the plains and the tribes-people. Furthermore, these greatest hills of mankind have given birth to a mind that is sometimes given to magic and then to mysticism, to much that is spook and yet sometimes in the nature of a deep quest. While the magic and the spook must go, the simplicity and sympathy of the humble quest should transfigure all endeavour.

Indians of Afghan ancestry in the Tribal areas and the Frontier province are naturally depressed at the partition of India. The Faqir of Ipi has formed a provisional government and eight

million people under the Frontier Gandhi and the Fajir are striving for a Pathan State. Afghanistan is taking a keen and direct interest. Even if the India Government may find it embarrassing to proclaim a policy towards these Pathan stirrings, the people of India and, in particular, the Socialist Party must associate themselves with the Pathan demand for freedom and democracy. In order to buttress themselves against the destructive impact of the Atlantic or the Soviet system, the people of Afghanistan will also do well to adopt a policy of socialism at home and the Third Camp abroad.

The Atlantic Camp seeks its allies in status-quo Asia and the Soviet camp in communist Asia and either is unable to understand socialist and freedom-loving Asia. The India Government's policies are to some extent responsible for this misunderstanding. All excitement and no fulfilment is as irritating to both camps as alternate servicing of either. A genuine policy of the Third Camp with regard to the Himalayan region can offer no positive service either to the Atlantic or the Soviet camp but it can guarantee the negative advantage that this territory shall not be used against either.

The Third Camp must grasp the limits of intervention as well as indifference. It cannot of course intervene imperialistically in the internal affairs of a country, nor can it send invading armies under the shameful name of Liberation Armies, in the fashion of China. At the same time it dare not stand the sight when democracy and freedom are slaughtered in any one of its constituent territories and, short of armed intervention, it must do everything possible to assist the growth of democracy and socialism in all its areas. Should, for instance, the people of India adopt a policy of indifference or even non-intervention to the events in the Himalayan ranges, a vacuum will arise and it must be filled up either by the Atlantic or the Soviet camp. To insulate the Himalayas against either camps and nurture the growth of the democratic and social forces is a great challenge to the Indian people in the three-fold interests of the world, the people concerned and India.

The India Government's home policies as much as its foreign policies are naturally a bar to the growth of the Third Camp. When India has re-divided land on an egalitarian basis and ended bureaucratic administration in favour of decentralised power, economic as well as political, she will by that single act give to the Himalayas, anchor to the mind and hope to the body. The Himalayas will harden once again into the traditional sentries of not only Indian freedom but also of world peace.

The Socialist Party has striven in the past three years to act in terms of such an Himalayan policy. It has not been worried by the ill-informed abuse that such matters of foreign policy belong to the Government and not to the people or any of its political parties. When India's patrimony is squandered by the men in-charge of Delhi the people of the country and their political parties must act with even greater force. The people of India and members of the Socialist Party and in particular those who reside on both sides of the Himalayan ranges must become conscious instruments of a Himalayan policy basing itself on socialism at home and Third Camp abroad. Socialists and freedom loving Asia must defeat the equally dangerous reactions of status-quo and Communist Asia and thus provide a genuine expression of Asian necessity and the Asian mind.

November, 1950.

## ECONOMICS AFTER MARX

[During the open Rebellion of 1942-43 against British-rule, when socialists were in prison or being hunted and communists waged their peoples' war in companionship with foreign masters, the doctrine of Marxism appalled me with its wide range of contradictory applications. To recover its truth and demolish its untruth became one of my desires. Of the four aspects planned, economics, politics, history and philosophy, I was halfway through the economic when the police got me.

Since then, this style of enquiry and expression has ceased to interest me. No man's thought should be made the centre of a political action; it should help but not control. Acceptance and rejection are varying forms of blind worship. I believe that it is silly to be a Gandhian or Marxist and it is equally so to be an anti-Gandhian or anti-Marxist. There are priceless treasures to learn from Gandhi as from Marx, but the learning can only be done when the frame of reference derives not from an age or a person.

Researchers must still enquire into a man's thought, particularly if the man is Marx or Gandhi. The pages that follow are thoroughly incomplete and no change has been made since they were written. But error is also a source of knowledge. I only hope that I have made some significant statements so as to titillate some man of greater talent and industry into further enquiry. In any event, these pages, I hope, show the need of an economic thought different from any that exists today that will turn the whole world into the gay unity of equal welfare.]

Communism began as a programme of social justice. Its basis was the achieving of a classless society. Like other programmes of social justice, it was early faced with greed and ignorance and the sarcasm of those who denounce everything great as unpractical and impossible. It, therefore, elaborated a whole system of philosophy, history and economy. The fact that its first philosopher was a German of the nineteenth century might

have played a part. In any case the elaboration of an entire system of thought in furtherance of a concrete programme of human improvement is nothing new to history; Vedism, Buddhism, Christianity, Liberalism have gone through a similar phase. What was new in the elaboration of Communism was its claim to being scientific, its assertion that it was not a moral law but a causal law. Communism, so claims its philosophy, is a necessary conclusion of the development of capitalism; the classless society must come. Around this claim has arisen a whole code of laws. This code formulated by Marx, has produced such powerful effect that Communism and Marxism\* have become synonymous, that all Socialists and Communists are in various degrees influenced by it. A study of this system of laws should preferably begin in the realm of capitalist economy, to which it is nearest in scope and where it is likely to have made the least errors. A summary of the principle and laws of capitalist development as formulated by Marxism must first be made.

The principle of capitalist development lies in the fact that labour is a commodity like any other commodity. Capitalists buy labour in order that they may with its help produce other commodities for sale. But labour, unlike other commodities, carries within itself two contradictory values. Every other commodity has a single consistent value, the time that is socially necessary to produce it. Labour has indeed this value, which is measured by such food and clothing and other requirements of the labourer as are effective in a given capitalist phase. The labourer works and is given his feed so that he may work again. What is given as his "feed" in any particular period is his wages. This is one value of labour, its exchange value, the value of its reproduction, its wages. But labour has another value, its use-value to the capitalist who buys it. The capitalist pays for the labour power of the worker but receives in return all the goods produced by it. From among these goods, a part goes towards the wages of the worker but another remains as the profit of the

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\* Sometimes known as Marxism-Leninism, as Lenin was the first man to put Marxism into the practice of a State and also made partial additions to its general theory.

capitalist; the labourer's day is split up into two parts, one of which produces wages and another profits. Herein lies the source of all capitalist profits and not in other transactions, for labour is the sole creator of value. In his drive for profits, the capitalist, indeed, tries to make use of machines and improve them in order that he may turn labour-power to better account. Machines do not produce better profits; it is mechanised labour that does so. Clearly, therefore, the dynamic of capitalist development lies in the contradiction between the value and the use-value of labour, between wages and produce. This contradiction is the source of surplus value, which makes up the entire profits\* of the capitalist system. In the career of surplus value can be discerned a whole series of laws of capitalist production and development.

Capital leads to further accumulation of capital. Surplus value or capitalist profits are used for improved machinery and joint labour, which in their turn produce increased surplus value. This is the law of capitalist accumulation.

Under capitalism, however, production and circulation cannot keep pace with each other. More is produced than can be bought, because productivity of labour and profits continually increase while wages remain comparatively fixed. There is thus a lag between the production and the purchasing power of a population, which causes crisis in industry. This is the law of the periodic crises of capitalism.

More capital is put into making heavy and intricate machinery, into building the means of production. This tides over the crisis for a while, for it does not immediately lead to increased production, but it lays the basis for a higher productivity in the near future. The organic composition of capital increases, the rate of profit falls, large-scale production increases, smaller capitalists are thrown out and capitalism changes into monopoly capitalism. This is the law of concentration of capital or of large-scale and monopoly production.

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\* Not to be confused with the profits of the entrepreneur. These are the sum of the rent, interest and high earnings of the entire system.

While capital accumulates and concentrates, large sections are turned into the workless, the reserves of industry, and the workers themselves become increasingly poorer. This is the law of pauperisation and of accumulation of poverty.

At the same time, the working class is increasingly unified and becomes conscious of itself, by virtue of the fact that it works co-operatively and in large numbers in the big-scale monopolist industries. This is the law of socialisation of labour.

Passing through these laws of development, the contradiction between the price of labour and its produce assumes sharp forms. It becomes the contradiction between capitalist appropriation and socialised production, between old relations and expanding forces, between monopoly capitalists and an angry, numerous, socialised working-class. The class-struggle enters its last phase, when the capitalist husk is burst asunder by the working-class. This is known as the law of the class-struggle leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To these laws must be added yet another on the general crisis of capitalism, when there are no longer any alternating periods of boom and depression in industry. In this period of general and continuing crisis, there are imperialist wars, general exhaustion of capitalism and the victory of the world working-class. This is the law of the general crisis of capitalism leading to imperialist wars and the law of the World Revolution.\*

In his well-known passage establishing how "the expropriators are expropriated," Marx has in a broad sweep defined these "immanent laws of capitalist production" as the "centralisation of capital,—purposive application of science to the improvement

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\* In the elaboration of this law, Engels and Lenin have played a greater part than Marx. Although twenty-six years before the 1914 war, Engels foresaw "the creation of the conditions for the final victory of the working-class" through the "general exhaustion" of capitalism in a war, it was left to Lenin and his theoreticians to deepen the law of the periodic crisis into the general crisis of capitalism and of the World Revolution. Should the World Revolution not materialise sixty years after Engels' prediction and thirty years after Lenin's and should world capitalism recover sufficiently from its exhaustion to be able to wage a third world war, what further laws would be elaborated is difficult to tell.

of technique, means of production—economised—by social labour, a progressive diminution in the number of the capitalist magnates and a corresponding increase in the mass of poverty, oppression, enslavement—, a working-class which grows ever more numerous, and is disciplined, unified and organised by the very mechanism of the capitalist mode of production.” These Marxist laws of capitalist development do not merely possess an interest for the scholar. Although only a few care to read them except as catechisms and fewer still to understand them as a whole, Socialists of all description, Marxists, neo-Marxists, anti-Marxists, base their thinking and action on one or the other of these laws, particularly on their source, the general history of the contradiction between the value and the use-value of labour-power.

A vast literature, confirming or refuting these laws, has arisen. It is largely a literature of barren controversy. We must approach these laws, not to confirm nor to deny, but to understand the process of capitalist development.

Let us see how far these laws have been unable to include or have gone against major facts of capitalist development. The first casualty is the law of pauperisation and of accumulating poverty. It would be useless to deny that, until well after seventy years of the formulation of this law by Marx and twentyfive years after the first formations of the big concentrations of capital, the proletariat in capitalist countries was not only not pauperised; not growing poorer, but was steadily improving its conditions of living. In fact, German economists were able to assert that, in place of the proletarianisation of the middle-class and the pauperisation of large sections, which Marx had predicted, a steady bourgeoisification of the proletariat was taking place.\* British economists could point to the black-coated worker. Communists tried to deny these facts and formulas by the astrologer’s wait-and-see. There was no such astrological hocus-pocus in Marx’s formulations. Pauperisation was a necessary consequence of

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\* The reader must pardon the use of these terms which communism and the German language have put into the mouth of large numbers but which have no further use except as means of re-education.

capital accumulation; accumulating poverty was a necessary consequence of monopoly capital: why should thirty years or even ten elapse before the necessary consequences appear; there must be a reason for it. In fact, sectional poverty and pauperisation did appear in the capitalist countries ten years after the end of the 1914 war, but it was again partly overcome. To say that capitalist governments overcame poverty by works-programmes and war-industries is to state a moral fact, but it is no answer to the "immanent" ability of capitalism to preserve itself from pauperisation. Socialist theory must be able to pick up these loose ends, find them a formula and reconcile itself with facts.

This weakness of Marxist theory in explaining the absence of poverty under capital accumulation has tended to blunt its understanding of what is otherwise a correct description of the industrial crises in capitalism. Industry throughout the nineteenth century suffered from periodic crises, but, quite as periodically, got out of them. The main Marxist explanation for these crises as also for their overcoming lies in the internal structure of capitalism, the conflict between the improving means of production and the constant purchasing power.\* Is it not possible that, on

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\* A vast lore has been written on these crises, their periodicity and nature, their causes and so forth. Attempts have been made to number these crises and the regular intervals at which they have occurred. We may also not worry overmuch with the University professors' characterisation of these as monetary crises, production crisis, crisis in confidence and so forth, for such categories express external forms and do not go to the root of the matter. Marx partly goes to the root when he traces these crises to the conflict between production and consumption, between the higher yield of mechanised labour-power and the constant or decreasing total wages of the working-class. But then Marx traces the overcoming of these crises to the same source which is their cause. He and his disciples emphasise the period of improvement in the means of production, building better machinery and so forth, during which goods of consumption do not immediately appear on the market but wages are still paid. They indeed drop phrases about the pressing of the peasantry, improvement in agriculture, enmeshing of the whole world in the capitalist net, but these facts have not been properly digested in the general Marxist theory on industrial crises. In fact, capitalist politicians and economists have elaborated a medicine-book for industrial crises and this is none other than the New Deal, works-programmes, war-industries and, perhaps in an unwilling measure, war, followed by post-war reconstruction. Quite a few of these works-programmes like draining of marshes, fighting malaria, building of town-halls for assemblies do not at all enter the consumption market but add to the health and entertainment of the people and also pay out wages

this basis, capitalism which is said now to have entered its general crisis may endure in this state as it endured in its periodic crises and may possibly, while dying out in one country, reappear in another?

As to the law of socialised production, it must be admitted that monopoly capital and large-scale enterprises have appeared, what has not taken place is the wiping out of the small capitalist. In fact, the number of small capitalists, either as share-holders in the large undertakings or as owner-managers of their own, has increased. In the same manner, although socialisation of labour in the limited sense of thousands of workers working co-operatively in a single establishment has taken place, what has not taken place is their unification. Aside from the technical and managerial classes, the free professions and the clerical classes, the workers themselves are cut up into a hierarchy of skilled workers, unskilled workers, seasonally employed and their differing wages have turned the predicted solidarity of the working-class into a piety-reality.\*

The worst trick played by history on the Marxist laws of capitalist development lies in the fact that the Revolution took place not in Germany,† where it was expected, nor in any other

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to the labourers. Even among the means of production, a distinction is made between the machines to manufacture machines which enter into consumption at a late stage and the machines which do so earlier. The industry of housing on a capitalist-cum-municipal basis can also tide over a crisis for some time, as it does not immediately enter the market. Capitalism is groping towards various combinations of industries which produce no or slow effect on the market. Unless the undigested facts of socialist theory on crises are properly understood, we are forced to look upon the capitalist crises, periodic or general, as upon the simple cold, highly unpleasant but not fatal.

\* Of late, books from the Marxist angle have appeared on the treason of the technical and free professions, salaried classes, the white-collared worker. Unable to understand as to why they should be so numerous or powerful, Marxism in Europe alternates between looking upon them as an annexe of the bourgeoisie and wooing them as its own allies.

† For seventy years from the publication of the Communist Manifesto to the Russian Revolution, Marxists including Lenin expected the revolution to take place in western Europe, particularly Germany. An odd reference by Marx or Lenin to the possibility of a revolution first in Russia or elsewhere is no more than a side-remark. The prophecy was about Germany and western Europe. For seventy years, Marxists lived on this prophecy and, after a brief interlude of the Russian revolution, returned to it again.

developed country of western Europe, but in Russia. According to the "immanent laws of capitalist development," the capitalist husk was to burst asunder where it proved incompatible with the socialisation of labour and the concentration of capital. How this law of the class struggle made an arbitrary leap still remains unexplained and undigested by Marxist theory. Trotsky's explanation that the capitalist chain snapped at its weakest link is indeed a graphic phrase, perhaps true, but an entire denial of the communist teaching on capitalism. Where is the capitalist chain to break? At its most developed link, says Marx; at its weakest link, says Trotsky; and, between these two with various other shades, communism will of course always be right. Lenin's explanation denies Marx as much as Trotsky's does. Lenin explains the Russian Revolution with the active role of the Bolshevik Party. With a slight change, in that the Party is now called the Party of Lenin-Stalin, Marxists have memorised this explanation. How this final activity of the class struggle flew out of its iron laws, nobody has cared to explain on any scientific basis. In fact, this was not necessary, for Soviet Russia and the Third International soon enough turned their attention again to western Europe as the centre of the World Revolution. The master's teaching proved greater than the big fact of the revolution. Marxists are apparently determined to prove, even at the cost of the World Revolution itself, that humanity will reach its highest foreseeable development first in Europe.

Marxism is quite accurate in its findings on capital accumulation, correct from one angle on questions of industrial crises, of monopoly and socialisation of labour, but factually wrong in the spheres of accumulating poverty, causal class-struggle and the World Revolution. Whence comes this conflict between its insight into production and the blind spots regarding circulation? It is not as if poverty and pauperism did not arise or that the centres of class-struggle and world revolution could not be located; it is also not that Marx and his disciples were unaware of the relevant facts; it is this that Marxism was not strong enough to digest these facts and weave them into its general theory on capitalism. Let us first get at the relevant facts.

Capitalism first arose in England during the second half of the eighteenth century. The pre-capitalist massings of silver were due as much to the plunder of Spanish ships and Bengal revenues as to the throwing out of farmers from common lands in Britain herself. The first industry to employ machinery, which is the technical basis of capitalism, was textiles. Hardly had this Lancashire industry begun, when it had to look out for a dynamic outside its own country and found it in India. British textiles did not overcome Indian textiles in an economic way. When one of the British parliamentary commissions pointed out that "the wares of Lancashire were bleached with the dry bones of Indian weavers," it did not mean that Indian artisans could not stand competition with British manufacturers. Aside from whatever measures were adopted for direct attack upon Indian weavers, the East India Company and its servants, by taking over the monopoly of internal trade in their own hands, were able to dictate what goods shall or shall not flow in the normal trade channels.\* The victory of British textiles over Indian textiles was political; the dynamic that Lancashire industry, at its very start, got out of India was due to Britain's rule. Once again, as soon as the first heavy industry of rail-and-engine manufacture is set up in England around the middle of the nineteenth century, it has to get an immediate dynamic from India. It gets that not only by way of the large numbers of engines, rails and other materials used in India but also by way of capital investments in Indian railways which bear a guaranteed minimum interest.† This dynamic of

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\* To suggest that machine-manufacturers must inevitably drive out hand-manufacturers is here irrelevant. We are concerned with the course of history as it has actually developed and not as one or the other theoretician can conceive it to do so. History's record shows that, unsupported by British rule over India, not the Indian artisans, but the Lancashire industry would have died in its infancy.

† This is perhaps the most remarkable piece of financial transaction in world history, unless another one is in the making, according to which British investors got a guaranteed half-yearly interest and, whenever profits rose above this, got them too. Incidentally, the problem is not as to whether railway development was a boon to India; the fact is that, without British-ruled Indian railways, the British railroad industry could

Indian railways has continued to act on British engineering industries, in fact, on all of British capitalism, through manifold ways. It need hardly be pointed out that the immense growth of commercial agriculture in India during the latter part of the nineteenth century and after, in the shape of jute, tea, cotton, oilseeds and the by-product of hides, pumped a much-needed impetus into British capitalism, sometimes by way of the German and Japanese capitalisms. This commercialisation of agriculture took place on the imperial-colonial level, on the level of pauper-wages to landless labour as in Assam and poverty earnings to farmers as in Bengal, U.P. and Bihar, except in the very limited case of some cotton farmers. Once again when British capitalism was faced at the end of the 1914 war with what has come to be known as a general crisis, Indian railroads alone rushed to its rescue by ordering goods worth a billion rupees and more.<sup>†</sup> This rapid survey of British capitalism has brought us to the conclusion that imperialism and capitalism are of joint origin and development. A similar development can be traced through the career of German capitalism, either by way of sharing in the Austrian, British and French imperial expansion or on its own.\*

On the surface, the American development will seem to have gone a different way. Actually, capitalist development in the United States has needed an identical imperial dynamic, has made use of the same elements as Britain. England used already popu-

hardly have gone beyond an infantile stage. Britain did not give railways to India; India gave Britain her railways and the engineering industry. History is full of such truths which seem to go counter to outward appearances.

<sup>†</sup> Already, in the midst of the 1939 war, orders for locomotives worth Rs. 42 crores have been placed and, unless something goes wrong, more will of course follow.

\* The commercial activity of the Hansa towns like Hamburg, as of the East India Company or of the crafts and guilds is pre-capitalism. Marxists emphasise, and quite properly, that capitalism should not be confused with other forms of exploitation which might bear some resemblance to it. German capitalism begins around the middle of the nineteenth century with the Customs Union and the Listian economy according to which free trade has meaning only after unequal historical conditions have been removed, (to the European, German or British, western Europe is his world), and it really comes into shape with the Bismarckian unification of Germany.

lated countries like India for her capitalist development. These two elements, a population and a territory, were similarly made use of by American capitalism. The territory was new and contiguous and the population was got from Europe. This territorial expansion took place over the larger part of the nineteenth century. To understand this, one has only to look at a map of the United States as it stood at the beginning and as it got to be at the end of the nineteenth century. All the Mid-Western States, the Prairie States, the Border States, the Eastern States, a territory larger than India, were the result of this expansion.<sup>†</sup> The problem of man-power for these large territories was also solved in an imperial way. No less than thirty million European paupers<sup>‡</sup> came into the United States during the century and settled in its factories or on its lands. Each fresh batch of immigrants stood, at least for a generation, in an imperial-colonial relationship with the older inhabitants, until it got Americanised. That imperialism and capitalism have jointly developed in capitalist history is clearly established by the American case. The results of this joint development inside the frontiers of what is now a single country and a single nation are indeed fundamentally different from those of the British. How American capitalism overcame its twin is a brave story of the Jeffersons, Jacksons and Lincolns, but, whether this was due to the new and robust American nationality or to the fullness of natural resources and a corresponding labour yield, and whether this may not yet lead to an imperial-colonial relationship on a world-scale is not within our present scope. It need hardly be added that Japanese capitalism began as a system of industries rapidly built chiefly out

<sup>†</sup> The old inhabitants of these territories, the Red Indians, were almost exterminated in wars and skirmishes. For one big chunk, which was finally acquired by purchase, the United States President had sent his negotiators armed, quite in the modern style, with two sets of orders, to buy if possible, else, to wage a shooting war.

<sup>‡</sup> The story of these paupers goes counter to Marx's analysis. Until capitalism arose in England and France, paupers came principally from these two countries. Graphic stories are told of how British men kidnapped British women in the streets of London and of marriage-at-first-sight bargainings on the New York Harbour. The growth of capitalism in England put an end to it. Then came the turn of Germany, Italy and Ireland before they turned capitalist. Last came the Slavs. Negro labour had been brought as slaves in the earlier century.

of government revenues and it could therefore wait for two decades or so before it too went the imperial way.

In face of this wide wealth of facts, how anyone could have suggested that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism is beyond comprehension.\* Imperialism not only appears at the first stage of capitalism but goes on developing with it. Capitalism seeks its external dynamic, one might say, even before it is born and, unsatiable in this search, it gobbles up one country after another. First Bengal and the Americas, then the whole of India, and on to China and Egypt, thence to South America and Malaya and Java and Burma and the great continent of Africa; the limits of the world are reached. No single dynamic lasts capitalism for long; it is soon stabilised and, with an almost magic resourcefulness, it uses the old dynamic for the conquest of a new one, Bengal for United Provinces, India for China and Burma and so forth.

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\* Lenin has devoted a whole book to the thesis that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism. This astounding phrase is meant to convey the fact of increasing capital investments in the colonies and semi-colonies. If we limit imperialism to capital investments, what of the factory goods that capitalism right at its start forced on the colonies and has been doing so ever since, not to talk of the other tribute of salaries and pensions and currency tricks. Moreover, even as capital investments go, Britain had already made the first of these in India around 1850, very much in the middle stage of her capitalism. Lenin's tables of statistics of increasing capital investments in the colonies from decade to decade have no more than a book-keeping significance on this issue, for, if colonial investments have increased, so has capitalist production. Keener students will find it worth their while to publish the respective ratios of Britain's total industrial production to her colonial investments and to her exports in the decade 1850-60 or 60-70 and also in the decade 1900-10. If Lenin had made such a study, he would have found that the total volumes of each of the three categories increase but the ratios are not vastly altered. Such a misuse of the term imperialism has greatly obscured the fact of the joint capitalist-imperialist development and, instead of correcting Marx's theory on capitalism, has further confused it. As a Russian, Lenin was probably influenced by the fact that his nation's first contact with capitalism was by way of west-European investments and he might also have wanted to give a clever turn to the phrase finance-capital popularised by Hilferding. Curiously enough, Indian Socialists have also unthinkingly repeated this phrase. What Lenin and these have probably meant to convey is that capitalism has already covered the whole world in its net and, therefore, it must either war and die or find a new dynamic in the more intensive exploitation of the colonies. It is also possible that, in their anxiety to discover a proletariat in every country on Marx's pattern of the class struggle, they have tended to equate imperialism with large imperialist investments.

Not only does an old dynamic continue to give capitalism a part of the needed surplus for home-production; not only does it produce armies and war-chests; it also yields labour-power, for instance, Chinese and Indians in Malaya, Indians in East Africa, Fiji and such far-off lands as Trinidad. If ever the world is able to look back upon capitalism and its play-time—the nineteenth century and after, without the heat of battle, it will contemplate with wonder this cruel and unscrupulous, nevertheless, the cleverest scoundrel of all history.

But now the limits of the world are reached. Its unsatiable expansiveness has come up against a dead wall. How will it, or can it at all, solve this contradiction between its expansive need and a limited world? But that is a question of its recentmost development and its future, which we will take up at the proper place. Meanwhile, let us look at another aspect of the career of capitalism through history, which is sharply related to this contradiction. Once upon a time, there was but one capitalism in the world, Britain's, for the five decades or so of the 18th and 19th centuries. In its herrscher gait through the world, it showed its superiority in war and its wealth in peace. It was also willing to help in the birth of cousins. Culture-capitalisms were born.\* By the first decade of our century, there were four such major capitalisms besides Britain's, German, American Japanese and French. This growth of culture-capitalisms has further sharpened the conflict between capitalist expansiveness and the limited world.

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\* Like a culture-pearl, which incidentally is not an artificial pearl, Capitalism is sterile on colonial soil, whatever be the volume of its trade with or investments in the colonies; if this were not so, we should have had a capitalism much sooner in India than we had it in Japan or Germany or even the U.S.A. Capitalism sells the machines to manufacture machines to cousins, that is, to such *free countries* as have the forces for capitalist growth; one might almost say that it is conscious of pedigree and wants no nonsense of half-breeds. That these cousins alternate between being partners and enemies of each other is rather unfortunate; but it is better than having a litter of children who might all come of age. But this fact of culture-capitalisms opens out vistas of enquiry. Is it possible that any new system of economy that establishes its superiority in war and obvious wealth has a tendency to produce cousins? Is it possible that the submerged countries in any world-phase yearn to produce such culture system? Is it finally possible that even opposing systems, for instance, the socialist to the capitalist tend to produce culture-pearl traits of each other?

We are thus living in an age which has come to be known as the epoch of imperialist wars and which, with greater appropriateness, can be called the epoch of capitalist wars. Can capitalism scotch the birth of new culture-cousins, can it lay low some of its existing ones, can the world, instead of going socialist, remain capitalistic by a process of stagnation or see-saw, are some of the intriguing questions of future development. For the present, let us weave the results of our enquiry into a correct theory of capitalist development. We have found the fact of the joint capitalist-imperialist development. We have found the fact of the growth of culture-capitalisms. We have finally found the fact of multiplying capitalisms within a territorially limited imperialism.

The question as to whether capitalism is at all possible without imperialism may be briefly answered with the strict understanding that, in history so far, there has been no capitalism without imperialism and that, therefore, it relates to the problematic future and asks for prophesy. Clearly, capitalism, depending upon an exclusive internal dynamic, theoretically improbable in a vast country with a vast population, will have to bear two burdens at the same time, the joint capitalist-imperialist burdens. Most likely, it will crash under these burdens; most certainly, it will cause an impoverishment on a hitherto unknown scale.

Let us now reconstruct the theory of capitalist development. Marx's initial fallacy was to have examined capitalism in the abstract, to have wrenched it outside of its imperialist context. Marx was not unaware of imperialist exploitation and his disciple, Lenin, was even more keenly aware of it. But imperialism is with either a tumour of capitalism, an odorous after-growth and this has at best awakened an unintelligent concern for the colonial races. Marxism has therefore not been able to give a consistent theory of capitalist development. Its picture of capitalism is that of a west European entity, with the later additions of the American and Japanese ones, more or less wrenched out of the world, more or less developing internally. All the dynamic of capitalism is placed within its internal structure, in the contradiction between the value and the use-value of labour-power, between the working-

class and the capitalist-class of the self-same structure. Marx's capitalism was that of a self-moving west-European circle, no doubt causing great repercussions in the outside world, but the principle and laws of its own movement were exclusively internal. Marxism to this day remains stuck in this picture, no doubt formulating laws about these outside repercussions, but is wholly unable to state the basic interacting principle of the two, internal and external, movements of capital. Socialism must forever shatter this unreal Marxist picture. In its place must arise a picture of two circles, one placed inside the other, the inner circle representing the free capitalist structures with their dynamic in the contradiction between capitalist profits and mechanised labour, the other circle representing the colonial economy of the rest of the world with its dynamic between imperial exploitation and colonial labour, the rim of the inner circle possessing an enormously porous capacity to suck into itself the dynamic of the outer. This is the only way in which we can join up the capital-labour dynamic with the empire-colony dynamic and arrive at a consistent understanding of the development of capitalism.\*

The Communist theory of capitalist development starts with the contradiction between the value and the use-value of labour and with the surplus value thus generated. The career of this surplus value reveals the further laws of capitalist development. All this needs to be restated, in the light of our investigations, both as to labour's value and its use-value. Labour is not an abstract something, although Marx made it so. In spite of their horror of idealistic concepts, Communists have continued to treat labour as an ideal, abstract entity. Actually, labour under capitalism has shown two forms, which differ so widely from each other, that lumping them up under one category can never give

\* Some persons will here remark that the two dynamics are present in Marxist studies of capitalism. Nobody questions that. The issue is whether the two dynamics are so inter-connected and the basic laws of this interconnection so discovered as to give a consistent understanding of the world. It is this interconnection that socialism must study. For a type of intellect which can only be satisfied by crude evaluations, let it be said here that, among all other Europeans, Karl Marx is the greatest economist of European history. But we must not be satisfied with that, for we need the economics of world history.

us a proper understanding. Labour has been either imperial or colonial and there have been vast divergences in their values. It is for these divergences that communism has had to evolve the concept of the socially effective requirements of labour. But its basic concept of the necessary requirements of labour\* has stood

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\* University economics has tried to understand the present distribution of wealth among various countries of the world and is preserving this understanding with the help of a few concepts. Let us examine the major concepts.

(a) Necessary Requirements of Labour: The requirements of labour are supposed to vary from country to country. Colder climates like those of England and Germany are believed to necessitate richer food, better housing, more numerous clothing and so forth than tropical climates like in Africa and India. As a result of these higher calories of food and so forth, labour in colder climates is also believed to be more productive. Thus, the teaching has sprung up of the greater productivity as also the greater requirements of labour in colder climates. This teaching is wholly erroneous. There is no reason why the German should not be able to do with the food of the Tibetan and carry a charcoal-firestove bound to his back or live the winters of his entire life-time in a single Eskimo coat. There is likewise no reason why the Indian can naturally labour without electric fans and air-conditioning and fruit juice and such like nourishing food to fight the rigours of a tropical sun. If climate has any economic relevance, the coal fire and central heating of colder climates has its opposite number in the fans and air-conditioning of warmer climates, the heavy meat-and-drink diet, in the fruit-and-milk diet, so that one might legitimately say that the requirements of labour in warmer climates are naturally higher than those in colder climates. But, to be able to say that, one would require an excess of political power in warmer climates as compared to that in colder. In fact, Europeans have in the past been able to do with Eskimo coats and without baths and the like. Quite obviously, therefore, there is no such thing as the necessary requirements of labour; there are only such requirements as varying political fortunes have bestowed upon this country or that. The Indian peasant who is today supposed naturally to sleep in the open and work may as naturally be supposed, in a different political climate, to require for his labour a pucca house lighted and ventilated by electricity. This brings us on to the question of what labour produces.

(b) Productivity of Labour: The teaching that credited labour in colder countries with a higher productivity by virtue of the climate itself is so patently untrue that it has almost been given up. It is now clothed in different garments. Such concepts as the lack of proper food or of training and skill are introduced to explain the low produce of colonial labour. Indian economists and businessmen make free use of these concepts. When, for instance, the low yield of the Indian steel worker is compared with the high yield of the British steel worker, this is naturally put down to the ill-fed and ill-trained condition of the former. Thus do our capitalists and economists hide their own shame and dishonour. For the west-European capitalist economy, Karl Marx proved conclusively, that the concepts of skilled and unskilled labour are highly transitory, what is skilled today may become unskilled tomorrow and the

labour that can be got dirt-cheap today may require good wages tomorrow. Let us look at our own rickshaw-driver. It is difficult to imagine a more exacting or a more skilled labour. In like manner, if there were some way to measure the labour power spent by the Indian metal-worker and by his British opposite number, it will be found that the former has performed no less an exacting labour. The economic fact is that the ill-fed Indian worker or peasant has to do as exacting a labour, in some cases even more, and spend as much of his muscle-power as the better-fed British worker. Is it then the higher skill of the European labourer that does the trick? We have already commented upon the skill of the rickshaw driver, than which there can be nothing higher in the steel-industry. The motor or bus driver in India is certainly as skilled as his opposite number in Europe. Perhaps what is meant is a particular type of skill required for a particular type of machinery, there being no suggestion that anyone is higher than the other. Even here, it will be difficult to prove how the skill of the rivet-driver in our country differs from that of the British. What may be possible is that adaptation to a particular kind of machinery may require a few years so that labour that has the earlier run enjoys a short-lived advantage. But conditions are soon equalised. Therefore, the concept of ill-fed and ill-skilled labour as an explanation of the low produce in our industry uses as much, if not more, of muscle-power and skill as labour elsewhere. Is it then their own incompetence which Indian capitalists seek to transfer to our labour?

(c) Capitalist Enterprise: Capacity to mix in the most profitable proportions the three factors of production, land, labour and capital and the readiness to take risks or to break out into unexplored regions of technique and industry are regarded as a part of the entrepreneur's skill in text-book economics. Aside from the question why this skill should get higher profits than, say, the skill of the school-teacher, it would be wholly absurd to suggest that the entrepreneur's skill in the more important countries is of higher or lower orders. The Indian capitalist is as skilful in the selection of sites for his industries and in marketing as the European, if anything, he is even more skilled in the manipulation of labour. He can also take enormous risks as evidenced by his bold speculations. This teaching of entrepreneur's skill, whatever may be its role in the internal economy of a country, has absolutely no meaning when applied to distinguish one important country from another. What has meaning is another concept, a country's total economic structure which is naturally dependent upon its politics. This explains that the Indian capitalist, while he takes the most fantastic risks in commercial speculation, is wholly crippled when it comes to breaking out into new techniques and industry. On industrial risks, he is as dishonourable as the tortoise, probably because he knows that the moment he takes out his head he will be decapitated. It is to this dishonour of a colonial economic structure and, not to the supposed lower yield or the lower needs of our labour nor even to entrepreneur's skill, that our low economic productivity should be traced.

(d) National Resources: Attempt is often made to refer to a country's natural resources to explain and justify what in university economics is known as the geographical division of labour. For instance, the presence of humidity in the Lancashire atmosphere and, therefore, Manchester textiles are brought in some sort of a mutually beneficial connection with the cotton growing black-soil of Maharashtra. The actual use of artificial sprays in Indian textile mills has completely busted up this connection,

for the cost of these sprays is not even an infinitesimal fraction of the earlier two-way freight charges. This does not however mean that there is no such thing as differing natural resources. It is to these resources that the United States owes, in part, its preponderant position in the world; with six per cent of the world's population, it controls nearly twentyfive per cent of the world's resources. Here again one has to be very careful. The factor of scientific inventiveness can almost equalise the differing natural resources. The present estimate of a country's resources is made on basis of materials such as coal, iron, petrol, water-power and so forth, which have already acquired key-importance. But one can depend on science to produce petrol out of coal and sugar out of wood and, if these ersatz industries may with some reason be regarded as a waste in the perspective of world-economy, there are remarkable new inventions such as plastics or electronics which open out the prospect of wholly new industries. Firmly entrenched vested interests of iron and steel in the already industrialised countries may make it impossible for the plastics industry to grow, whereas another country with less resources in iron may develop this new industry with great profit to itself. Scientific inventiveness can thus add to the great variety of key natural resources and equalise the differences among various countries. No doubt, applied science will have to be more alert and alive and diversified as between one country and another than it has so far been; it must not blindly follow already explored lines. In this way, differences in natural resources can be equalised and a country, poor on, the present showing, may even aspire to gain a lead, however short-lived, over others. In order that we can have a really beneficial world-trade and obtain a true teaching of the geographical division of labour, science must get an unfettered scope in various parts of the world and also make an intelligent, human use of its possibilities. Until this is done, text-book teaching on natural resources must be viewed with suspicion and be looked upon as a justification of existing geographical division of labour, that is, of the imperial structures on the one hand and colonial structures on the other.

We have found that the concepts of the necessary requirements of labour, of the productivity of labour, of capitalist skill and of natural resources, when used to distinguish one country from another, are either meaningless or harmful to proper understanding. To understand world economy, as it is and as it has travelled through the past two centuries, we would need such concepts as the politically effective requirements of labour, the productivity of the total economic structure, the imperial-colonial division of labour.

What we have hitherto had as the science of economics is nothing else but the rules of accountancy, industrial management, trade and banking. The science of economics is yet to mature. This is further illustrated by the pitiful use that economics makes of statistics.

Fairly copious statistics are now available of the total annual production in various countries, their national incomes, foreign trade, capital investments and so forth. What does economics do with them? It just establishes surface ratios. For instance, we know that, in a normal year, 20 per cent of Britain's production enters into export trade, around 3 per cent comes to India, the total of investment dividends and home charges going out of India do not make more than 2 or 3 per cent of Britain's national income. According to these surface calculations, India contributes, at best, a 5 per cent to Britain's national income. The politician, Mr. Churchill, is nearer the truth than these calculations of economists are,

when he puts down India's contribution to Britain's national income around 15 to 20 per cent. In fact, it might even be more. For Mr. Churchill is aware that money-expressions of economic values greatly obscure the dynamics that go on underneath, that the loss of dynamic in one region leads to losses in other regions and so forth.

Let us evaluate the statistics of India's foreign trade as the science of economics ought to. We would find that, in a normal year, 5000 crores of labour-hours spent on our farms and fields are exchanged for 250 crores of labour-hours spent in British factories. The German and Japanese factories have also their share. These calculations are easily made. If, out of our production estimated at Rs. 2,000 crores in a normal year, Rs. 100 crores worth of agricultural goods enter our export trade, 1/20th of our entire population, that is, 2 crores of men have been at the job of producing these exported goods. For the purpose of ensuring complete comparison, the entire population and not the working population is here regarded. At the estimate of 2,500 labour-hours per man per year, we get a total of 5,000 crore labour-hours spent on the production of our exported agricultural goods. Likewise, if out of the British production estimated at Rs. 4,000 crores in a normal year Rs. 100 crores worth of industrial goods enter the export trade, 1/40th of the British population, that is 10 lakhs of men have been at the job of producing these exported goods. Thus 250 crores of labour-hours are spent on the production of these industrial goods imported into India. This is the real story, which money statistics of India's foreign trade are so shy of revealing, that the labour of 2 crores of men is exchanged against that of 10 lakhs of men, 5,000 crores of labour-hours are exchanged for 250 crores of labour-hours. It will not do to summon the exploded concepts of labour productivity or of natural resources to explain this fantastic exchange. The concept of the imperial-colonial division of labour, of the productivity of the total economic structure, alone can explain it. Behind this fantastic exchange, lies the history of layer upon layer of saved labour from generations of tillers and miners of India, China, Java, Malaya, Africa, South America and other lands, which has continually been converted into the gigantic machines of England, Germany and Japan.

How then to disentangle the two surplus values, that which capitalism extracts from labour in its home factories and that which it extracts from colonial labour? There is so much of history, so much of continually changing dynamics wrapped up with this problem that one despairs of evolving an adequate mathematical formula. And yet, cannot perhaps this terrific flux of surplus value be grasped by a simple formula, if we bear in mind that labour's use of muscle-power and skill is the same all the world over and, granted equal conditions of technique, would yield equal produce. In fact, university economists who believe in exchange of equal values should have no difficulty in accepting this formula. Let us then convert the world's entire production of a year into the currency of any one country. Care should be taken to convert not the nominal values, but the real values. We may then divide this production equally among the world's working population. For the rough calculation that follows the world's entire population is taken into account. In our own currency, this would roughly work out at Rs. 100 per head per year. Whoever receives less than this as his income and to the extent that he does so, man, woman, or their child, is a contributor to the surplus value of capitalism; whoever receives more than this, and to the extent that he does so, is a recipient. This will perhaps show that nearly 99 per cent of

in the way and prevented a richer understanding of the newer and correct concept. There are no necessary requirements of labour, at least, they have no economic relevance except in periods of famine. Human labour has shown a remarkable tenacity to live and work and its requirements have varied from the minimum of 2 annas a day for colonial labour to that of Rs. 4 a day for imperial labour. This shows that requirements of labour are dictated, not by nature or physique, but by history.

Historical development has dictated that a colonial labourer shall keep himself upon the brink of starvation and work, while nature has shown its marvellous elasticity in how very little is needed to keep a man alive and enable him to turn up for work day after day. We thus find that there are two distinct values or wages of labour, those effective in the imperial countries and those effective in the colonies. This distinction between imperial labour and colonial labour and their respective wages is of the utmost importance for a proper understanding of the source of surplus value. Likewise, the concept of the use-value, the produce, of labour remains abstract and meaningless unless it is understood in the context of joint capitalist-imperialist development. In the current produce of labour in west-European factories appears the saved labour of many generations of colonials. Economists, including Communists, are wrong in crediting this entire produce to imperial labour and in using pompous phrases about the higher productivity of labour in Europe as compared

colonial labour and not more than 10 per cent of imperial labour is the victim from whom capitalism extracts its profits, although, perhaps another 10 per cent of imperial labour lives on the margin. The accountants, misnamed economists, will perhaps wilt at this calculation. They might suggest that this calculation steps up India's production exactly double by a magician's trick and it makes appear two where there is only one. They have to be reminded that the one their eyes are unable to see has from generations been crossing India's frontiers and appearing in the product of west-European and Japanese factories. They have also to be reminded that the spending of muscle-power and skill is the same all the world over and, if it today yields less in India, China or Africa, that is because its previous yields of many generations lie congealed in the machines of other lands.

We can now define surplus value. Labour, whether of the peasant or the factory worker, creates surplus value to the extent that its earnings fall below the average per worker world production of its time.

to Asia or Africa. Labour, on the whole, uses the same muscle-power and skill everywhere and, what appears as the higher produce of imperial labour, is directly due to the many generations of imperial-colonial division of labour in the world. One might almost say that the ghosts of hundreds of millions of colonial toilers are invisibly moving the machines in imperial factories. The highly elaborate machinery, and its continuing improvement in capitalist countries, is due, in large part, to the surplus value created on colonial firms and mines. The continuing use of the productive capacity of these factories is also due, in large part, to the vast masses of colonial toilers who buy their produce. In this welter of a current production that carries with it many entangled skeins of history and of two distinctive values of labour, the old formula that capitalist development has proceeded with the contradiction between labour's wages and its produce has become meaningless.

If capitalism has extracted surplus value from its home labourers by paying them less than what they produce, upon this extraction has continually acted the far greater surplus value derived from colonial toilers. Do the immensely rich persons and the vast middle classes of England and Germany, receive surplus value from home-labour or from colonial labour and in what ratios? Does not imperial labour itself, at least some of its better-paid ranks, receive a large measure of surplus value extracted from colonial labour? There seems to be only one way to get out of this labyrinth. We must forever abandon the habit of examining a country's economic structure as a self-moving entity; we must therefore abandon the Marxist understanding of capitalism as a self-moving west-European entity. Capitalism from its origin to its recentmost development has moved mainly on the imperial dynamic. So that we may evolve a formula which may grasp at the same time the internal and external dynamics of capitalism, we have to give up the idea of an isolated produce of labour within a single economic structure and replace instead the concept of the world's total production averagely distributed over its working population. Thus, the contradiction shall be, not between labour's requirements and its produce, but between the

politically effective requirements of labour and the average production of the world for each worker. Surplus value cannot be calculated, nor understood, on the communist basis of the difference between labour's requirements and its produce. Surplus value, wherever it appears and to the extent that it does so, is the difference between the actual earnings of labour and the per worker world production of the time. It is in the career of this surplus value that the laws of capitalist development can be discerned.

Surplus value, which makes up the entire profits and high earnings of the capitalist system, is derived mainly from colonial farms, fields and mines. The inner imperial circle of the capitalist structure revolves in a way as to draw with great suction the labour-yield of the outer colonial circle. One could quite graphically describe the movements in colonial economy through the past two centuries to now. Four distinct rings inside this circle are discernible. The outermost, and now perhaps the broadest, band is composed of landless labour in agriculture and the suction here has been the strongest. The second, almost equally broad, band of the peasantry, factory-worker and such lower middle class as the small trader and the primary school-teacher has been sucked at just a slightly less terrific rate. Then comes the rather thin ring of the middle classes which alternates between sucking and being sucked. Last comes the almost invisible streak of monopoly capitalists which appears at a late stage and acquires completely the capitalist quality of seizing the labour-yield of others. This outer colonial circle with its four rings moves as an adjunct of the inner capitalist circle to which it is attached in political and economic slavery. The suction does not abate, and throughout but more particularly at the point when exhaustion is reached, the outermost bands of landless labour and small peasantry are piled up with the dried bones of starvation and famine. The colonial economies become one vast village to the capitalist economies. The town-village relationships of exploitation inside a country are as nothing compared to this deciding town-village relationship in which three-fourths of mankind is transformed into a village for the benefit of the rest.

With this instrument of an interwoven inner and outer dynamic, we are in a position to understand the other appearances of capitalist development. In particular, the high capitalisation of west-European industry is made intelligible. This industry has not only continually got the larger part of its capital from overseas profits, but it has continually found overseas outlets for its produce in goods as well as its capital accumulations. Thanks to the fact that corresponding industries could not be established in the major part of the world, west-European industry could capitalise itself so highly, could become unmistakably monopolistic. The west-European population could never have borne the burden of this heavy capitalisation, could neither have created it nor carried it through, not even if they could have distributed their produce on a communist basis.

Just as this heavy capitalisation is the outcome largely of overseas dynamic, the overcoming of the periodic crises is to be traced to the same source. To say that industrial crises are caused by the lag between a people's production and their purchasing power or that they are overcome by inventions and heavier capitalisation is to state some half-truths and outward appearances. Industrial crises, in addition to being a partial result of the capitalist distribution of internal incomes, have more largely been due to the time-lag between the exhaustion of an old imperial dynamic and the discovery of a new one. An old technique of producing goods with a given overseas area for imperialist exploitation tends to produce crisis, until a new overseas area is conquered to enable the use of a new invention.\* Thus was it possible for capitalism

\* If an attempt were made to pair off Stephenson's steam-engine or the Bessemer process or the internal combustion engine with such events as the conquest of Bengal or the opening of the Suez canal and the consequent commercialisation of Indian agriculture or the conquest of Africa, the results would prove that a crisis set in largely as old colonial areas started proving inadequate and capitalism got restored to health with new political or economic annexations. Incidentally, this theory of capitalist crises might mean that such heavy capitalisation as in European industry would, even under socialist conditions, be impossible without imperialist exploitation. We would consider this question later.

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to survive its first crisis and its later periodic crises, for, the internal purchasing power could in no event have sufficed for its produce. Thus is it that, with the complete conquest of the world and the impossibility of a new imperial dynamic, capitalism has entered the phase of general crisis. It is wholly unable to get out of this phase. Whether it will as a result break asunder or stabilise itself at low levels of wealth will be considered later.

Capitalist crises are often sought to be understood in terms of the rise or fall in the rate of interest. As an outward appearance, it is incontestable that crisis is a period of very low outturns on capital, that is, almost negligible rates of interest, while boom is a period of high outturns. It is also true that, after a period of abnormally low outturns, a new invention for the production of goods used to bring a higher yield on capital. A new composition of capital and labour took place. But this is merely touching the surface of the problem of crises or, even, of the rate of interest. Going deeper, we are offered such explanations as that new inventions caused a fall in the costs of production and the price of goods and, with the increase in population, this gave higher profits to capitalists and thus restored equilibrium. This is yet not a full explanation. Each boom-making utilisation of new inventions and the consequent fall in the costs of production was possible only with the fresh markets of large overseas populations for trade as well as investments. It was this that restored capitalist equilibrium and profits and the new restorations tended to be on lower levels of interest. With the possibility of such new restorations now blocked, capital is faced with the problem of a zero or a minus rate of interest. Capital is faced with its own extinction. This is the problem of the general crisis of capitalism.

While capitalism has progressed through periodic crises in its homelands, it has brought devastating pauperism and increasing poverty to the colonies. Landless and starving labour in agricul-

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availability of imperialist exploitation, but also because most of the retarded two-thirds of the world possesses a tremendous density of population. 1952.

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P.S.—I have now come to believe in the utter impossibility of such heavy capitalisation for the whole world, not alone because of the un-

to survive its first crisis and its later periodic crises, for, the internal purchasing power could in no event have sufficed for its produce. Thus is it that, with the complete conquest of the world and the impossibility of a new imperial dynamic, capitalism has entered the phase of general crisis. It is wholly unable to get out of this phase. Whether it will as a result break asunder or stabilise itself at low levels of wealth will be considered later.

Capitalist crises are often sought to be understood in terms of the rise or fall in the rate of interest. As an outward appearance, it is incontestable that crisis is a period of very low outturns on capital, that is, almost negligible rates of interest, while boom is a period of high outturns. It is also true that, after a period of abnormally low outturns, a new invention for the production of goods used to bring a higher yield on capital. A new composition of capital and labour took place. But this is merely touching the surface of the problem of crises or, even, of the rate of interest. Going deeper, we are offered such explanations as that new inventions caused a fall in the costs of production and the price of goods and, with the increase in population, this gave higher profits to capitalists and thus restored equilibrium. This is yet not a full explanation. Each boom-making utilisation of new inventions and the consequent fall in the costs of production was possible only with the fresh markets of large overseas populations for trade as well as investments. It was this that restored capitalist equilibrium and profits and the new restorations tended to be on lower levels of interest. With the possibility of such new restorations now blocked, capital is faced with the problem of a zero or a minus rate of interest. Capital is faced with its own extinction. This is the problem of the general crisis of capitalism.

While capitalism has progressed through periodic crises in its homelands, it has brought devastating pauperism and increasing poverty to the colonies. Landless and starving labour in agricul-

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availability of imperialist exploitation, but also because most of the retarded two-thirds of the world possesses a tremendous density of population. 1952.

ture has claimed an increasingly higher percentage in the total population. Because of their basic misunderstanding of the dynamic of capitalism, Marxists have looked for increasing impoverishment among imperial labour, whereas they should have looked for it in colonial labour. The history of capitalist development is the history of the increasing poverty of colonial masses and their reduction into starving and landless labour.\*

The worst sufferers under capitalism are the colonial masses. Presuming the validity of the Communist law of class-struggle, there is obvious need to change its basis. Not the working class in capitalist countries, but the colonial masses are the principal

\* Landless labour in Indian agriculture has risen from being less than 200 of each 1000 of agriculturists at the end of the last century to nearly 400 in each 1000. This is the most important result of the commercialisation of agriculture. Nevertheless, men can still talk that India has been enriched through commercial agriculture. It would be hard to find a more obvious stream of blood that has flown from a huge mass of population to a foreign economy or to a section in its own. The receivers of this stream alone can talk of the enriching of the people from whom it is taken. There is no greater collapse of human intelligence than when an Indian or any other colonial repeats parrot-like the Marxist formula that capitalism was at one time progressive but has now ceased to be so. Capitalism has at no time been progressive to the colonial masses; it has increasingly wasted their economic and spiritual welfare. If only some one with sympathy and a historical sense could write "the History of Colonial Labour in India", it would not only be a service to knowledge but would read like a thriller. The materials of such a history may have to be found in the indenture records of such far-off lands as Fiji and Trinidad; they will have to be ferreted out of the numerous British commissions and reports; old budgets and prices will have to be discovered and, in part, they may have to be reconstructed out of such evidence as is available from men who are before our eyes fading into skeletons. This might take a whole lifetime, but it will be a great work. Such a history will relate the repeated auctionings of Bengal lands by Hastings, the speedy reduction of craftsmen into landless labourers, the cry for salt and oil, labour's work on rail embankments and roads to be followed by successive gazes on its flooded fields and its own creation, the story of its fascinating women quickly fading into wrinkles and gawkiness or of a rare flower picked up by the zamindar's son and the indigo sahib only to be thrown away, the occasional revolts, the resignation and pain of indenture slaves on ramshackle ships and on lands thousands of miles away, the arrival of jute and tea and cotton with Bessemer and the Suez canal with them—the piteous cry for food, famines, the stifled moan, the wondrous victory of the loin cloth over nakedness, the background of the huge factories in foreign lands and their spawns in Bombay, Calcutta and like towns and, through all this story of vanishing food and vanishing cloth, running like a red thread, the disgrace of caste and the songs of Paltu and other Bhagats that spoke of the dissolving happiness in the Great Absolute.

grave-diggers of capitalism. Imperial labour can at best be an ally of colonial toilers in the destruction of capitalism. The class of colonial toilers\* pours its life-blood into the capitalist system from its birth, carries it along through its various phases and is itself steadily impoverished, until it reaches a stage when its own extinction spells the decay of capitalism, while its purposeful rise into manhood ushers a new world. Whether the class of colonial toilers will do its work well or ill, whether it will allow itself to stay in decay or rise into manhood, will be discussed under the recentmost development of capitalism. Suffice it here to say that the future of capitalism depends not so much on the behaviour of labour in capitalist countries as on the behaviour of colonial masses. The student of capitalist future will have his eyes pre-eminently on the political action of colonial toilers.

The Russian Revolution fits in very well with this theory of the class-struggle. As a country which by no means formed part of the inner capitalist circle of world-economy but was being gradually brought into the outer colonial circle of the west-Europeans, its semi-colonial toilers were yet powerful enough to overthrow the foreign and native systems that spelt their servitude. The capitalist chain snapped where the colonial masses supplied their strongest link. Those desirous of seeing the capitalist chain break again will do well to look for the now strongest link in the class of colonial toilers. Such a breaking may perhaps usher in a real new world, as the snapping link is now no longer semi-colonial but wholly colonial and vitally necessary to capitalist continuance.

Before we go on to consider the recentmost development of capitalism, let us ask ourselves how Marx could have made an inadequate use of his own instrument and have considered capitalism in its west-European isolation. One is tempted to answer in the Marxian way that, as a limb of European economy, Marx

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\* Whatever Marxists may say about the impossibility of regarding the colonial toilers as a single class, even under Marx's tests of community, political consciousness and national organisation, the colonial toilers as a whole are more justifiably a class than is the working class of capitalist countries.

could not see beyond the interests of the European working-class. As a philanthropist, he vaguely wanted the whole world to prosper, but the centre of his world with its deciding movements for economic and spiritual welfare was placed in west-Europe. This view is further confirmed by the attitude of Marx's critics. They have attacked Marx's theory of capitalist development from various angles such as marginal utility or preference scales and costs of production but none of them, even as an argument, has pointed out the error of Marx in looking upon imperial labour as the sole creator of value in capitalist factories. Capitalists and communists alike of west-Europe have maintained a singular silence over this division of labour into imperial and colonial and the great consequences of this division to capitalist development through its various phases. One would be tempted to call this conspiracy of thought a reflection of economic interests, but that Asiatic socialists have also been party to it only proves that thinking has perhaps its own laws and its lapses need not always be put down to economic self-interest or the working of class forces.

The recent development of capitalism can be appropriately studied by analysing west-European economy after the first decade of our century. Apart from the fact that west-Europe until recently decided the destiny of more than half of the human race and was consequently the main determinant in affairs of capitalism, it has, during this period, had the strength to involve the whole world in two major wars. In the study of west-European economy, we will be concerned with economic facts, as the thoughts and motives of men, except in so far as they are of economic consequence, will be studied in another connection.

The main source of west-European economic movement in this period has lain in the extremely heavy capitalisation of industry and in the fact of multiplying capitalisms within a territorially blocked imperialism. The capitalisation of west-European industry had, until the first decade of our century, proceeded on the basis of ever-available large chunks of colonial masses and their territories; it needed an expanding world on which to operate. The source of such an expansion is now completely blocked.

There are no more new worlds whose colonial masses can act as a dynamic to west-European capitalisation. On the contrary, a kind of diminishing returns has begun to operate in the available spheres because of the increasing poverty of colonial masses as well as their obstruction and opposition. All this has produced a chronic condition in west-European capitalisation; not only has industry reached the summit of its capacity and can no longer expand but it cannot make use of whatever capacity it has already reached. The use of productive capacity fell in the five years of the 1929 depression to nearly three-fourths and, in certain industries, it was as low as fifty per cent. Even in the five years immediately preceding the 1939 war, Britain and France could not make full use of their productive capacities. This downward trend in the use of productive capacity was accompanied by downward trends in world trade and employment.\* West-European capitalism has thus been faced by three kinds of insecurities to its existence; insecurity due to colonial poverty and obstruction, insecurity of internal disorders and insecurity as a result of competition within its own ranks and from extra-European lands. Due perhaps to a doom that will not release it from its coils, west-Europe has been wholly unable to meet, except in a hand-to-mouth fashion, the insecurity of colonial poverty and obstruction that most threatens its existence. Out of fear and a kind of obsessed thinking, its conscious talk has been largely influenced by the internal conflict between capital and labour. In actual practice, however, and so far as vital consequences are concerned, the insecurity that has moved west-European capitalism in its entire being is the competition within its own ranks. Twice in the course of a generation, it has sought to master this insecurity by wanting to reduce its members in war. The downward trend in productive capacity, world-trade and unemployment has been followed by the upward trend in arms-industries and war.

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\* At the peak of the 1929-33 depressions, nearly 10 per cent of the British and nearly 17 per cent of the German populations were the unemployed and their dependents. At the time, world trade also fell to about half its pre-depression size.

Back of the two wars in this period, in so far as economic issues are involved, is the clash of productive capacities, the fact that the productive capacity of one capitalist structure cannot be fully used until that of another is laid low. This clash is overlaid by a number of cultural issues and men might for all kinds of reasons ranging from narrow interests to democratic welfare, and even whole nations, get dragged into the war as a measure of national freedom. All these reasons are perhaps important in the very long run; some are even economically important and we will presently consider them in their bearing on west-Europe. But both as to economic origin and consequences, the wars of this period are predominantly wars of productive capacities. The biggest economic dissimilarity in the two wars lies in the fact that the 1914 world-war was almost wholly of west-European origin and making, while the 1939 war is only slightly more of a west-European character than it is of Pacific set-up. Whatever else this might denote, it unmistakably shows that the spheres of economic vitality and arising disorders are shifting and that, comparatively speaking, west-Europe is stepping back in history.

This stepping back is not occasioned by the destruction caused in the two wars. The direct destruction caused to a powerful country by war is seldom such that it cannot be made good by replacements. Rarely do the killings, however large they may be, outnumber the births, so that a war produces little effect on the numerical strength of west-European populations except with regard to the ratios between the age-groups. In like manner, the west-European productive capacity, whatever be the extent of destruction by land, sea and air, is continually renewed and even expanded in the midst of war, so that the end of a war finds a west-European power at a slightly higher productive level in certain directions than at the beginning. It is possible that the 1939 war, before it has ended, will have caused vast destruction; even so, unless they fight it out to the last factories, the productive capacity of west-European capitalisms will not have been appreciably reduced. Not war-destruction but post-war incapacities reduce a people's strength. The morale of

the peoples, however, is quite another question. There is no saying when a people might fade out of history as a result of repeated wars; the German example of a beaten people coming back soon to war-like vitality makes such calculations extremely hazardous. It might be said with caution that repeated and long wars may at some stage turn a people from the zest of this life to the bliss of the hereafter. Nevertheless, it is safe to treat the factor of people's morale as an unknown variable.

West-Europe is stepping back in history as a result not of the destruction but of the shifts caused by war. The necessities of war cause such a disturbance in the ratios of the productive capacities, and their use, of the world's Great Powers that continents and hemispheres gain and lose at each other's expense. The end of the 1939 war will probably have achieved a greater disturbance than the 1914 war did.\* Impelled by the urge to

\* Of the world's seven Great Powers, at the beginning of the 1914 war, the ratio in favour of Europe was 5 : 2.

Of the five European powers, the three west-European lands, England, Germany and France, were, in view of their developed economies and productive capacities, genuinely Great Powers, while, of the two east-European powers, Czarist Russia fell something short of a Great Power and the Austrian Empire was only nominally so. The end of the 1914 war saw no visible alteration in the world ratio, except that the nominally great role of Austria was taken up by Italy while Russia started making strides towards being a genuine Great Power. But back of this seeming stability in the world ratio, a great change had taken place. The two extra-European powers, U.S.A. and Japan, were so rapidly expanding their productive capacities and influence that one of them was preparing to be the world's greatest power while the other was amassing quite handsome chunks of power. At the beginning of the 1939 war, the ratio of world powers was nominally maintained, as before, at 5 : 2 in favour of Europe, although real strength could best be measured by the ratio 3 : 2. The progress of the 1939 war has already seen Italy knocked down so badly that she may not again find it possible to strut about in peace-time as a Great Power on pretence. France is, in view of her defeat and other reasons, unlikely to regain her productive, or world-power position. Whatever may be the outcome of this war and whatever shifts may yet take place, Europe will have, with the most favourable ending, two Great Powers against two of the rest of the world. If Soviet Russia is to be one of these powers, her intervention in world affairs may continue in the political sphere, but is hardly likely, at least for some time, to spread over to foreign trade and investments. That leaves just one Great Power for the whole of Europe, whose productive capacity is relevant to the future of capitalism. Whichever this power may be, it will not only have defeated its other west-European competitors in war but will take care to see, at the end of the war, that not alone the military possibilities but more so the industrial possibilities of its defeated foes are

eliminate the insecurity of each other's competition, west-European capitalisms achieve through their wars a far greater measure of insecurity. The increasing insecurities of colonial poverty and obstruction, of competition from extra-European capitalisms and, perhaps also, of internal disorders are causing west-European capitalisms through their various wars to step back in the affairs of man.

The west-European populations have lost their former rate of increase. Some are constant, while others have a very slow increase and all are showing unmistakable tendencies towards great reduction by the end of the century. A reduction in population, however, does not necessarily imply a reduction in its capacity to dominate over colonial economies or to wage war.

destroyed, at least considerably curtailed. What this may mean to Europe's share in world trade is not difficult to foresee. Although competing with each other, west-European capitalisms, in their clustering, were able to dominate world-trade. Europe took over 51 per cent of world trade. The three west-European powers, England, Germany and France, took over 35 per cent of world trade. West-Europe, before the 1939 war, was undoubtedly the economic centre and, therefore, also the military and political centre of the world. West-Europe has irretrievably lost this position. This is so, not only because one west-European power has already lost its productive position and one more must follow suit, but also because the American hemisphere is coming up. The productive capacity of the U.S.A. has gone on expanding even in the midst of war, as illustrated by its fantastic aircraft production and Henry Kaiser's a ship a day programme. This expanded productive capacity is already manoeuvring for a corresponding position in the world's trade, air traffic, oil and other arrangements. Furthermore, U.S. economy has now used up its internal dynamic and must have recourse to an expanded world-trade. The pre-war ratio in world-trade between Europe and the Americas that stood at 51 per cent to 23 per cent in favour of Europe is likely in the post-war period to be reversed in America's favour, though perhaps not immediately to the same extent. At the same time, the position of Asia in world economy might perhaps improve slightly. If Japan loses the war, the legacy of her productive capacity will to a considerable extent be taken over by China and, so, in any case, there will be one great power in Asia. A number of other economic and political movements are maturing, whose course will to a large extent determine Asiatic development. The pre-war share of Asia in world-trade was around 14 per cent and, whether it greatly improves or not, depends very much on extra-economic and unknown considerations. What these great continental drifts in world economy may mean to the future of capitalism will in some measure be considered elsewhere. Before we enquire into their significance, let us be aware of their existence. Suffice it here to say, therefore, that great continental drifts in world economy are taking place.

What a population may lose in numbers, it may gain in technique. Actually, however, it is not so in view of the fact that the technique of extra-European free economies is quite as advanced, if not more, and, furthermore cultural and scientific stagnation does under capitalist conditions seem to go with a constant or declining population. The exact connection between cultural stagnation and a declining population is difficult to determine, except in so far as capitalism, because of a falling birth-rate, is denied a very vital internal dynamic, which, in a variety of ways, also causes it to lose its control over external dynamics.\*

West-European inventiveness is also on the decline. With the rapidly increasing importance of electrical engineering and the internal combustion engine, west-Europe is slipping back from the unquestioned leadership in applied sciences which it held in the age of steam and steel. The German effort at substitute and synthetic industries is indeed a brave attempt at recovering by technique what is not naturally available; it is valuable for a closed economy but can hardly determine the world's economic career.

\* West-Europe nearly trebled itself during the 19th century, exclusive of the paupers who went to the U.S.A.; Britain quadrupled her population; Germany trebled herself; France more than doubled herself. These vast increases in population were helpful to west-European capitalisms to tide over their industrial crises, as they offered enlarged markets and also supplied man-power for heavy capitalisation. France's population has remained constant for over two decades now. The failure of Germany's deliberate effort to reverse population trends indicates that statistical calculations putting Britain's population at around 25 millions in place of the present 45 millions and Germany's at 35 millions by the end of the 20th century may not prove entirely unfounded. There seems to be a great deal of truth in a British novelist's suggestion made about the imagined Forsyte family that the birth-rate under capitalist conditions corresponds to the rate of interest. The falling rate of interest is threatening to become negative and it seems hardly possible to check the accompanying decline in population. This reduction in population, however, does not by itself imply a reduction in west-Europe's economic power against the colonial masses. As it is, in terms of the horse-power used, the German population is greatly in excess of India's and so is Britain's. Horse-power is a great determinant in existing forms of economic and political power. Nevertheless, one has to beware of the concentration of horse-power in the British or German style, for concentrated horse-power is a reason among others of population decline and so forth. If the age that is passing belonged to concentrated horse-power, the age that is coming will belong to diffused, perhaps increased, horse-power.

It is more in the nature of a heroic effort to delay as far as possible west-Europe's appointment with destiny.\*

Colonial poverty and obstruction, more than any other factor, are forcing a contracting rigidity into west-European economy. From Peking to Kahira and beyond, over Calcutta and Bombay, nationalism, at least with regard to consumption goods, is becoming the dominant spring of action. Except some small and semi-fashionable sections of city-dwellers, colonial masses show greater interest in where their goods are made than in questions of quality and price. Such an attitude is likely to grow and ramify with the passage of time and its effect on west-European economy can already be seen in the unlifting depression that has set upon Lancashire and Lyons. At the same time, colonial obstruction has been unable to produce any appreciable effect on west-European investments and production goods industries. With the exception of Mexico where the British owned Eagle Oil Company was confiscated, such attempts made elsewhere in this period, as for instance in Iran, have come to naught. Nor have any industries for the making of machines and machine-tools been set up in the colonies, that may reduce the use of west-European capacity in production goods. While colonial obstruction, therefore, has great effect on west-European industries of consumers' goods, it has little appreciable effect on producers' goods industries.†

\* Whether the accountic torpedoes, radio-directed bombs and such like of west-Europe's war machine are indicative of continuing scientific vigour or are the achievements of an old craft is difficult to tell. Perhaps Europe may yet take the lead in the sciences of small-unit horse-power and low-wattage electricity. As it is, U.S.A. was already before the war the leading country in industries of electrical engineering and the new science of electronics seems to be making great headway there. As the Asiatic countries are not burdened with the heavy capitalisation of an old technique, there seems to be no reason why Asian scientists should not take the lead in the new sciences of dispersed technics of electronics, plastics and so forth. They have, however, not yet shown adequate scientific vigour and are dominated by the urge to ape European technics of the industrial sciences. All this however should not in any way obscure the outstanding fact that west-Europe is still the leader in the highest branch of science, that of mathematical physics.

† A colonial population can determine the origin of consumers' goods even while it may be politically enslaved, but it cannot do that with regard

Much more than their deliberate obstruction, the increasing poverty of colonial masses is causing rigidity and contraction in west-European economy. Through successive repetitions of the town-village relationship, over decades in some areas and over a century and more in certain others, colonial masses are no longer able to act as adequate life-givers to capitalist economies. They may yet delay west-Europe's final stepping back in world affairs by their replacements of requirements for railways, public works and consumers' goods industries, but these requirements are showing a tendency to contract. Unless prevailing economic trends are reversed and that does not seem very likely, the increasing poverty of colonial masses will be the greatest single factor towards the undoing of west-European economy.

Continental shifts in the use of productive capacity, tendencies to declining population and to loss of inventive vigour and colonial poverty and obstruction are relegating west-European economy to a back-seat in the affairs of men.

Let us now see if the purposive activity of west-Europeans is such as may stem their relegation to a back-seat. We will be concerned here with that aspect of purposive activity which produces tangible economic results; questions relating to motives, secondary aims, moral worth, errors and of what ought to be done will be discussed when we take up the general problem of history.

The purposive activity of west-Europeans with regard to their greatest insecurity has tended, with the increase in colonial

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to producers' goods, as the capitalisation under existing technics is heavy and the market is almost entirely confined to a foreign government and native capitalists so that it is influenced more by considerations of risks and prices and non-national interests than by national sentiment or interest. The repair and loco shops of India, for instance, have, in spite of thirty years' talk, remained assembly and repair shops nor are they likely to become effective manufacturing centres for locomotives and automobiles. However, the economic movement in producers' goods industries begins when political movements have matured into success and, therefore, this is hardly the place to predict as to how soon or how late colonial obstruction may start affecting the west-European industries in producers' goods. Incidentally, the Mexican confiscation with some compensation to American and British oil companies, although the result largely of Mexico's own national vigour, was partly facilitated by the attitude of certain influential interests in U.S.A.

poverty and obstruction, to be more political than economic. This tendency is likely to grow, not so much because colonial obstruction will become increasingly active, but, more so, because the problems of colonial poverty are too baffling to admit of an economic solution by west-Europeans. Events no longer wait upon capitalist activity in the colonies and it has very often to go counter to them, so that it is almost always left behind. West-European capitalisms are frightened of the development of cousin-capitalisms in the colonies and they have even less vigour to work out a new system of technics that may bring wealth to colonial masses and impetus to their own economies. Retention, not development, is become the colonial key action of west-Europeans. With each repetition of the town-village relationship, the retainable volume will lessen and west-European capitalisms will shrink with the shrinking of colonial economies.\*

\* Recent west-European activity in the colonies has been of little economic consequence. The recent expenditure on canals, for instance, in Sind, Rajputana and the Punjab, although big in its own way, has in no way given a new dynamic either to Indian or to British economy. If there is any increased agricultural production, it is either just sufficient to cover the canal rates, that is, the interest and profits on government-owned canal capital, or it flows into the pockets of a very small section of big landowners without further productive use. At the same time, west-European activity in the colonies is assuming more and more a luxury character, as, for instance, the Bombay Backbay Reclamation, the new Howrah Bridge, the Tanganyika Hunting Preserves, the Kenya Highlands and so forth. These may make life more pleasant and beautiful for the west-Europeans and a section of the native rich; they may even give a little retentive support to the west-European engineering industries; but they are absolutely powerless to revive capitalist or colonial economies. There is no likelihood of west-European economic activity acquiring a different character. Recent trends indicate that the west-European drift towards public works, transport and what is now becoming known as agricultural mechanisation will continue. Whatever their value as political or propagandist expedients, these measures of road-making, canal-making, electrified agriculture and the like cannot revive colonial economies nor can they assist capitalist economies beyond making a small demand on the engineering industries. Until the internal relationships of colonial agriculture, among landless labour, poor peasantry and big land-owners are radically altered and, what is more important, until colonial villages can undertake certain co-operative activities without much capital expenditure and can also reinvigorate themselves by some new type of small-unit technics, there is no hope for colonial economies. All this is beyond the reach of a foreign authority. There has indeed been some stray talk of a vigorous colonial policy, as, for instance, when a Secretary of the British Federation of Industries, speaking at a meeting of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, proposed the development of

West-European political activity in the colonies is simple. If colonial poverty is an insoluble problem, colonial obstruction is not quite that. By virtue of their political power, west-Europeans have to date been able to prevent a sudden cessation of the colonial dynamic through the revolutionary action of colonial masses. They have also tried to appease colonial obstruction to the extent that is possible without danger to their own economies. When therefore, west European political activity in the colonies is not based on repression, it is informed by the tactics of investigating commissions, enquiry committees, reports and piece-meal reforms. This is so not only when conservatives are in office, but also when popular front governments, such as those in France and Spain to which Socialists and Marxian communists were party, held office. Nor is this condition likely to change. The liberal conscience of west-Europe, whatever its moral worth, is too uninformed economically to be able to direct the future of capitalism. Its solution to let the colonies develop themselves in freedom and to depend on their goodwill for such dynamic as they may choose to give has never been worked out in its economic details and, even if it were, there is no guarantee that it would

Africa and other colonies at a negative rate of interest. In the first place, such talk is more an adventure in thought than a working policy, for west-European capitalisms will far sooner battle against the inevitable than accept such a vigorous policy full of grave and unknown risks; in the second place, it shows that even the most fore-sighted of west-European economists can only think of colonial development on the basis of old technics and, therefore, on the basis of diminishing capital. West-European capitalism, therefore, is likely to continue fighting a rearguard action on the colonial front; even more in the economic than in the political sphere, must it forego all positive ideas and stick to the negative policy of non-liquidation. It can at best try to prevent the deterioration of the colonial dynamic to the extent that is possible by the employment of political methods. This will be so, whether conservatives are in office or communists or any other variety between these two extremes. Marxism has no solution for the heavy capitalisation of west-European industry. Its ready-made answers that, with the socialisation of industry, everything will be all right, must appear strikingly irresponsible not only to the owners and managers of west-European industry but also to imperial labour with its sub-conscious insight into the need for colonial annexes. That is why Marxism has so far proved unacceptable to west-Europeans and their working class and, should it under some stress capture power, it must, with its present understanding of the class-struggle and technics, stick to the economic policy of colonial non-liquidation or, else, if it chose to fulfil its loosely held ideals, send west-European economy hurtling along the path of relegation, of low production and unemployment.

prove acceptable to west-European governments.\* Unless, therefore, some severe stress occurs as a result either of successful colonial obstruction or of great continental shifts in the ratios of productive capacity, west-European political activity in the colonies will continue to be based on the policy of retention. In the midst of shrinking economies, this political policy to retain whatever is possible can only mean the attempt to stabilise colonial masses into the lowest caste of capitalism much in the same manner in which Hindus of a disreputable period stabilised one of their own limbs into the caste of untouchables.

With regard to the insecurity presented by the clash of productive capacities, west-European purposive activity has been able to evolve nothing beyond international understandings on technical processes and certain quotas of production and trade. Such understandings open or secret are arrived at among the capitalists of deciding nations and they have operated in spheres like oil, chemicals and sugar. While they last, they are helpful in removing various sources of friction among different capitalisms but they are wholly unable to prevent war. As, however, west-Europeans have no economic remedy other than this against war, these international understandings, when they are set up once again, are likely to cover extensive spheres such as foreign exchange and currency. They will undoubtedly help in delaying another outbreak of open hostilities among nations, not only because of the wide tie-up they will introduce among important national economies but more so because of the lessened competition due to the post-war destruction of a few substantial economies. Nevertheless, these understandings can hardly prove enduring, as they will be strained, on the one hand, by the diminishing yield of colonial dynamic and, on the other, by the pressure of continental shifts on their stable systems of quotas of

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\* Incidentally, this liberal conscience of freedom and justice is not to be confused with west-European communism. On account of its mistaken understanding of the world struggle, west-European communism, when it is not irritating its own nationals, is busy exasperating the colonial masses whose struggles it chooses to look upon as the expression of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois interests. It is thus ineffective and, to the extent that it befogs men's minds, somewhat harmful.

production and foreign trade. They can delay war, but they cannot prevent it. It is even possible that the war that comes after the operation of these very loose international agreements on production, currency and trade may be genuinely deadly. Nevertheless, world capitalisms must pursue this policy of international understandings, for they have no other economic preventive against war.

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The U.S. and Hindustan are graduating themselves into the two polarities of the rest of our world. If the U.S. has become the leader of the capitalist system, what happens there might yet deflect the sequel being worked out in west-Europe; so is Hindustan become the chief arena for the shaping of an alternative economy.\*

The U.S. productive capacity is higher than that of the three west-European lands, Germany, France and Britain put together. Its productive capacity in mining and manufacturing, and that is what matters in the international relationships of world economy, is higher than that of the whole of Europe. But, with this economic expansion, the U.S. has fully exhausted its internal dynamic and used up such a dynamic as it could get from the other countries of the American hemisphere. There is now little question of further expansion; the U.S. is faced with the problem of preventing a set-back into lower levels of production.† But

\* The study of west-European economies has disclosed the main directions in which the capitalist system is developing, among which is the shift in favour of the North American continent. We have now to find out if this shift alters or modifies any of the main directions. There is not much need for our purposes to study in detail the remaining major capitalism, that of Japan, as it is developing more or less along west-European lines, only that the caste-stratification is easier and the relegation slower. With respect to the two-thirds of the human race, the colonial adjunct of the capitalist system, our study of Hindustan will apply more or less to China, to practically the whole of Asia, to Africa, to the broad masses in the South and Central American Republics. Hindustan has become so to say a mirror to these other economies. The chief among the colonial adjuncts has come to such a point of saturation that it reveals the many facets of colonial economy better than any other.

† The enormous production of the U.S.A., as reflected in its yearly national income, which, with round Rs. 1,400 per head in a population of 13 crores, works out at one and three-fourths of the total in the three west-European lands, Britain, France and Germany, with an average of Rs. 750

per head in a population of 16 crores. It may be suggested that a higher cost of living and the greater range of services in the U.S.A. vitiates these figures and the productive capacity of the country should be assessed on firmer grounds. Of the world's entire primary produce in 1937, Europe shared 21 billion dollars, Europe including the U.S.S.R. shared 28 billion dollars, while North America comprising U.S. and Canada shared 15 billion dollars. These figures, however, do not give an adequate idea, as they are made up largely of food and other agricultural products. Confining ourselves to non-agricultural products, we find that Europe including Russia produced 39 per cent, Europe excluding Russia produced 30 per cent, while North America shared 40 per cent of the world's total. These non-agricultural products used in industry and manufacture give a true idea of the U.S. productive capacity, which is thus shown to outstrip that of the whole of Europe including Russia. That the Canadian productive capacity is here merged in that of the United States does not introduce a new factor, as it is comparatively small and is more or less an annex of the U.S. Further evidence of the preponderance of U.S. productive capacity in world economy can be had from certain figures of production in 1937; it may be remembered that this year was particularly favourable to Europe in view of its hectic rearmament.

	<i>Europe</i>	<i>minus Russia</i>	<i>Europe plus Russia</i>	<i>North America</i>
Raw Material	.. 24%		34%	35%
Fuels & Power	.. 30%		38%	47%
Metals	.. 24%		36%	34%

It is well known that the U.S. produced over 65 per cent of the world's petroleum in 1929 and has not allowed the ratio to fall very much lower; at one time, it produced nearly 80 per cent of the world's automobiles; its production of steel and cotton was almost half of the world's. The 1939 war must have further expanded U.S. productive capacity; U.S. leadership in world economy must now be without parallel.

If U.S. productive capacity has on the one hand reached such amazing heights, it has, on the other, arrived at its peaks from where the downward passage is already showing. On the basis of 1929 being 100, the North American mining and manufacturing position had deteriorated to 93 in 1937 and 73 in 1938, automobiles had sunk to 89 and 46, while the index of producers' investment goods fell to 87 in 1939 and 54 in 1938. The U.S. has exhausted its internal dynamic. The expansion in rail-roads and allied industries, in internal roads and the automobile industry appears to have reached its limits; the 1929 production of 50 lakhs automobiles in a world total of 63 lakhs is an all-time record. Even the production of electricity can only be extended more with a view to tide over a depression than to satisfy real needs of expansion. There is also not much scope for expansion in the internal consumption of food or cloth. It may be remembered that the U.S. has used up whatever dynamic it could get from the South American Republics without going too far in the way of west-European empire-colony relationships.

What stares U.S. in the face is that, despite almost ten years between 1929 and 1938 of increased population and scientific improvements, its production-index of capital goods fell to 87 while that of Europe rose to 111. It would appear that the leader of capitalist economies is fated even more than the other members to suffer speedy contraction and relegation. When the 1939 war has ended, some of the west-European capitalisms at any rate will have a lot of internal reconstruction to put through while the U.S. will

the world is limited and imperialism is territorially blocked. Increasing poverty in the colonies is causing a contraction in such capitalist economies as have so far been using them up. The leader of all capitalist economies will thus have to discover fairly soon whether it can enlarge an external dynamic in the process of using it to its own advantage. Is it at all possible to shunt world-trade from its empire-colony rails to a new road which leads to expansion in the production equipment and consumption of all trading countries? U.S. economy will have to tackle this question, not for the good of the world, not for the good of the colonies, but for its own survival and for full use of its own productive capacity. If there is no answer to this question, U.S. capitalism must suffer the same tendencies to relegation and to transformation of class into caste, which we detected in west-European capitalisms. We have therefore to find if there is any additional strength in U.S. capitalism, which marks it off from its west-European cousins. Before we do so, let us broadly go over the entire scope of dangers to which we have found world economy to be subject.

The severest danger to world economy consists in the productive equipment of two-thirds of the human race. Denied the advantages of science and improving technics, this equipment has been knuckling under the weight of foreign capitalisms and labour done with its help is getting increasingly barren of yield. 5000 crores of labour-hours under this equipment are of equal

have no such additional incentives in repairing war-destruction. There may be few years of animated demand, in consumption and in the produce of limited new industries. The United States will thus be wholly unable to make use of its expanded productive capacity unless it chooses to utilise for post-war world-trade the shifts caused in mid-war. Herein lies a reason for the decay of U.S. isolationism stronger than any articles of faith. The U.S. productive capacity demands involvement in world-trade. It demands a world in which trade shall freely grow. Aside from the question of what a largely self-sufficient economy can exchange for its produce, the United States will have a still greater menace in the poverty and obstruction of two-thirds of the human race. If colonial poverty is primarily causing the relegation of west-European capitalism, it also remains to cause a lower use of the U.S. productive capacity. The most outstanding question, for capitalist survival, therefore, is whether the leader of capitalist economies will be able to face any better than west-European capitalisms the issue of colonial poverty.

money-yield to 250 crore labour-hours in free capitalist economies. This great unbalance in the productive equipment of the human race goes with the equally great unbalance in its political and armed power. There are three major aspects of this unbalance. One aspect is whether the world's productive equipment at all its geographical points could be brought to the efficiency of yield that has been attained at any favoured point. If that were not possible, can the productive equipment of the retarded nations be in the alternative so remodelled as to give an average per-worker yield of the world's production? These two aspects, however, relate essentially to the creative activity of the retarded peoples themselves and the existing capitalisms can have nothing to do with them except in so far as to support the activity when necessary. But there is a third aspect with which the continuance of the existing capitalisms is bound up. This is the aspect of the decreasing yield of colonial labour-hours in a world where no new ones can be annexed and those that have been are jockeying to get into their own. This decreasing yield of the retarded peoples is depressing the highly mechanised industries of the free economies. Time there was when this mechanisation proceeded triumphantly with each new annexation, but the reverse process, going on all the time, is now become irresistible; larger and larger masses of men are getting thrown on the rubble of the outermost rings of the colonial circle. These men just do not exist either as market for foreign manufactures or as field of investment for foreign capital. To raise their consumption has always been a moral and a human need, it has now become an economic need of the free capitalist economies. This can only be done by improving the productive equipment of the retarded peoples and by so reshaping their internal distribution that larger masses may get a share at least of the increased production. We have found the west-European capitalisms wholly unable to face this issue of the productive and distributive equipment of the retarded peoples and the Japanese capitalism has also no solution except the short expedient of cheap-selling goods. The closed Russian economy is not yet concerned in an economic way with this world issue. It will now be our task to find out how far, if at all, the leading

capitalism of the U.S.A. may give a new twist to this paramount issue of world economy and, in what manner, the retarded peoples themselves, as mirrored in Hindustan, may attempt to refashion their productive and distributive equipment.

Second only to this danger of retarded equipment in two-thirds of the world is the danger of prevailing technics. Heavy and large-unit technics have been the mode of a world in which application of science to industry is the exclusive privilege of a few powerful nations. These same technics cannot be spread throughout the world without being in some measure an act of simple displacement. If Hindustan and China are to build shipyards and make turbines and textile machinery of their own, they will no doubt add to their own wealth and, in the process, may add somewhat to the wealth of the world but will also take away considerably from the productivity of the Japanese and British capitalisms that have so far supplied these needs for them. This, however, is a question which we may set down as insoluble in any foreseeable human future; no free nation would ever reduce its own wealth in order that another's may not be reduced nor would all the nations of the world agree to share equally in the fruits of human toil. Simple displacement in the application of prevailing technics to economy and, with it, displacements in the wealth of nations are therefore bound to occur.

The more serious aspect of the danger of prevailing technics lies elsewhere. It consists in the unequal application of science and mass-production to man's various demands. If it were possible to produce unlimited quantities of all types of goods, this danger would not exist. But that is impossible in any economy of any age or type. Even for such first demands as bread and milk, man has not yet found the means for their free municipal supply. Perhaps in a very intelligently managed economy under social ownership, he may make of bread and milk free supplies as of water, although in fixed equal quotas, but that too will take a very long time to come. The economy as a whole, whatever the ownership and management, must remain an economy of scarcity and price, unless a benevolent God gives us again a Kamdhenu or

places us back in Adam's paradise. We cannot escape the price mechanism. In capitalist economies, this price mechanism coupled with the needs of war has made for a block-use of science, not an all-round use. Science and mass-production explore in any period a special bit of the territory of men's demands, this particular demand becomes most profitable to supply and productive capacity in this sphere is pushed into great expansion. This is the basis of heavy mechanism, large-unit technics and mass-production. The Soviet economy of Russia has indeed eliminated the profit motive, but has taken over the technical basis of capitalism, its block-use of science, its lop-sided large-unit technics. The problem of technics is therefore independent of the form of ownership in an economy and must be tackled separately. Otherwise, it may make for specific industries, expanding and depressed by turn, for obstruction in changing over to better processes and materials, for foreign exploitation, for chimerical expansion, for concentrated destruction in time of war and, above all, for hopeless mal-distribution of social understanding and intelligence and for an unequal distribution of wealth. An economy with large-unit technics and block-use of science cannot achieve balance.

This problem of technics is not to be confused with the demand to return to a simple life with few wants. Nor is it to be taken as an advocacy for simple spatial decentralisation, now becoming quite a fashionable idea, in which all that is done is to break up prevailing technics into its several processes and to specialise these in different factories over different areas. It is as little to be taken for a denial of the machine or, of mechanical and electrical power; it is not an advocacy of handicrafts. All these aspects are diversionary offshoots of the current problems of technics; the basic problem is not to cut down the use of mechanical or electrical power but to make it available for production in the same small units in the manner it is today available for consumption in prosperous economies as light, ventilation or heating. This may increase the total wattage and horse-power in use, most certainly it would do so among the retarded peoples, and this power would be a kind of maid-of-all-work and, there would be corresponding

small-unit machines to process not one bit of an article but to produce the whole article. This will require an almost new beginning in science, a kind of flexible small-unit technics. It cannot be achieved at once, nor does it today seem at all possible in spheres such as those of turbine and automobile manufacture. But an economy must steadily aim to realise flexible technics wherever possible. Only so can an economy hope to achieve real and undepressing expansion and an equal distribution of wealth and social understanding. Only so can an economy acquire balance, in which man's various demands are orchestrated in a harmony of all-round application of science. So may perhaps culture and economy become joint partners in an enterprise of all-round and unhurried development in place of the order where culture is subject to an economy of piece-meal but fevered expansion. We have found privileged and imperialist west-Europe burdened too much with its own past of heavy mechanisation to take up flexible technics and Soviet Russia does not seem inclined to experiment with any new patterns of science. It will be our task now to find out if the U.S. has any contribution to make in this direction, more particularly, if the retarded peoples can summon up enough understanding and courage to show a new way of technics.

The third danger to world economy consists in private ownership and the corresponding forms of distribution. Critics of capitalism have fixed this danger in such well-known phrases as 'the clash between forces of production and relations of production' or 'the lag between production and purchasing-power' or consumption. Even those who reject the theoretical scaffolding of these phrases, namely, the labour theory of value and the theory of surplus value, continue to talk of the main malady of capitalism, as the clash between expansive production and contractive consumption. Actually, however, there is no reason why there should be contracting consumption even in a society where a considerable part of the annual wealth is usurped by the small class of capitalists and landowners. Such a differentiation of consumption will take place that luxury goods play an unduly large

part in the economy. The purchasing power of wage-earners and little men is restricted, not so of the owners, so that there will be a greater consumption of luxury goods and no necessary lag between production and consumption. It is, of course, possible that not all the earnings of capital are consumed and a large part of these are saved. These savings may be larger than what is possible to invest in further production. In such a case, there will be a falling-off in consumption. But, then, this will be under-investment or the inability of production to expand. Actually, this is how the apologists of capitalism, with the reason or unreason of its traditional critics, are styling the trade cycles and slumps. They maintain that, during periods when an old demand exhausts itself, a scientific impulse runs out and no major inventions take place, production cannot absorb savings. In other words, the forces of production are weakened. What thus started as the theory of low purchasing-power and contracting consumption in the hands of the traditional critics of capitalism has now made its full circle as the theory of under-investment and weakened forces of production in the hands of its upholders. This is the fate of all theories which contain a partial truth. For a time, they appear so true and brilliant, and then they are shown to be too wide a generalization.

We know the origin of these errors and how wrong it is to think of production, consumption and savings in abstract or as entities of an isolated capitalist economy. We have found them to be highly complex categories of a duality consisting of an inner capitalist circle and an outer colonial circle. The basis of capitalist development has lain in the clash between expanding equipment of the free economies and contracting equipment of the annexed economies, between imperial production and colonial production.\*

\* We must continue to avoid all questions relating to the general theory of value. If, in earlier parts of this study, the term, value, has been used, it was more with a view to explain Marx's economic thought. And where the conception of surplus value has been attempted to be set right, it has stood for nothing else but the source and extent of exploitation that takes place in a world of political and armed inequality. One of the most prolific subjects of economic enquiry is value and its measurement. But the results attained are hardly in keeping with the enormous labour

As such, the dangerous consequences of capitalist ownership cannot be fixed in such abstract phrases as the clash between forces of production and forms of distribution. These dangers have to be viewed separately. The most important among these is the level of consumption among two-thirds of the human race. It is a consequence of the productive and distributive equipment of the retarded peoples, which is itself a consequence of capitalist rule over the world. We may merely note it here as, one, the fact of colonial starvation and, two, the fact of blocked and falling consumption of quality goods of foreign manufacture.

spent on the subject. All the current theories of value are variations either of the labour theory or of the supply and demand theory. No formulation helps us to understand life's economic substance, for the formulation is rigid and eternal, while the substance is fluid and, historical. We have seen how Marx's socially necessary labour-hour as the measurement of value is all upside down in view of the imperial-colonial inequality in the application of science. The only thing really worthwhile in this theory is its ideal, its norm, that the labour-hour should be enabled to produce approximately equally, whether in Timbuctoo or in Sydney, and that it should be given approximately equal consumption. In like manner, the supply and demand theory, also in its form of marginal units and preference-scales, deliberately ignores the forced conditions within which the narrow act of buying and selling takes place. This theory is perhaps good enough as a principle of accounting and industrial management, but, as a mirror to value in changing economies based on changing forms of ownership and rule, it is hopelessly anaemic.. All this discussion has perhaps proceeded from a question that does not exist; what is value is like asking what is God. This may be a good enough question for metaphysics, but, for economics, the proper question relates to the price-mechanism through which a set of historical conditions translates itself into money-expressions. We must therefore avoid this discussion on value and retrieve from its debris the only article of value, that labour-hour, whatever its land, should be enabled to produce approximately equally and, whatever its form, should be assisted to consume approximately equally. For the rest, economics must study man as a producer under certain conditions and as a consumer under certain conditions. Our enquiry has related to the conditions of capitalist development. We have studied capitalism as a process in time. This has yielded certain results both as to the past and, as to the current tendencies that run into the future, but more so is it important as a method of enquiry. It may be possible, and perhaps worthwhile, to erect a logic of theoretical economics based on this method and the results, but that would be a vast and independent undertaking. Such a logic would presumably deal in detail with five entities, man in his economic dealings, productive equipment in its relative yield, world-relationships, political rule and economic ownership. Essentially these would be the two entities of labour and the productive equipment and they would act and react upon each other in the context of the three other entities.

When we confine our study to the distributive mechanism within the inner capitalist circle, recentmost development discloses an increasing emphasis on luxury consumption in contrast to the consumption of necessities. In the measure that capitalist economies are unable to expand or even to make full use of their available productive capacity, there take place unemployment, seasonal employment and price fluctuations that affect the wage-earners adversely. All this leads to under-consumption, both in quantity and quality, of the necessities of food, clothing and housing; around-the-poverty-line consumption in the case of nearly twenty percent of west-European population. It is hardly likely that, so long as the profit-structure and the world-relationships of empire-colony production remain intact, any schemes of minimum wage and social security may offer an enduring solution of this vexed question. There is also a certain amount of voluntary foregoing of necessities in favour of fashion or entertainment, as in the case of the west-European girl who would deny herself a meal a day for a whole week so that she could get her dress laundered for the next ball. One can depend on capitalist civilization to keep up such expenditure. Essentially, however, the enormous earnings of capital in the highly-capitalised economies must partly spend themselves in luxury, as this is encouraged by the lack of new fields of investment and by tax-policies and also, because, in its absence, there would be a further fall in production and slumps would grow acuter. The structure of over-capitalised profits in the context of contracting economies turns luxury-expenditure almost into a kind of national virtue. There are, of course, various grades of luxury-expenditure as of the low expenditure on necessities, but we may broadly describe this dangerous feature of capitalist distribution as the under-consumption of necessities and the growth of luxury-consumption.

But the distributive dangers of late-capitalism go deeper than the increased expenditure on luxury and the blocked expenditure on necessities. The enormous earnings of late-capitalism cannot be wholly reinvested nor spent, and the larger part of these must perforce remain idle. It must be remembered that these earnings

are the genii of a system by which the three west-European, U.S. and Japanese capitalisms meet almost wholly the world's demand in machine-tools, machines, transport and power engines and in a considerable range of manufactures. There is thus a concentric force that pushes the world's capitalist profits into these centres. But there is now no pushing back of these as profit-yielding new investments or manufactures. We are already familiar with the main argument of this increasing exhaustion of the external dynamic and we will yet have to straighten out some tangles; we will here confine ourselves to that aspect of the external dynamic which does not permit the reinvestment of its profits. Let us take one by one the fields of investment in the retarded economies. It would be a highly dangerous undertaking to equip retarded economies with the industry of machine-tools, for, whatever the initial investment, Western capitalisms may thereby choke the way to their own sales of machines and engines. Except under irresistible competitive and political pressure from a stronger cousin, no capitalism can ever want to sell machine-tools where it can sell their products, locomotives, textile-machines, turbines, printing-presses, autos, dynamos and so forth. It would be the turning of an annual demand into a twenty-yearly demand, if even that.\* Likewise, imperial capital except of the U.S. has got so mixed up with the sale of manufactures to retarded economies that it would seriously depress itself if it chose to sell machines instead or invest in them; this danger has got fixed into the well-known phrase of the clash between Birmingham and Lancashire. Only such machines have been installed in the retarded countries as followed a long and bitter fight or as were not competitive with manufactures. Imperial capital would have preferred to sell electricity rather than turbines, if it could somehow, on cables or elseway, ship the current with profit; it prefers to sell continually the electrical accessories of bulbs, radios, refrigerators and the like to a limited clientele rather than risk supplying them with the

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\* In the year 1942, of around 1000 per cent machine-tools expansion, the U.S. produced less than 2000 million dollars worth of machine-tools against a total machine production thirty to forty times as much. The U.S. machine-tools industry is likely to slump severely in the post-war period, for machine tools last 10 to 40 years.

machines to manufacture these. Along the entire gamut of machine-tools, machines, engines and manufactures, there is an internal competition and imperial capital therefore exerts its utmost to retain its areas of consumer's goods rather than seek investment in new fields of colonial production.

This rearguard and fear-stricken policy of retention is further encouraged by the fact that major capitalisms including the U.S. have little capacity to absorb an increased produce from retarded economies. Their demand for food and raw materials is not capable of great expansion and such developments as increased food production in England and the U.S. quest in Arabia in pursuance of its oil-conservation policy are likely to cancel each other in their effects on world trade. Unless, therefore, the breath of freedom fructifies the science and technics of retarded economies so as to produce raw materials or quality goods, the problem of increasing their food and their primary produce remains an internal question, without effect on world trade. To increase the food and cloth supply of two-thirds of mankind may be man's greatest economic task, but world-capitalism must remain indifferent to it as long as it offers no commodities for international exchange nor return on investments. The colonial masses have interested imperial capital as low-wage producers of limited raw materials, as rate-payers on its transport and public utility installations, as consumers of its manufactures and all this range of interest provides no scope for new investments. World capitalism has come to a dead end where new investments in the retarded economies threaten to choke off the source of its profits. The greatest distributive danger of late-capitalism is thus the enormous accumulation of unproductive savings and the continued depression of the colonial equipment.

Aside from the distributive dangers, late-capitalism continues the tradition of waste and deceit in production and, what is worse, deepens the element of chaos. As a principle we are already familiar with the industrial crisis and trade cycles that are as old as capitalism itself and we have also traced how the territorial blocking of the external dynamic has thrown it into a condition

of general crisis. But, even, in this condition, there is no gradual decline, but general disorderliness and ups and downs. Unable to find new profits in the industries of life's staple substance, the methods of capitalist production lead themselves profitably to new industries of tenuous living on a mass scale. It is not for nothing that the industries that could still greatly expand in the decade before the 1939 war were those of films, radio, alcohol and low-price fashions. Air-travel and televised entertainment seem now to be on the list and, though various pep foods and vitamins might yet effect some improvement, the staple demand that capitalism seems yet able to tackle and mass-produce is that of pre-fabricated houses. This will probably have been capitalism's last useful contribution, not to the world, but to its favoured peoples. Capitalism goes where it finds profits and this productive impulse must further exaggerate the importance of luxury-consumption, not alone of the high-income groups but also of the low-price mass-scale variety. In addition to this specific chaos of tenous production, the general chaos of the regulation of an entire economy by the blind motive of profit remains. This motive expands the supply of certain demands beyond supportable dimensions, there is a scramble to contract just as there was a scramble to expand, and the sensitiveness of markets assisted by highly speculative expectations produces serious ups and downs.

A serious fall in the use of late-capitalism's productive capacity makes of war an almost irresistible temptation. When demand in producers' goods and transport falls very much below the supply arrangements, there is a temptation to shunt to war; if steel, autos, electrical equipment and such like are not sufficiently purchasable for civilian use, their rate of consumption as tanks, jeeps, shots and shells can be feverishly fast. The insecurity emanating from the unemployed millions disappears for a time, the victor hopes for enlarged exports to retarded peoples at the expense of the defeated capitalisms and rationed consumption during the war serves to animate the post-war civilian demand just as it helps an imperial population to key up its war-effort to a total pitch. If the index of producers' investment goods in a

major capitalism is falling too far low, an experience to which late-capitalism must be increasingly subject, and if it is elsewhere shooting up so high that armaments alone could have done this, the cunning of rulers has discovered no means other than war and its preparations as the way out. The greatest danger of late-capitalist production to world economy is its general and special chaos and its escape-mechanism in war.

It is surprising how late-capitalism with its surfeit of savings and the comparative lack of new investment-fields can still preserve a handsomely positive rate of profits. Should not capital flow into the available fields of investment and increase earnings or bring down prices and expand production, although, in the process, the rate of profit may fall so low that the rate of interest reaches the zero or the near zero-level? Against this natural development are operating the forces of monopoly, such monopoly as is the result of concentrated production as well as that which depends on the political rule of one country over another. The monopoly in production operates because of the huge amount of capital necessary to start rival and risky enterprises in the industries of producers' goods, because of government assistance and of the national and international understandings of capitalists in the same industry. The monopoly in the foreign trade and investments of subject peoples can operate either nakedly or through the currency, tariff, purchase and other policies through which an imperial government can easily shut out inconvenient competitors. These monopolies, arising out of imperial rule as also out of heavy mechanisation, shut out rival capital, keep production low and prices high. Their aim is to maximise profits, while, if they had not existed, there would be expanding production, particularly among retarded peoples, at levels of nominal rate of interest. In fact, interest has about ceased its productive function in the major capitalisms. It still continues its distributive function of making the rich richer or of maintaining a rentier class. But its productive function is restricted to an expanding economy, when enterprises of old and new wants are continually added and interest serves as a regulator. In an over-capitalised economy that can-

not further expand, interest is a deadweight and an obstruction to production. That the monopolies keep it up artificially prevents in particular the expansion of colonial equipment and does not allow late-capitalism to face its distributive dangers. But such an artificial maintaining of interest is bound to lead to a clash between capital that is being used and capital that is idle, capital that is tending towards extinction and capital that is artificially propped up to continue. This monopolistic maintaining of interest and profits as a productive factor in late-capitalist economies is thus a serious interference with normal development and the source and aggravation of the many dangers to which world economy is subjected.

The dangers of private ownership in late-capitalism may now be enumerated as, in the sphere of colonial economies,\* the fact of starvation, the fact of falling consumption of foreign quality goods, the fact of enforced depression of the productive equipment and, in the sphere of developed economies, the fact of under-consumption of necessities, the fact of growth of luxury-consumption, the fact of unproductive savings, the fact of chaotic and war-making production, the fact of monopolist continuance

\* The concepts, "retarded economies," "colonial economies," "outer circles," on the one hand and "major capitalisms," "imperial economies," "capitalist economies," on the other have been here used more or less synonymously. It might appear somewhat extravagant to lump together Hindustan, China, Iran, Sinhal, Misre or Congo under one category, in view of their varying political status. But, on the deciding issue of capitalist development, their status is similar, that of a retarded, colonial equipment which acts as an external dynamic to the major capitalisms. Without a doubt, there are two main economic camps in the world today and the basis of the division lies in the use of science and technics and in the yield and fruits of the labour-hour. Such an economy as that of South Africa is obviously colonial, with this difference that there is a very numerous middle class in the shape of the South African whites. The Australian economy, however, has slipped out of the colonial field, not because it is rapidly industrialising itself, but because the free application of science to its agriculture and sheep-rearing has enabled it to enter the world market with a raised status of the labour-hour. Nevertheless, it has certain mixed features, not the least important of which is its imperialistic exclusion of new settlers from a land, almost twice as big as Hindustan with less than 1/40th of its population, and a corresponding dependence on a stronger capitalism, that used to be Britain but is now changing into the U.S.

of interest in an unexpansive economy. Some of these facts overlap each other and, in particular, the productive equipment of the retarded peoples. West-Europe has been found to be wholly unable to overcome any of these dangers with the result that its classes are being transformed into castes and its economies are being relegated. By the abolition of private ownership, Russia has eliminated such of these dangers as have arisen in the inner circle of late-capitalism but, by virtue of being a self-sufficient closed economy, has remained unconcerned with the outer circle of two-thirds of mankind. It will now be our task to find out how far the U.S., as the leader of late-capitalism, and Hindustan, as the mirror and leader of the retarded economies, are likely to overcome these dangers in a constructive way.

Can the leader of late-capitalism assist in reviving the productive equipment of the retarded peoples? In one essential, it is differently placed from its west-European or Japanese cousins. While these have acquired a pervading interest in retarded economies so that they can sell their machines only at the expense of their manufactures and their machine-tools at the expense of their machines, U.S. capitalism has no such burdensome past except to some extent in the American hemisphere. Its trade in manufactured goods with the retarded peoples of Asia and Africa does not play a vital role in its economy. It is free to sell them machines and machine-tools. It is thus unfettered enough to transact such trade and investments with the retarded economies as would increase the yield of their labour-hour. This introduces a new factor in the fortunes of capitalism. The prospect is opened out of restoring, perhaps temporarily, the imperial dynamic, which has ceased to expand with the enmeshing of the whole world and which has started contracting due to colonial poverty and obstruction. In making such sales and investments to retarded economies as they need and not as are forced on them by west-European and Japanese capitalisms, U.S. economy can develop their productive capacity, can assist them in producing a very much larger volume of goods. There is thus a theoretical possibility that capitalism may yet be able to expand

through re-equipping the colonial economies, where alone expansion is still possible.

Against this theoretical possibility must be set the peculiarly self-sufficient character of U.S. economy, which distinguishes it from that of its west-European and Japanese cousins. The U.S. has much to give, but it can take very little. It is the leading producer in the world not only of producer's goods and manufactures but also of food and raw materials. The other capitalisms are great consumers of food and processors of raw materials extracted from retarded economies; they thus maintain the gigantic town-village relationship between themselves and two thirds of mankind. U.S. economy has worked out this relationship largely within its own frontiers, beaten it into a kind of balance in the use of science, so that its great industrial production is matched by an equally great agricultural and mining production. The U.S. may be willing to sell machine-tools for the manufacture of locomotives or small dynamos and also it may be wanting to increase its export in radios or fountain-pens; in this quest, it would want an expansive economy in the retarded areas, but what would it take in exchange, not food-crops, not fruit, not meat, not cotton, not iron, not petrol, no manufacture of mass-use, not any kind of the staple goods that are the bulk of world-trade. U.S. can give, but it cannot take; this hamstrings the leader of late-capitalism in its effort to shunt world-trade to the new rails of two-way expansion. If other capitalisms are unable to expand world economy for fear that this would hurt them, the leader of late-capitalism may find that, while it had little to fear, its hopes were also ill-founded. It is, however, possible to exaggerate the inability of U.S. economy to take, as it appears to us in the immediate present. With an expanding equipment in the retarded areas, the furs of Sinkiang, the silks of China, the brocades of Hindustan may come into such mass-use of the U.S. population as to become articles of bulk-trade.\*

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\* It wouldn't be such a fanciful thing if the U.S. handed out scrips to its citizens for travel and stay in those areas from which it would not otherwise receive payment. Such travelships could be granted on the close

It is also possible that the retarded peoples, through their scientific ingenuity and collective effort, may yet produce new goods and raw materials to enliven world trade, but that can only come out of their free endeavour and no outside agency can awaken it.

The leader of late-capitalism would, in addition, be unable to use to the full its capacity to re-equip the retarded economies. To U.S. has fallen the leadership of an economic system that has reached maturity and, as such, it would be unable to interfere too much with the existing arrangements. The west-European capitalisms, ably supported and rivalled by the Japanese, have knit up the larger part of the retarded world into a political rule that guarantees the working out of the town-village relationship. The U.S. must accept these different imperialisms as so many agents of stability and, when it is not at war with one or the other, it must work in collaboration with them. There may be an under-current of hostile competition, there may at times be bitter clashes and wars may not always be avoidable, but, as a general measure, the U.S. must accept these imperialisms as stabilising agents in an otherwise uncertain and unforeseeable world. The retarded peoples themselves may hold quite another view of what would really constitute a stable world, but the leader of late-capitalism would need an incalculable courage to experiment with a stability that is yet to emerge. Calculably, therefore, the U.S. would have to compromise with imperialistic trade policies and its supply of

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of secondary studies or marriage or some such general occasion applying to all citizens and the internal arrangements between the U.S. government and the investors and exporters would not be impossible to make. It is however doubtful if even the U.S. could summon up sufficient courage to do this for the mass of its citizens. Likelier it is that the U.S. would want to become monopolist, the collector of old treasures and the user of new luxuries of the wide world. That travelships or treasures would raise the U.S. so infamously above the rest of the world in luxury and in what is known as culture is a moral fact with which we are not here concerned. But, while we may think out all the possible ways in which U.S. could receive payment from other economies, let us not forget that the debts and reparations owed by post-1919 Europe were defaulted, partly because Britain and Germany were not over-particular about their credit, but more so because the U.S. had no use for their manufactures or raw materials.

producer's goods to retarded economies would be limited. In addition, U.S. capitalists would prefer to transact their sales and investments with groups of capitalists among the retarded peoples, rather than encourage a socialist reconstruction. Although this is a question which we will yet examine in greater detail, it is extremely doubtful if the re-equipping of retarded economies can be carried out by their capitalist classes.

But U.S. economy will be forced, to whatever extent it can, to expand its dealings with retarded economies. Its state of continued slump will force it to do so. It cannot continue on a basis which compelled its index of producer's goods to fall from 100 in 1927 to 87 in 1937 and 54 in 1938, and certain intervening years were worse, while that of Britain rose to 133 in 1937 and 199 in 1938. Not all of America's fall or Britain's rise could be explained by the arms industries; a considerable part of it was due to the same conditions, which made the rate of industrial profits in the U.S. fall from 12·8 per cent in 1929 to 2 per cent in 1932, 6·7 per cent in 1937 and 3·8 per cent in 1938, while that in Britain was maintained at the comparatively steady levels of 10·5 per cent, 8·5 per cent, 11·2 per cent and 12 per cent in the same years. It is significant that the majority of U.S. manufacturing companies registered negative rates of profit for the years 1931 and 32. The U.S. cannot fail to notice that Britain is able to steady its fall by the use of the external dynamic, which, although deteriorating, is still capable of providing replacement orders and limited quality consumption. U.S. economy, however, has completely exhausted its internal dynamic and also such as it could get from the American hemisphere, with the result that, if it is to save itself, it must hit out for an external dynamic, which may be enlarged while being used. Recent developments are arousing a kind of vigour, albeit naive, that aspires to cope with this task.\*

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\* Let us first acquaint ourselves with the vast increase in U.S. productive capacity that has taken place as a result of the war. A Federal Reserve Board index places industrial production in 1943 at 2·4 times the average of 1935-39. It is thus roughly, three-quarters over again of the 1929 production. Less than 30 per cent of this production is for civilian use, while the rest is war-goods, which have gone to different parts of the world. What will happen to this enormous productive capacity when it is

With regard to the productive equipment of retarded peoples, we may now sum up the U.S. position as the absolute need for an enlarging external dynamic and the willingness to supply producers' goods on the one hand and, on the other, the necessity to

reconverted to peace-use? It will naturally burst to make use of the world-routes that it discovered in war.

Quite surprising are the opinions expressed by U.S. businessmen, chief among whom is the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. He is reported to have said sometime in 1944 that the only way to achieve an expansionist economy in the U.S. is to supply producers' goods, capital and skill to the backward economies. Without awareness of the basis of capitalist development, the U.S. chamber president has, through sheer eclectic observation, come to a conclusion to which our analysis of capitalism has brought us. Mr. Eric Johnston also talked to the British people in October, 1943 on the function of capital, "in its British-American intermingling, it shall include an intermingling with whatever capital may volunteer itself in the regions of new investments. And, finally, it will alive and alert on its own business feet." In the course of a revealing conversation with the chairman of the British Imperial Chemicals, who thought that the American anti-monopoly legislation stood in the way of a wide Anglo-American international understanding, Mr. Johnston maintained that American capital still believed in individualism and competition and that even a concern like the General Motors could not depend on State-action to pull it through in peace-time. British capital is too wise to be able to rejoice; American capital is too innocently robust to recoil. We are not here concerned with who is right, whether or not the prospect of a producers' goods industry in Hindustan or China should frighten the Americans as much as it already frightens the British. And we have already indicated the severe limitations upon American attempt to develop backward economies, which are likely to turn it into more talk than activity. The robustness, nevertheless, stands out with which Americans are trying to grasp that the only way to achieve an expansionist world economy is to supply producer's goods to the retarded economies.

In this connection, it would be worthwhile to disabuse our minds of the complex issues raised to elaborate the American attitude towards retarded peoples. Much is made of the Declaration of Independence and the articles of the Constitution or even of the American's inability to wear a dinner jacket while dining alone in the tropics and these spiritual and psychological traits are adduced to prove that U.S. citizens are opposed to imperialism. It is not yet our scope to examine the values of spiritual and psychological qualities in human affairs, although we may be permitted to doubt how far such qualities can withstand the pressure of other forces in international dealings. It is with-these other forces, in so far as they are economic, that we are here concerned. Incidentally, the Russian economy enjoys a position similar to that of the American, in so far as neither has acquired such a vested interest in the consumption of retarded peoples as to be unable to supply them with producers' goods. The difference comes in, where the Americans are forced in their own interest to exploit their position, while the Russians have yet a lot to do with their internal expansion.

collaborate with existing imperialisms for being agents of stability and the comparative inability to receive a large volume of goods from other economies. It is easy to see that this is an exceedingly divided position. The only positive results that may be expected from it are some displacements of the existing volume of world-trade\* and some expansion of the retarded economy of China as is not politically enslaved. The pressure of U.S. economy may also compel its capitalist-imperialist cousins to permit or undertake a very limited expansion of the colonial equipment. For the rest, the U.S. will play a pervasively obstructive role. If it will obstruct the west-European and Japanese capitalisms in stabilising the colonial peoples as the untouchables of the capitalist system, it will also obstruct the retarded peoples in availing such opportunities as make for a sharp break with the past. That it will thereby be unable to prevent successive fall in the use of its own productive capacity or genuinely expand the productive equipment of the retarded peoples can be said without hesitation. It will not have provided a positive dissipation of the severest danger to world economy. How long it will be able to delay the hardening of declining capitalism into a world-wide caste-structure or the advent of a wholly liberated world economy is another question. The world-index of production and its tendencies would show that either the one or the other must happen well before our century is out. Capitalism must either harden into a world-hierarchy of castes or it must be blown up with the advent of liberated economies and the U.S. will meanwhile obstruct either solution and be generally negative. In its recentmost development with regard

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\* In an earlier chapter, we have seen how the war is causing shifts in world trade and productive capacities and how this, combined with other factors, is causing the relegation of west-European economy. There seems hardly a doubt that the U.S. will try to make full use of these shifts for its post-war economy; its world-shipping, air-traffic, trade in machines and goods, foreign investments are bound to grow at the expense of the west-European economies. At the same time, this growth will be unequal to the needs of American economy, so that, inspite of the continental shifts in favour of the U.S., the major fact of colonial poverty and obstruction in conjunction with the heavy mechanisation of capitalist economies will be there to cause the relegation of U.S. economy. That the process of this relegation will be different and will produce different consequences has already been indicated.

to retarded equipment, U.S. economy is showing a tendency to divided interests and delaying action. The leader of late-capitalism has, thus, about already relinquished its leadership of the colonial peoples; will they submit by becoming increasingly starved helots of a declining capitalism or will they rise into manhood?

The technical danger in the U.S. can be assessed from the fact that, while the index of total production fell from 100 in 1929 to 73 in 1938, the output per man-hour rose from 100 in the earlier to 116 in the later year. Scientific and organizational improvements are continually increasing the yield of the labour-hour, but there cannot obviously be a corresponding and unceasing increase in the production of known goods. The hours of work must therefore be reduced or men thrown out of work and it is usually the second alternative which materialises. The shock of continuous improvement in the known lines of heavy mechanisation and mass-produced goods can only be observed if scientific vigour can at the same time create new mass-wants and the means to satisfy them. Aside from the question whether each continuous expansion of wants is desirable, the U.S. experience shows that it is no longer possible. The great new line of which much is being made today is air-traffic. According to a U.S. statement, the air-craft industry and the traffic personnel would in coming years give work to anywhere between 6 per cent and 10 per cent of the entire population. This appears a highly inflated estimate, but, were it true, it could only be effected largely at the expense of rail and ship traffic. As such, it would not be the creation of a wholly new work. Although scientific vigour is abundantly improving known lines and synthetics, there is not adequate evidence that U.S. economy could match it by hitting out into wholly new venues. This will cause a forced depression in technical progress from one industry to another; there will be no unhurried and balanced use of science and stability will not come.

U.S. science is, however, not oblivious to the problem of flexible and small-unit technics. The war has, for instance, given it the jeep. This is a kind of maid-of-all-work; it can plough the fields, furnish power for milking, in addition to being

an auto. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has calculated that the jeep can do the job of a heavy tractor with the petrol consumption of a half gallon to the acre, in place of the tractor's 3·3 gallons. There can be no better illustration than the jeep of the new technics that we must strive for; all-purpose, small capitalisation, low running expenses. In like manner, U.S. exporters are reported to be busy perfecting small dynamos for use in retarded economies, which would cost 15 dollars to the horse-power in place of the former 40 dollars. All these experiments in small-unit technics are, indeed, offshoots of an economy that promises to remain predominantly large-scale and heavily mechanised. The U.S. can no more make a sharp break with traditional technics than west-Europe can. Nevertheless, these experiments and others being made on the uses of low-watt units may inspire retarded economies to base their industrial renovation on a purposeful striving after small-unit technics.

U.S. science will yet add to the amenities of life, it will give gas that heats and also cools, it will give new materials like plastics and new fibres to wear, new drugs and surgery and, of course, new weapons of war when needed and, on the whole, it will make life more comfortable, at least, for the majority of its citizens. But, beyond grazing the problem of small-unit technics and thus maturing it slightly, U.S. science will not have provided a new technical base that can sustain a more purposeful production, distribution and defence.

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## AN ASIAN POLICY

From Rome to Honolulu is one world. From Tokyo to Cairo and beyond is another. Already in Tokyo, housefronts are dirty and Asian, but Hongkong in the East just as Cairo in the West is the first true symbol, of clothes drying on projected iron-rods, of tattered gunny-bags making do as screens, of ill-fed and diseased children, of fouled humanity sprawling on road-sides. Or a round-the-world adventure, after six weeks of America and Europe with their wholesome bodies however sick they may be of war and all else, I felt like committing a crime in Hongkong, in this Asia of teeming millions, of dirty and impotent millions.

All Asia is prostrate with the common disease of poverty, and it is aggravated in that Asians know so little of one another. Indians in recent times have played truant to history and tradition by turning their face towards the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic and the misery and glory of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific have been unknown to them. All Asia must first understand and sympathise with itself and then, if possible, evolve a common policy.

A major weakness of Asia is the existence of politics of religion or caste or race or language. Everyone is familiar with this weakness but it is not confined to India. It extends all over Asia. Even such a country as Indonesia, which only recently won its freedom, is a victim to politics by religion. A fanatical Muslim party by the name of Darul Islam is in rebellion and has taken up arms against the Indonesian State. Even the Government of Indonesia is being carried on today by a coalition of which another party of Muslims, the Masjumi, is the dominant partner. There is little difference between these two Muslim parties in their declared aims, but the one is fanatical and in armed rebellion, while the other is comparatively liberal and in office and both are pledged to the establishment of a Muslim State.

A little more to the north, Malay presents itself as a very great example of what can be but is not for the reason that Asian masses are still motivated by politics of religion, of race and of

#### AN ASIAN POLICY

language. Singapore is a great city and the hinterland is equally great. The Indian Ocean meets here the Pacific Ocean. India knows very well that where two rivers meet, there stands a pilgrimage; where two oceans meet and where peoples of various races, have met in the past, there should stand a pilgrimage because there is nothing more exciting in human history than the meeting of races and of peoples. Men and women of remote Indian ancestry and Indonesian and Chinese ancestry, have met and fought and loved one another and given birth to what is today Malaya. This is a great adventure in human living but what is the situation today? Malaya with its 2½ millions of Malayas and another 2 millions and more of Chinese ancestry and a little over half a million of recent Indian ancestry is provided with a wonderful opportunity. The meeting of peoples continues and Europeans are the latest arrivals. Malaya can give birth to happy new men if it so desires. But politics by race and religion and language are tearing them apart. Suspicion and distrust are loosening their relationships and they are unable to organise a strong political party that may give notice to Britain and the race politicians and also to the communists not to corrupt Malayan affairs and achieve a Malayan republic so as to deal equal treatment to everybody, no matter what his or her ancestry is. At the moment, however, politics by religion and language and race are enabling Britain to continue her rule and Russia to attempt a replacement.

To the north of India is Nepal. If the Nepali genius could somehow cut across existing barriers of the Gurkha, Newar, Tarai and other multifarious folks, Nepal could present a glorious example of common living.

West Asia is continually being weakened because of religious politics. That is the condition prevailing in Pakistan and India and over most of West Asia. The potential strength of Asian masses for economic betterment, for a more peaceful and good neighbourly feeling, is not being realised because they are divided into groups, distrustful of and hostile to one another. All the world except Asia, and South Asia in particular, has rid itself of

this poison of religious, race or language fanaticism that corrodes a state within and fouls its relations with neighbouring States.

Another weakness of Asia is the lack of integrated thinking and of discernment. Capitalist and communist parties have undoubtedly an outlook. I will not go into a detailed examination of their outlook, although one may add that the unconcealed capitalist outlook is not very relevant to Asia, because there is and can be no worth-while party to express it. There are, however, Asian political parties which have no policies and no outlook. In their thinking and expression, such parties flit about like butterflies from capitalism to socialism, and the existing arrangement of landlords and capitalists continues. It is precisely such parties that have got control over a large part of Asia, barring, of course, Japan, Burma, the Communist areas and certain West Asian States which have a definitely feudal outlook. Asian statesmen talk socialism and act capitalism; their phrases are radical and their acts are conservative.

As examples of absence of integrated policies and social philosophy, India and Indonesia stand supreme. Following a precedent set up by Sun Yat Sen in neighbouring China, the effect of which is now all too well-known, the President of the Indonesian Republic has laid down five pillars of state policy. An Indian may be excited to learn that these are known as Panchshilas in Indonesia, thereby revealing a kinship even in language over certain parts of Asia. President Soekarno named these five pillars as nationalism, internationalism, social justice, worship of God and democratic representation. Much can be said about worship of God but wisdom may also lie in keeping quiet, and democratic representation has a somewhat fixed meaning without danger of equivocation. The other three pillars of state policy are, however, far too vague and meaningless and provide every shade of interpretation to suit the whim and the moment.

The Indian example is no better. In four years of freedom, the prime minister of India and the ruling party have made five attempts to define the supreme objective of the Indian State.

Starting from the cooperative Commonwealth, they are back again to it, but have in the process taken their stride over the concepts of a classless and casteless society, of a State without isms and of the welfare state. This whimsicality could perhaps have endeared, if there were a fixed meaning behind any of the concepts experimented with. The welfare state has indeed acquired a meaning in the Western world, but that is so irrelevant to India as to turn it into a hoax. India and all Asia have still to produce very vastly with a State whose policies and outlook are aimed at such a production, before they can take up the distributive functions of the welfare state and that is a long time yet to come. And the concept of a classless and casteless society is a mere beguiler without an accompanying structure of property relationships.

This is no time for *laissez-faire*, at least not for Asia. Tossed by stormy seas, the ship of Asian States needs, as no European State has ever needed, a compass of a comprehensive social and economic outlook to steer its course or else the crew will continue to mutiny and the captain to yell. I do not know of a single Asian country which after freedom, has been able to increase its production and allay poverty. If Asian governments and countries are unable to expand their production in agriculture and industry, that is sure enough ground to believe that they lack totally in any kind of integrated policies and outlook.

Lack of policies and integrated thinking on the part of government parties is aggravated by the lack of discernment on the part of the people. The peoples of Asia do not distinguish between grades of certain happenings. They make no difference between living in comfort and living in luxury, between politicians as have wide social contacts and others who misuse these for acquiring influence or money, between a free social relationship of man and woman and vulgarity of conduct and breach of promise and action that does not shirk from misusing party or state funds for bestowing presents on wife, sister or sweetheart. These are absolutely different gradations. A line must be drawn and Asia must recapture the concept of limited behaviour or grades of action. Lack of policies on the part of Asian governments and

lack of discernment on the part of Asian masses have led us into a fanciful situation.

The third major weakness of Asian politics is the disease of the big man who is in reality a small man. The big man is very clever at making phrases or action as though on the stage but his achievements in the internal as well as external affairs are empty. All over Asia one finds the very frequent appearance of such big men, phrasemakers and stage actors. The big man who likes to go about with five stars on his jacket without being an armyman, who wants to make wonderful phrases on one occasion or the other, who can jump into a crowd and try to be some kind of a non-official policeman, who punishes corruption in speech and consorts with the corrupt, who is continually resigning and as continually talking of his indispensability, who tongue lashes the capitalist and the landlord and lets them make easy money, who turns into a dock-labourer or a digger for a few moments is totally unable to clothe his phrases with reality. All over Asia, phrasemaking and stage acting are increasingly becoming a substitute for action and most people are being fed on them. I do not dislike theatre. A little bit of drama, a colourful life can, on some occasions, hasten the development of good things but drama should never be a substitute for action or life. Only when action and drama are supplementary to one another and help each other that one can create activity in a people but a total neglect of the act and a continual emphasising of the drama obtains in Asia so that there is a lot of empty noise and no achievement.

The fourth Asian weakness is the emergence of a new middle class with expensive tastes and habits. Asian countries have always had some kind of middle classes. India too had and has. I will not go into an examination of these middle classes. Some of them have tried to preserve simplicity of living and others have in the course of their advancement under foreign rule tried to imitate the European in his habits and dress. Most native tycoons and princes are scandalously expensive. But, with the emergence of various Asian countries into freedom a new middle class is appearing, of politicians and bureaucrats. It is quite revealing

to notice that men and women who have come into power either by virtue of a revolution or have adapted themselves from foreign-controlled into native-controlled bureaucrats try to give themselves a social and political importance by trying to live like the European with the same kind of home and furniture, clothes, food and habits. Expenditure then becomes excessive. The European manages with very much less in his native surroundings but Asian politicians and bureaucrats who try to live like Europeans necessarily become expensive in their habits and tastes. Japan is the only Asian country where politicians and bureaucrats try to live in houses of two or three rooms or may be four. Their art of living and their tradition is such that they can make out of three or four rooms what we in India would be unable to make of 10 or 20 rooms. The old Kyoto palace amazes one at the rich variety of brooks and rocks and bridges and various kinds of plants and mosses and number of bamboo-made rooms called palaces but, after traversing the whole length of the palace and coming out of the gate through which one entered, one finds what a colossal hoax has been played because the compass is so small but artistry has made it look so immense.

With the exception of the Japanese, all over Asia, a new middle class of politicians and bureaucrats is emerging with very expensive European tastes and habits which is disastrous because that leads to all kinds of complications. I do not know whether one can ever do away with the middle class. But, for the time being, whether socialist or communist, whether capitalist or any other system, a government has to have a middle class to run it and, therefore without using empty phrases about destruction of the middle class, such classes would do well to examine the Japanese method of being able to live economically without incurring a lot of expenditure. Ten years ago, the salary of the Prime Minister of Japan used to be one thousand rupees and the lowest salary used to be about Rs. 150/- to Rs. 200/-. Even today this ratio continues. In America too the land of plenty and prosperity and great wealth, the margins of inequality in that country are very much less than in India or in any other Asian country. The

driver of a locomotive in America gets a salary of between 7000 and 8000 dollars whereas the manager of a big industrial enterprise would consider himself lucky if he got a salary of between 10,000 and 15,000 dollars. The margins in Asia are far too colossal so that I am inclined to make a general observation that the poorer a country, the greater is its inequality and the richer a country, the more equal is it likely to be. Poverty and inequality seem to go hand in hand.

Seven or eight years ago, the government of Thailand issued a decree that no woman who did not have her hair cut or her face painted and who did not use lipstick would be permitted to travel first-class. It was a decree penalising all women who did not powder or paint their faces. In Japan too, all women from duchess to skivvy look almost alike. One of the tests which I will lay down for the advancement of Asia, shall be the looking alike in dress and appearance of maid and mistress. Powder and paint, a trait of the new middle class, aid in this. The man who invented the gun made the very big claim that he was achieving equality between a six-foot and a five-foot man. I wonder whether his great claim has been realised. Some countries and peoples have been able to obtain the atomic bomb and others have been left behind in the stage of the gun and the revolver. With greater reason, one could almost make the claim that powder and lipstick have in Europe and America and also in some parts of Asia achieved equality between one woman and another. Wide differences can still be achieved, but a very expensive make-up is hardly an atom-bomb to the revolver of a simple but tasteful cosmetic. When the new ways of the new middle class are not too expensive, a little experiment would do no harm. This was only an illustration and no opinion on the absolute value of the female's war-paint.

Finally, the last great weakness of Asia is politics by assassination and government by terror. There is just no knowing when some body will be shot dead, some street car is burnt down, some rebellious parties or groups take the law in their own hands and try to overthrow the state by using weapons. All over Asia this

situation exists. In the past 4 or 5 decades, west-Europe and America have had very few cases of assassination and government firing to record whereas in every country of Asia some act of political assassination and armed revolt or government repression is continually taking place. No country of the continent can prosper or better itself if it continually disrupts itself through acts of such internal violence. Political parties have also been trying to disrupt their countries by acts of terrorism and sabotage. In Burma, a party of separatism, which believes that the Karens must have a separate state and, similarly, the communists of Burma who wish to set up a particular kind of government have been in armed revolt. Karens and Communists of Burma have been carrying on simultaneously a violent warfare against the Burmese Republic for 3 years. In similar fashion, Darul Islam has taken up arms against the Indonesian Republic and simultaneously, the communists of Indonesia have also revolted against the Indonesian republic. All over Asia, politics by assassination and government by terror goes on. Asian Governments are more inclined than any other to put down their opponents illegally and ruthlessly regardless of any democratic laws. Similarly, Asian political parties, whether they are of the religious variety or the communist variety, are ever ready to jump into an armed affair against their states and republics.

I must point out a disturbing phenomenon in this connection. Few Asians are worried by any concern or anxiety as to what would happen to Asia should evil acts go on. Asians have to some extent so degenerated that they are unable to see the wider implications of an act and confine their attention to the narrower results of what would happen in the immediate present. Their emotions have been so fouled because of this passionate rousing of hate or love on the basis of language, religion, caste or race, that an act pleases although the extent of its crime may be enormous and displeases if what one considers ones narrow self-interest is impaired thereby. On the basis of such an emotional foundation, there is no hope for Asia. Only when Asian masses have begun to feel that evil acts which disrupt the very foundation for

any kind of existence or progress must not arouse sympathy that there can be a rational basis for political action.

The major diseases from which Asia suffers may now be named as: (1) The existence and growth of politics based on religion, caste or race; (2) the prevalence of government by repression or terror and opposition politics by armed rebellion or assassination; (3) the rise of a new middle class of bureaucrats and politicians with expensive European habits; (4) the unquestioned leadership of phrasemakers and stage actors whose deeds are negligible; (5) the absence of a social philosophy and comprehensive policies and programmes. The fifth disease is the root cause of the preceding two diseases and also gives powerful nourishment to religious and terroristic politics. In order, therefore, to overcome this crisis of the Asian mind and give it an anchor in a working social philosophy, an awareness of the main political currents and their behaviour becomes necessary.

The big political forces operating to-day in Asia, and throughout the world, are the capitalist and the feudal forces, the communist force, and the socialist force. These three are world forces. Asia has a fourth force in religious or racial politics which has been liquidated almost entirely in Europe and America. In addition to these three world forces and the aberration of religious or racial politics, there are a large number of men and women who have begun to feel that all politics are empty and meaningless because a political party starts out by professing very honestly certain high ideals of equality and liberty but ends up in some kind of a tyranny and inequality. There is a certain difference in the quality of this attitude as it exists in Asia, Europe and America. In Asia, scepticism is born out of indignation, bitterness and resentment, out of a feeling that some people who were deeply trusted had betrayed and played foul and also out of a belief that men and women, no matter what political parties they belong to, are inclined to betray because of their personal self-interest. This is the Asian feeling. The European and American feeling is of a different order. They seem to be arriving at the belief that, in spite of the best efforts of men and

women to re-order human affairs, in spite of the fact that they may be thoroughly honest in carrying out their professions, there is some hard stubborn element in life which makes it impossible for men and women to realise their faith and their ideals. Such doubters are no cynics but are made of stern stuff that will take part continually in any movement for the betterment of mankind though with a laugh. They know that cathedrals and palaces are replaced by secretariats but their passion for freedom has not died out. Asian cynicism born out of a sense of betrayal must be combatted by purposeful action, both while in opposition and in government. Asian youth may at the same time imbibe, at least somewhat, of the world feeling that an effervescent enthusiasm against temples and palaces coupled with an equal ardour for secretariats is not quite the right thing for mankind. Even after the last king is hung with the entrails of the last priest or the last capitalist with those of the last landlord, man will not yet be free.

A primary test of the three major ideologies dominating the Asian and the world scene is their respective behaviour to the curse of separatist bigotry. Communists and communalists have simultaneously been rebelling against the Burmese and Indonesian Republics for the last four years. Again events of the past four years disclose that the religious and the communist reactionary revolt simultaneously against their various states in order to carry out their nefarious designs. Communism considers the existing society as thoroughly evil and aggressive. It wants to destroy that society. Whoever is seeking to destroy it is therefore to some extent welcome, particularly when a disturbed state enables communists to pursue their objectives. Therefore, Burma as well as Indonesia, two of India's great neighbours from whom she may expect a great deal, not only in the reconstruction of Asia, but also in the achievement of the better world, are living examples of a cordial alliance, whether conscious or unconscious, between communalist and communist reactionaries who have been trying to disintegrate their states for the past four years. To suggest that communism can end religious fanaticism is to neglect

wilfully and arbitrarily whatever has been happening in South Asia. The communist convert disregards events that take place in the process because his eyes are fixed on the ultimate goal, and he may think it odd that his doctrine should be accused of perpetuating religious or racial fanaticism. To the objective student, however, who can neither be sure of communist victory nor neglect to view the historical stream as a whole, the conspiracy of communism with separatist bigotry, at least in South Asia, and all its disastrous consequences are abundantly clear.

With regard to the behaviour of capitalism to religious reaction everybody knows that the men of God and the men of wealth find it very easy to combine, and that, when either set are attacked, the other rush to their rescue. Whenever anti-capitalist forces rise in a country, and that is happening all over Asia today, capitalism does not hesitate to take help from religious or racial separatism. It would prefer to operate through a secular and national party, when such a one is effectively available. Capitalists, however, hesitate as little as the communists from conspiring with the separatists when their rule is imperilled. In any case, their way of life and thought is totally powerless to remove the separatist poison from the Asian body-politic. A special feature of South Asian political groups, more or less capitalist in their outlook, to think narrowly and nationally on this issue, is peculiarly hurtful. South and West Asia contain over a dozen states, whose predominant religions vary and they border upon one another. This is the world's poorest area and also most quarrelsome in religion. The internal security and strength of most of these states is impaired through religious strife, which also extends into and fouls their inter-Asian relationships.

The Indo-Pakistan question, for instance, is not alone an internal Hindu-Muslim question for India or Pakistan, nor only a question of international relationships between two neighbours; it also profoundly affects the total South and West Asian relationships of Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Iran, Syria and others with one another and jointly. Capitalism is however unable to evolve a common Asian policy against fanaticism of race,

religion or language. This leads to a general weakening of South and West Asia with temptations to the Atlantic and the Soviet camps to interfere. Most Asian politicians in power or near it are inclined not to take sides on the Indo-Pakistan question on account of a fancy belief that if they do take up a stand, they would displease one or the other. Similarly, Indian politicians also refuse often to take a stand on an Asian issue out of a similarly unreasonable desire not to embarrass or displease. If all Asian countries started thinking in that way, a narrow national selfish way, that they shall not displease any of the combatant parties and therefore shall refuse to take a stand, they shall encourage separatist and fanatical politics to continue their hold over the Asian mind. Asia must unitedly cleanse itself from all fanatical politics of religion, race or language.

I regret to add that some Asian socialists have imbibed this capitalist outlook of non-embarrassment. I do not suggest that Asian governments should start interfering with the internal affairs of their neighbours. But Asian politicians and political parties should combine, such as may, to achieve an attitude of mind that will pronounce judgment on and work against forces of bigotry.

An essential to such an attitude is a revolution in the idea of citizenship. The India Government could perhaps have taken a forward step. The largest single country that got its freedom after the last war was called upon to outline new concepts of nationality and citizenship and was faced with a position in which men and women have more rights or less according to birth or colour or religion or language, but what it did was to incorporate a concept of citizenship which is prevalent in Europe and America. Asians are naturally indignant at the vast continent of Australia to the east or Africa to the west. Fantastic notions of citizenship prevail in Asia as well, like in Ceylon. Ceylonese of Indian ancestry cannot even travel between India and Ceylon because, if they did so without a government permit which they can rarely obtain, they would not be able to return to Ceylon and to their work and earnings. If the people of India and the peoples of

Asia, went to give mankind a new concept of world citizenship, they should realise that it does not matter where a person was born or who his parents were, or whether he is indigent, he has an equal right with every one else to live and work and vote and die where he pleases. If some Asian government were to present this concept in utter simplicity, that would be a challenge to the whole world. Asian governments and political parties are inclined to borrow concepts from Europe and America, with the result that nothing new or significant happens. A conscious blinding of the government and the individual and political groups in Asia to colour, religion, language and birth as basis of citizenship must take place. All the world and in particular Asia is anxiously waiting for some state to assert the simple faith that citizenship shall be human.

By a process of elimination, socialism is the only force that can combat separatist policies in Asia. Even otherwise, its doctrines do not lend themselves to the use of disruptive tactics or the pursuit of non-embarrassment. Socialism, unlike communism, is in no unholy hurry so as to throw overboard all scruples about the means used nor is it sure that ultimate victory would wash away the evil effects of all the deceit and disruption practised in the battle. At the same time, it has, unlike capitalism, no vested interests to maintain and, therefore, no need to encourage separatist bigotry and it is sufficiently aware of the international ramifications of separatism so as to avoid the imbecility of non-embarrassment.. Among the most encouraging developments of recent years is the growth of socialist forces in West Asia, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. If the ten thousand strong and peaceful peasant demonstration in Damascus is not a mere flash and is followed up by purposive activity for the abolition of landlordism, Arabia may cease to be an inspiration for separatist politics of any kind. It is indeed an Asian tragedy that such creative news are very gingerly publicised, while riots or speeches of an old order are headlined. Socialism alone possesses the vigour and the integrity to combat separatist bigotry on the internal as well as the inter-Asian planes.

How do these three ideologies react to the other Asian malady of terrorism? Instead of emphasising the evil character of communist and communalist thinking and practice, the question should be answered why Asian soil provides such a fertile ground for the practice of violence and terror. A mere condemnation of murder and insurrection is a moral exhortation, and more important is the question as to what is lacking in socialist action which enables communists or communalists to carry out politics of assassination and terrorism. Asian masses are inclined to be either constitutional or violent. They do not think of a third course of action, with the possible exception of India, where there is still the tradition of Satyagraha. If Asian religious and communist parties have strayed into violence and terrorism, a share of the blame lies also on other Asian parties and masses, and on socialist parties in particular, for they have not the patience of the right type which ever struggles and never compromises with evil forces but have another type of patience which is lethargic and indolent and which does not protest against poverty and injustice. Socialists of Asia have to learn that if they wait endlessly for their peaceful resistance to injustice, somebody else will come on the stage and take over the management of affairs.

Asia does not have endless time at its disposal. To rely exclusively on constitutional action and not to combat injustice as it takes place from day to day is to play into the hands of religious and communist reactionaries. At least as long as Asia is a victim of great poverty and capitalist governments that rule with terror, democrats and socialists of Asia must practise the weapon of civil disobedience against evil and injustice. Undoubtedly, there can be no socialism without class struggle. The question arises with regard to the methods in the pursuit of class struggle. Unless socialist Asia practises civil disobedience against injustice, unless it practises class struggle without violence, it will not be possible to quench the fires of hate and bitterness.

A well-meaning doctrine has recently emerged in India. It takes its inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi and calls itself Sarvodaya. But, while it has imbibed one of Mahatma Gandhi's

principles, the principle of love, it seems to neglect the other equally powerful, the principle of anger. While communism is hate, Sarvodaya is love and both are woefully inadequate. Mankind has suffered many revolutions of hate that degenerated and awaited as many revolutions of love that never came to birth. That revolution which comes on the wings of sympathy and anger may well mark the first real beginning. If socialism in Asia can learn to combine the two elements, sympathy for all and anger against injustice, it may provide the only democratic answer to armed politics and terroristic government in Asia and also help achieve in the world a revolution based on the twin principles of sympathy and anger.

Even if there were no other maladies except these two of separatist and terrorist politics, they would have required the coming together of Asia. An effort was made. An Asian conference met in Delhi in all glory and splendour, but it ended up in smoke and, inspite of continuation committees and a solemn resolve to meet again, nothing more has been heard of it. While censure attaches to the immature originators of the idea, a more enduring fault is to be found in imagining a false Asian unity. There are three Asias, the Asia of status-quo and capitalism, the Asia of chaos and communism and the Asia of peaceful change and socialism and any attempt to bring them together for general all-Asian purposes is foolhardy. Their attitudes will differ and nothing concrete can come out of it. History seems to have placed all the burden on socialist and democratic forces in Asia.

The capacity of capitalism or communism to achieve the economic reconstruction of Asia may now be studied. Asia needs more tools and machines, new industries and occupations; it needs to cultivate new lands and make the old yield more. But any scheme of rapid industrialisation or agricultural reconstruction must take account of decisive factors of Asian economy, teeming millions and poor equipment. Asia's density of population varies from 300 persons per square mile of India to Java's 600 persons, while its productive equipment averages at Rs. 150 per person. To provide Asia with a rational economic existence, this huge

density together with a totally inadequate capital equipment must be faced. Industrialisation in all its history has never had to face this problem of a high density of population coupled with an absurdly low equipment. These two factors taken together make it impossible for any scheme of industrialisation on the Ford or the Stalin basis to succeed. Both of them will break their heads against this wall of such density and low productive equipment.

An agricultural worker in the U.S. works around 70 acres of land. Under collectivist agriculture of Russia, this average works around 30 acres. There is no sense in applying traditionally known science to agriculture or mechanising it unless the area worked per person reaches a respectable size. An agricultural worker in India works around  $1\frac{1}{2}$  acres of land today. Any scheme to rationalise Indian agriculture, whether of the capitalist or the communist variety, must provide at least six to ten acres of land to every agricultural worker. Immediately, 30 to 40 million agricultural workers will go out of work; that would mean about 80 to 100 million agricultural workers and their dependents who would be unemployed. If capitalism or communism tried to rationalise Indian agriculture, where would they go? They would have to be starved out or killed outright. This new economic situation has made both capitalism and communism equally irrelevant to human civilisation. Votaries of Mr. Ford and of Mr. Stalin may yet wage grim wars but the solution of man's misery lies elsewhere. It is in decentralised socialism with all its appropriate forms of small machine, cooperative labour, village government and so forth. After all, Japan averages at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  acres per agricultural worker. If the socialist programme of redivision were carried out, India, for instance, would have no landless labour and the minimum held by an agriculturist family would start around three acres.

Some Asian economists will try to answer in a haphazard way. They will tear up parts of the argument and give stray answers. They will say that Belgium too has a high density of population but they will forget that Belgium has got a high productive equipment. Few countries in the world with the exception

of Japan started this industrialisation with a density of population higher than about 70 or 80 per sq. mile. 100 persons per sq. mile has been the maximum with which any country trying to industrialise itself has started, and, even Japan, with all its austerity and militarism and early imperialism, had 160 persons to the sq. mile when it started on its industrial revolution. The essential point is, how many machines and tools are to be given to each man to produce wealth with either in agriculture or in industry? In Europe and America, they give tools and machines worth 1000 or 2000 dollars, somewhere between 5000 and 10000 rupees. Today, Asia has machines and tools worth about Rs. 150/- per man with which to produce wealth. To get out of this troublesome situation is not possible through American or Russian technology but through a new technology altogether and that neither capitalism nor communism is trying to think out. It is only the Asian socialist who has tried to provide a conceptual answer in the shape of the small machine and small tool run by electric power or Diesel oil. I do not believe that the spinning wheel, for instance, can be a solution to Asia's poverty but the spinning wheel run by electricity, like the cottage power-loom invented by Japan, can be.

Some economists might facetiously suggest that planning, whether capitalist or communist, will be spread over a number of years and all these fearsome calculations will be proved wrong. They forget, however, that accepted rationalisation, no matter over how long a period it might be spread out, must proceed at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- worth of tools per worker. This can give rational employment to a very small section of the population in the first ten or twenty years' of planning. The rest of the population is kept out of the rationalised apparatus so that insurmountable tension, rebellion, terrorism and repression are the inevitable result. The choice for Asia's planners is not between private capital and social capital; the task of equipping Asia's economy is so gigantic that the pygmy of private capital cannot undertake it. The choice is between lifting up a region or an industry to acknowledged rational levels while keeping the rest.

of the economy depressed and an all-round, although slower, lifting up of the whole economy with all its occupations and regions. This is not to say that concentrated capital and large-scale industry is entirely ruled out. There must be, for instance, steel works or river-training projects. But the accent should rest on the other type. A main reason why current Indian planning, for instance, must fail is that, in addition to being capitalist, it shows no awareness of the Asian scene and places its accent on concentrated capital.

Some persons are so content with paper transactions regarding property that they are unable to distinguish between the socialists' redivision of land and nationalisation of industry and the communists'. Whether this redivision and nationalisation takes place within the frame-work of political and technological decentralisation, of the four-pillar state and the small machine, is a crucial issue that will decide not alone the quality of freedom but also the quality of bread. Let no Asian mouth the usual western claptrap about communism. Atlantic democrats, not worried too much about problems of bread and sharing its economic basis, have attacked communism for its cultural degeneration. Their influence over Asian opinion is yet so strong that it has led to a widespread belief in Asia, even among critics of communism, that, while it may suppress freedom, it provides bread. This is a dangerous belief and so ignorant and untrue. The sinners who publicise the dichotomy between freedom and bread do not realise that Asia may be willing to purchase imagined bread by paying for it in freedom. Furthermore, how can Asia ever obtain bread through communist planning, which can only operate in a lower density of population or a higher productive equipment. Communism can provide as little bread as it provides freedom. Bread and freedom are inseparables in Asia.

A guess is sometimes made that communism will adapt itself to Asian conditions and will learn to operate in the context of political and technological decentralization. When that happens, it will change into socialism. Until then, nothing can be more absurd than to assist a doctrine of centralisation, with its inevi-

table accompaniments of murder, famine, terror, deceit and war preparations, in the fond hope that it will decentralise itself. Let it first do so.

A common fallacy of the market-place in Asia is to distinguish between reactionary and progressive, between right and left along fancy French lines. If socialism and communism should be called relations because of their common opposition to capitalism, why then, capitalism and communism are better relations because of their common opposition to feudalism. Just as communism at one time fought feudalism as well as capitalism and went beyond them both, socialism to-day fights capitalism as well as communism and goes beyond them both. Illiterate Asian politicians have done no little amount of damage by talking of socialists and communists in the same fair or foul breath. They have got so mixed up in their facts on religious and terroristic politics and on Asian economy that they are unable to distinguish between progress and reaction.

Socialism is undoubtedly a growing doctrine and, if Asia were to accept all which goes by that name in Europe as socialism, sterility will inevitably result. While the democratic, egalitarian and distributive impulses and achievements of European socialism must always evoke the admiration of Asian socialists and make them comrades in a common struggle, Asian socialism must be drastic instead of being gradual, and unconstitutional, though peaceful, whenever necessary.. It will also have to emphasise production.

Socialism in Asia, and perhaps all the world over, must increasingly become the doctrine of maximum attainable equality through redivision of land and social ownership over industry. Its political structure must arise out of the decentralised state and it must seek its technological framework in the small machine. Such a socialism would incline men to seek a decent standard of living instead of enslaving themselves to a desire for an ever-increasing standard of living. They will then be able to attempt a civilisation of peace within and action without. The odds

against such a socialism are heavy. There is an almost irresistible tendency to concentration in the modern world. But the odds against man ever being happy are also heavy. Just one economic factor is decisive and encouraging. Asia cannot even obtain its bread except through such a socialism. The only progressives in Asia, therefore, are the socialists and some sections of democrats which have not yet been deceived into fellowship with either the religious or the communist parties.

Progressive Asia must take note of the fact that Asia's role in world affairs has hitherto been negligible, when not that of a lap-dog to the Atlantic or the Soviet camp, and seek to find out the reason for it. Asia has lived far too much from hand to mouth and without any integrating policies. At its best, the newly won Asian independence amounts to the right to say "Yes" or "No" to Mr. Truman and Mr. Stalin. The time is come when Asian countries should take the initiative in speech and action so that America and Russia are sometimes called upon to say "Yes" or "No". That would be true independence and creation of a new constructive force in international affairs.

All Asia is faced with a variety of tensions that may lead or have already led to war and an all-Asian foreign policy must be formulated with regard to each type of these tensions:—(1) the type of tension where the combatants are a direct reflection of the Atlantic or Soviet camps and have already begun waging war and, where no third creative forces are present, as represented by Korea and Indo-China. Abstention is the only course open in such a situation. Possibilities of conciliating or creating a third force should not be neglected.

(2) Tension where the combatants are native or are only partially under the control of the Atlantic and Soviet camps, and where democratic and socialist beginnings have been made, as represented by the conflict between India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab World, and Peking China and Kuomintang Formosa. Aside from the basic policy to eradicate religious and terroristic

politics, the immediate remedy is to recognise existing frontiers and to attempt confederative agreements.

(3) The tension where an Asian people and government are being sucked into the orbit of one or the other camp is represented by Japan. All Asia has been guilty of wasting five post-war years without wanting to formulate a Japan policy and is even to-day engaged in formalistic debates regarding the San Francisco Conference and also who should sign the peace treaty. Interest in forms and procedure to the neglect of positive initiatives is suicidal. Japan belongs to the group of danger spots comprising of countries defeated in the last war and all Asia must put forward a policy of guaranteed neutrality in respect of Japan.

(4) Tensions that flow out of foreign interests still existing in Asia are shown as in the case of Iranian oil or Portuguese Goa. All Asia must associate itself with the native against the foreigner, but take good care to see that the native does not fall from the frying pan of the Atlantic into the fire of the Soviet camp or *vice versa*.

(5) Tensions that arise out of the weakness in body and mind of Asian areas unattached to either camp are latent throughout the belt that stretches from Indonesia to Egypt. Aside from joint efforts towards reconstruction in ideology and economy, the policy of mutual assistance pacts must be worked out. This area must give itself joint ideological, economic and military security. Without internal economic reconstruction, no Asian country can become a fit instrument for such an all-Asian foreign policy.

This five-fold Asian policy of abstention, confederative approaches, neutralisation, expulsion of imperialist interests and mutual assistance pacts, to suit the various types of Asian disorders, is a peace policy as well as a freedom policy and may be tested on the recentmost tension represented by Japan and its peace treaty. Japan was defeated in the war; it was occupied by the Americans who ruled it for six years and more. America then came forward with a treaty. That treaty ends the American occupation over Japan but enables the Americans to hold some

bases in Japan. That treaty results in the rearmament of Japan. This is the whole process. But Asian governments for whom this problem of Japan existed for six years said and did nothing. India should have said something about this problem, but she had just no policy. But when President Truman came along with some policy of his own making and a policy which conforms with the Atlantic way of thinking, the Indian Government came forward with a 'no'. Upto now Asian governments have contented themselves with trying to agree or disagree with policies presented either by the Americans or the Russians. That is not an independent policy; that is not creating a new force. Let Asia dispense with this luxury of agreeing or disagreeing; let it try to create some new force so that it may at one time or another have the benefit of finding out whether Mr. Truman or Mr. Stalin agrees or disagrees with it. Four years were wasted. Even to this day, Asian peoples are sought to be divided on a formalistic issue of whether they should have attended the San Francisco Conference. The real issues of momentous importance are kept away. Again, the India Government is trying to weaken the mind of Asia by presenting another issue that all Asian countries must come together and agree on a common policy to be pursued towards Japan. To some extent it is a worth-while idea, but an exclusive emphasis on formalistic and procedural issues without a positive debate on policies is mischievous. What would be a worth-while and independent policy towards Japan is the real question.

Asian governments should have asked for complete independence of Japan the moment they got their freedom. India Government could have at least unilaterally declared peace with Japan on 16th August 1947. They had neither the ancient wisdom nor Europe's intelligence to declare a state of peace unilaterally with Japan, Germany and Austria and, on the basis of a very high and noble principle, to declare that a new world could not be created with victors and vanquished. India could have declared peace with every people in the world on 16th August 1947, but the government ignored all counsels and permitted British-

enforced declarations of war to continue. Even four years ago, India should have told the world the policy that should be pursued towards the defeated countries of Germany, Japan and Austria.. These countries have now become the cockpits of another war and dangerous to the peace of the world. The attempt to neutralise this group of danger spots could have been made four years ago.

One of the main reasons why the movement for non-violence and pacifism has made no effective headway outside of India is its divorce from general politics. Mahatma Gandhi put meaning into non-violence only because he linked it up with the people's desire for freedom and turned it into a fighting weapon. The movement for peace throughout the world will, therefore have to pass two tests; (1) that it is fully aware of the need to preserve freedom and the way to do this; (2) that it has the courage and the methods to pass over into action whenever necessary. In Asia, it will additionally have to connect itself with the urges for economic progress. A peace policy in Asia will at the same time have to be a freedom policy as well as a renovation policy.

Although too late, these considerations must be borne in mind while formulating a peace and freedom policy for Japan. Japan like Germany and Austria belongs to that group of danger spots in the world which comprises of the nations defeated in the last war. A meaningful peace policy for this group must base itself on certain postulates; (1) complete independence and sovereignty of the peoples concerned; (2) recognition of their neutrality by the Atlantic as well as the Soviet camp and consequently their armed forces to be kept at a reasonable minimum; (3) the non-recognition of their neutrality by either camp to result in their right to keep armed forces at whatever level they like; (4) in the event that their neutrality is violated after recognition, such violator to be treated as enemy of the world and a corresponding resistance by the armed forces of the world to follow.

Such a policy is in keeping with the declared intentions of both the camps. The neutralising of this group of danger spots effectively stems expansion of whatever type. This policy fulfils

either condition that it must be reasonable and also that it must appear to be acceptable to both the camps. The present opposition to rearmament, whether in Japan or in Germany, is either vaguely idealistic or narrowly national. When vaguely idealistic, it will not be able to divert the main flow of national politics and, when narrowly national, it will disappear as soon as certain conditions are fulfilled.

Opposition to rearmament can prove effective only when it is made part of a general policy to secure national freedom and world peace. The world being what it is, there must be an opportunity to rearm when there is no reasonable guarantee of national freedom. Should such a guarantee be, however, forthcoming, it will not only release forces of peace inside the group of defeated countries but also encourage a diversion of activity throughout the world.

The peace movement might well seek to approach both the camps with the postulates of this peace policy. Should the Atlantic camp accept and the Soviet reject them, there is no other way for Japan except a military understanding with the U.S. Should the Soviets accept and the Americans reject them, the people of Japan may well have an opportunity to practise satyagraha or peaceful resistance against the foreign occupation of Japanese bases and areas.

I have been asked by some Japanese if India could not voluntarily abolish her army and accept a Constitution on the lines of the Japanese. In the first place, I do not know how far the Japanese Constitution will not prove to be a pious wish destined to be ignored at the first attack of reality. Secondly, a meaningful and political abolition of armies can take place only in such areas whose neutrality is universally recognised and the group of people defeated in the last war is the best for such purpose. We should be only too willing to consider abolition of armies in any other territories including India if their independence and neutrality were universally guaranteed.

In respect of recognition of existing frontiers and attempts at confederative approaches, this comprehensive Asian policy will have to overcome many prejudices born of native ignorance and foreign intrigue. To the Arab may appear galling the idea of having to confer with the Israeli, the Peking Chinese may hate having to sit at the same table with the Formosa Chinese ; but both would find it reasonable for India and Pakistan to get together. Asians must learn greater introspection. Instead of bemoaning any situations that have come to exist through their own weakness or imperialist chicanery, they would do well to seek control over them. Instead of dancing any further to imperialist tunes or native intrigues, they should pursue policies that direct situations away from the unpleasant to the pleasant.

The Prime Minister of India had in a genial moment suggested United Nations membership both for Peking and for Formosa China. He did not ever repeat his suggestion. A momentary outburst was either suppressed or Peking rapped India on the knuckles. It is precisely in such situations that non-official organisations make foreign policy. A government and a politician in power may often find it embarrassing to say or do that which is good ; political parties, particularly those not in office, are not similarly encumbered. Among the unpardonable sins of Asian politicians is their effort to strangulate political parties including their own and to turn foreign policy into a closed preserve of their foreign offices.

The India government has drawn both praise and abuse for its China policy. In some of its aspects, this policy has been very clever and perhaps also inspired by commendable motives. There seems to have been some desire for peace in Asia and good-neighbourliness with China and what Asian would not want to have warm relations with the people of China. The desire to help communist China assert its independence from communist Russia may also have been there and, in the alternative, to manoeuvre for righteous positions and to prove China in the wrong when the break with her came. At the same time, there has been a great deal of bad timing and keeping quiet over misdeeds

and misinformation or total suppression of news and views. The India government pursued for a long time a China policy whose inevitable result was the strengthening of communist parties in India and elsewhere in Asia. This was an unintelligent thing to do. When an Englishman praises a foreign system, he runs no risk that his people would imitate it for they are self-assured. Asian peoples do not yet possess that self-assurance. Praise must therefore be very truthful and very objective, if it is not to lead to imitation of evil ways.

Non-communist Asia is victim to yet another tendency to look up to left-wing socialists in Europe. They are indeed among the best comrades in Europe of Asian progressives. But they have their own local battles to wage, a feverish desire to ease European tensions by Asian compromises, a struggle with America and with rearmament. Asians must now think on their own. They have some contribution to make not alone for Asian progress but also for world peace, for Asia's load of evil in the past four centuries is not as heavy as that of Europe. This is not a plea of Asia for Asians nor even the usual illiterate complaint that Europe or America does not understand the Asian mind. This is an attempt to recover the vigour of the Asian mind as an expression of the world mind. Only to the extent that the Asian mind expresses the dreams and hopes of the world as a whole is it of value. The rest is tinsel.

An Asian policy must inevitably face conflicts that take place in other continents. Apart from relieving tensions to the extent it can, it must assist in the achievement of a world conscience and a world parliament, equality among nations, a world development authority and in all endeavours to approximate the human race. At the same time, the attempt to relieve short-run tensions without seeking to remedy the basic disorder in Asia must inevitably fail. Slavery and poverty represent the basic disorder of Asia, Africa, South America, in fact, of two-thirds of the world. The crisis of foreign policy is a part reflection of the crisis in modern civilisation. Feudal, capitalist and imperialist systems, dynastic power and communist ambitions clog Asia's path. They must be combatted and overthrown through peaceful struggles,

constructive work and the vote. Asia must renovate itself. Without internal change, the best of foreign policies in any Asian country condemns itself to futility.

Asia's lack of policy has already wrought painful havoc. The relationship between India and Indonesia is an illustration. Nothing warmer was conceivable. And yet, the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia is today the most powerful person in that country on the governmental plane same as the Pakistan ambassador is the most powerful foreigner on the people's plane. Part of this deterioration is due to causes over which India has no control. But an equally large part is ascribable to lack of a positive Asian policy. If progressive Asians leave vacuums all around them, native and foreign reactionaries will fill them up. In fact, the ruling progressive in Asia is only a name and is actually a reactionary; he does not act, he only reacts.

The dominant impulse in international relationships of the modern world is conformist and foreign policies of the great powers at least stem from that impulse. Conformism is the wish to achieve a single uniform policy all over the world. It seems to be a dominant characteristic of politics and more so of foreign politics. Russians are conformists. Americans are conformists. More than communism, more than capitalism, this disease of conformism is disabling the world. The Atlantic camp wants the whole world to conform to its foreign policy. So does the Soviet world. These two monstrous structures of the Atlantic and the Soviet camps have been unable to produce a world apart from the one that exists to-day, a world of evil and poverty and war and destruction. Either accuses the other, but with the accusations mounts also the misery. The politics of socialism with a new internal and external outlook, although it might also want to introduce conformism in world politics, should be given a chance so that at least it may take the world away from its present moorings and set it on a different course.

Whatever truth may be in the abstract, it is hard and cruel in normal practice. Politics deals with truth and power; it is the attempt to change the world along lines of truth with such power as one may command. But truth appears differently and, although

the Atlantic and the Soviet camps are increasingly promiscuous in their use of concepts such as democracy, human rights, economic equality, cultural freedom and people's security, they embody palpably opposed images of truth. In their effort to spread the truth as they see it or to save it from the evil encroachment of others, they want the world to conform. Conformism, like puritanism, is cruelty and leads to war. Social philosophers may well argue whether there is a single truth or, if there is one, whether the western or the Soviet democracies have got hold of it. If the test be practical achievement, the rewards of these two truths are poverty and war and a woodening of the mind. In all human history, the battle of ideas had never so degenerated as today. Ideas no longer explore, they only postulate; the great function of ideas is limited to massing of power; idea serves force instead of force serving idea. The advent of yet another body of truth into this situation will at least cause a loosening and a general fermentation of ideas. I hope that socialism, even in its great day, shall not acquire the conformist mind of the two titanic combatants of today. Conformism is indeed a bundle of two sets of desires; the desire to check and cure evil and the desire to impose the truth as one sees it upon others. The line is hard to draw, but any well-motivated foreign policy must learn to do so.

Votaries of the theory of coexistence in foreign policy profess to draw such a line and to combat the cruelty of conformism. The advocates of coexistence maintain that the capitalist and the communist systems can exist alongside of each other, that the Atlantic and the Soviet systems can coexist in peace. It need hardly be added that no great power allows its foreign policy to flow out of such a belief. Soviet and Atlantic statesmen are now and then heard to advocate coexistence. That seems to be more an item in the propaganda war than a genuinely held belief. There may be some attenuated liberals who genuinely believe in coexistence. But, by and large, Atlantic and Soviet statesmen press the theory of coexistence into their service either as a rhetorical cover for their war-drives or to buy respite when the tensions of the cold war become unbearable and the disproportion in armed strength looks dangerous. Everyone knows that coexist-

ence by itself is an impossibility, because as long as two mutually contradictory systems exist, they are suspicious of each other and hostile, each tries to increase its armed resources more than the other and, apart from intervals of peace, they are together a menace to world peace. That is the lesson of history, of another attempt at coexistence in recent centuries. Protestants and Catholics were endlessly exhorted to coexist but they continued to war. Only when the third system of the industrial and secular state rose right before their eyes, did they acquire a new frame of reference and sense an authority to whom they bowed in moral awe and material fear. A third new system and integration must begin to gather strength before two war-like camps can learn to coexist.

India must specially guard against too naive a belief in co-existence. Her genius is tolerance. But the history of tolerance in India is as rich in disasters as it is rich in victories. There is a tolerance of the hard way and another of the soft kind. There has been no dearth of soft, namby-pamby ninny-goats at many points of Indian history, to whom toleration dictated weakness and surrender, an abdication of the truth, a vain belief that moral phrases could make do for hard acts, a purposeless existence tossed about by mighty waves. A documented history of Indian tolerance would be fascinating both as a philosophy and as a story. Once again, the glib and facile talk of coexistence is not infrequent.

Neither conformism, nor coexistence, but beyond them both, is an attitude of mind that takes from conformism its desire to check and cure evil and from coexistence its desire not to impose the truth as one sees it upon others. This attitude is perfectly aware that, without a third new system of growing authority, no two war-like systems ever learnt to live in peace. When such a new system arises to give hope to tortured mankind, the spell of the other two systems over their own votaries and peoples is somewhat broken and they sneak a look or two of curiosity or affection at the new creation. This moral appeal of the new system is in time aided by considerable economic and armed power. The two current and war-like rulers of mankind learn respect. They become ready to check and remove their own

excesses and a process of approximation starts between them. The once incompatible titans of their era learn to approximate to the new creation and to one another. The present crisis of foreign policy is so obviously a crisis of the general human situation that nothing short of the effort to create a new civilisation can overcome it. Meanwhile, creators of this new civilisation will be actuated by the impulse to coexistence with approximation in their foreign policy.

This impulse to coexistence with approximation will increasingly evoke response throughout the world. Undoubtedly, the dominant trend is away from it. Dominated by the conformist impulse, the Atlantic as well as the Soviet camp seeks, to use a candid phrase of Mr. Acheson, situations of strength. The U.S. seeks situations of strength in Japan, China in Tibet, the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe, the Atlantic camp generally in all the world not yet subject to Soviet control and the Soviet camp in such areas as are contiguous to it. The impulse of coexistence with approximation would oppose to this policy of situations of strength the policy of guaranteed neutralisation wherever possible. The Asian policy outlined earlier has included such an item in respect of Japan. This policy of guaranteed neutralisation need not be restricted to Asia; it should be applied to all areas in the world as are objectively ready for it. The group of countries defeated in the last war are subject today to the pressures of a policy of situations of strength. They and all the peoples of the world would instinctively prefer a policy of neutralisation.

There is a snag in this policy of guaranteed neutrality. The warmest and most numerous advocates of such a policy would be found in areas of comparative armed inferiority. That opens up the still bigger question of whether the new civilisation of decentralised socialism can ever aspire to an equality in arms with the two titans. I can only hazard the guess that the character of defence would undergo a sea-change in a decentralised and socialist society and might indeed be superior to the present arts and skills of warfare. But that can be no basis for policy-making, although an adequate ground for hope. A point of some significance is the hope and yearning that a policy of guaranteed

neutrality arouses in the breasts of large masses in Europe as in Asia, who are today forced to belong to the Atlantic and the Soviet camps. There was a time when U.S. democracy was virile and experimenting enough to request its President to enter into negotiations with foreign powers "for achieving a permanent neutralisation of the Philippines". These are the words of the Independence of the Philippines Act passed by the U.S. Congress. The impulse of coexistence with approximation must at least be virile and experimenting. If this principle of coexistence with approximation were worked out in India and Pakistan, China and Formosa, it would be best to recognise the existence of native forces and their existing frontiers and to act in such a fashion that confederating tendencies may be released, that approximation may be achieved and that, at some stage, free and democratic ideas may bring together peoples and countries that have been artificially sundered, that the wound in the body of many Asian countries may be healed. In fact, the human race may learn to live in peace and freedom.

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